Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ADDISABABA732
2009-03-30 08:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

USAU: AFRICA COMMAND DEPUTY MEETS ETHIOPIAN PRIME

Tags:  PGOV PREL AU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3456
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #0732/01 0890807
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 300807Z MAR 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4241
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7781
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000732 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AF/SPG, AF/S, AF/W AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU
SUBJECT: USAU: AFRICA COMMAND DEPUTY MEETS ETHIOPIAN PRIME
MINISTER

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000732

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AF/SPG, AF/S, AF/W AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU
SUBJECT: USAU: AFRICA COMMAND DEPUTY MEETS ETHIOPIAN PRIME
MINISTER

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Mary Yates, Deputy to the
Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) at Africa
Command, met on March 25 with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.
Their discussions covered a range of security issues
including Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea, as well as the
command's fledgling military relationship with Libya. Yates
was accompanied by Ambassador Yamamoto and the RDML Kurta,
Commander of CJTF-HOA. End Summary.


2. (C) Following an exchange of pleasantries, DCMA Yates
thanked Prime Minister Meles for Ethiopia's support to US
Africa Command and its partnership in the war on terror. She
stated that the command is maturing, but that it remains
committed to listening and learning from its African
partners. Meles responded with accolades for US military
cooperation in general, noting specifically that relations
with Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
are excellent. DCMA Yates informed Meles that policy reviews
within the new Administration are under way. Meles responded
that he assumes USG policy vis-a-vis Ethiopia will remain
unchanged.

Somalia: A Tale of Two Regions
--------------


3. (C) Meles then embarked on a tour d'horizon of Africa's
horn, beginning with the "key challenge" of Somalia. He
explained to DCMA Yates that when assessing the current
situation it is helpful to divide Somalia in half. The
northern half is largely stable and development is ongoing.
Puntland has an "open-minded leadership," and the "older
generation of leaders is out of circulation." The new
leadership is eager to stabilize, but its main challenge is
piracy which threatens to negatively effect the political
balance of power in Puntland. Meles reported that the
Puntland government seeks to partner with others in the
region to address piracy. (Note: Per Meles, Puntlanders
generally appreciate international counter-piracy efforts,
but remain skeptical of some Asian navies who may be more
focused on the protection of illegal fishing, which was
essentially the root cause of Puntland's piracy challenge.
Meles reported that Puntland would like to see more balance

in naval operations, with coalition partners addressing
illegal fishing as well as piracy.)


4. (C) Meles characterized Somaliland as generally stable for
over a decade. He noted that while upcoming elections may
cause tension, they probably would not destabilize
Somaliland. The Prime Minister claimed that the Somaliland
government is "scaling back its expectations" for
international recognition, and is now seeking status as a
civil administration authority vice an independent state.


5. (C) Meles described the situation in southern Somalia as
"mixed." Baidoa is now less stable, with al-Shabaab in
control of towns in this area. He reported that the "middle
Somalia group" and some Baidoa clans are fighting Shabaab in
this region, but with limited effectiveness. Mogadishu is
less stable than Ethiopia would like. He also said that he
was worried by the new government's overtures to some
Islamist elements, saying that it "is not making as clear a
distinction as we'd like."


6. (C) The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is likely to
experience increased "polarization," Meles predicted. The
big threat to the TFG is not ideological, but rather
financial. Some of the warlords in Sheikh Sharif's
government are trying to recover airports and sea ports. Per
Meles, Sharif has no prospect of imposing central control
over Somaliland and Puntland, but if he can maintain the
cohesion of his clan in Mogadishu then the best case scenario
is that Sharif will confine al-Shabaab to the southern
fringes of Somalia.


7. (C) Meles opined that central governance will eschew
Somalia for at least the next decade or two, suggesting that
the international community must learn to deal with the de
facto states within Somalia. "There is lots of room for
pragmatism here," said Meles. Failure to acknowledge the de
facto divisions puts the stable parts of Somalia at risk.

ADDIS ABAB 00000732 002 OF 003


Somaliland in not sovereign but it is a self-administrating
region and should be able to engage in business. The Prime
Minister noted the challenges to development and stability in
this region if foreign investors are unable to get insurance.
Meles argued that Somaliland deserves some credit for 18
years of stability, for its efforts in fighting terrorism,
and for the fact that it has avoided the piracy problem that
is plaguing the rest of Somalia.


8. (C) On the extremists in Mogadishu, Meles estimated that
there are no more than a few hundred "hard core Shabaabs,"
but warned that he has indications that foreign fighters are
beginning to take leadership positions within the group.
Meles believes that Osama bin Laden's recent declaration
encourages the extremist elements within al-Shabaab.


9. (C) The African Union's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) "has
held on better than we feared," said Meles. He stated that
while the peacekeepers had not been challenged like the
Ethiopians anticipated, AMISOM might need to be reinforced at
some point. Meles noted that al-Shabaab is currently focused
on fighting clansmen in Somalia's middle belt, but may
eventually reorganize and shift its effort to AMISOM.

Somber on Sudan
--------------


10. (C) Shifting gears, Meles painted a pessimistic picture
of Sudan. He characterized the 2009 elections as a
"sideshow" and "irrelevant," and said that all sides are
preparing for the referendum on secession in 2011. Meles
said the 2009 elections were to have "cemented marginalized
areas of Sudan, but this vision died even before Garang."
The elections are now redundant and the focus of the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement is no longer on rebuilding
Sudan, but rather on the establishment of an independent
South Sudan. In West-Central Sudan, the defining issue is the
arrest warrant of President Bashir by the International
Criminal Court (ICC).


11. (C) Given current trends, and absent a major transforming
event, Meles predicted "generalized conflict" in Sudan.
Khartoum is preparing to rekindle tribal conflict in the
south using the southern militia. Oil revenues will fuel the
fighting. Darfur will not be resolved by 2011, and therefore
the North-South conflict will find its way to Western Sudan
and may eventually engulf the entire country. Evoking
memories of the Mahdi, Meles suggested that Sudan may
eventually be worse than Somalia.

On Eritrea
--------------


12. (C) Meles stated that the Sudan-Eritrea relationship has
changed over the past three years. Initially, it was Prime
Minister Isaias "blackmailing" Bashir, but Eritrea is now
much more dependent on Khartoum. Meles claimed that Bashir
is "feeding Eritrea's army" and transmitted reports of
famine, desertion, and population displacement from the
highlands. Meles admitted his sources might be prone to
exaggeration, but said that only the scope of these problems
remain in question. Eritrea, Meles warned, may catch us by
surprise.


13. (C) When queried about Bashir's recent visit to Eritrea,
Meles stated that it was a matter of Isaias trying to show
Bashir that he was the most strident in defying the ICC, and
Bashir being generous in response. Meles suggested that
Bashir miscalculated in his first foreign travel since the
ICC warrant, and said it would have been wiser for Bashir to
travel to Cairo first.

The Guide, and AFRICOM's Overtures to Libya
--------------


14. (C) After being informed by DCMA Yates of the Africa
Command's fledgling military cooperation with Libya, Meles
congratulated the command's efforts and indicated that there
was great potential in pursuing this relationship. Meles
said that only the US could have a military relationship with
Libya that would meet Qadhafi's expectations. Working at a
lower level may be more effective, however, given the Guide's

ADDIS ABAB 00000732 003 OF 003


idiosyncrasies.


15. (C) Qadhafi, in Meles' estimation, is no longer a
terrorist or prone to adventurism. His idiosyncrasies
include his belief that Saudi Arabia should be divided into
three states and his penchant to involve himself in all of
Africa's conflicts usually with negative results. That said,
Meles suggested that the USG might be able to help Qadhafi
outgrow his idiosyncrasies.


16. (C) Ambassador Yates has cleared this message.
YAMAMOTO