SOMALIA: TFG AND AMISOM VIEWS OF SECURITY ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000717

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG AND AMISOM VIEWS OF SECURITY ISSUES

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary. Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
Minister of Defense Mohammed Abdi "Gandhi" told the
Ambassador on March 23 that his government was "out-gunned"
by the insurgents and said that the UN arms embargo on the
TFG should be lifted. He said his government was not engaged
in any official discussions with members of the anti-TFG
forces, but said unofficial contacts were occurring between
the insurgents and businessmen, civil society members, and
clan leaders to convince the insurgents to stop their
attacks. Gandhi said he did not understand U.S. vetting
requirements for support to TFG security forces, and he
requested additional information on the subject. In a
separate meeting on March 24, African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) Force Commander Major General Francis Okello
told the Ambassador that the Somalis themselves must take
ownership of the political process or it would not succeed.
Okello said that the Joint Security Force (JSF) had yet to be
established because the Joint Security Committee (JSC) had
made little progress and was taking too long to do its work.
He thought that AMISOM's current mandate was sufficient, but
he made a plea for better armored vehicles, secure
communications, and real-time warning of threats against his
forces. Both Gandhi and Okello were in Addis Ababa for the
March 23 Consultative Meeting of the African Union, Troop
Contributing Countries, and International Partners. End
Summary.

Gandhi: The TFG is Outgunned, Lift the Arms Embargo
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2. (C) TFG Minister of Defense Mohammed Abdi Gandhi told
the Ambassador on March 23 that the insurgents were better
armed, and that the UN arms embargo was restricting the TFG's
ability to fight. He said the TFG had requested a waiver on
the embargo from the UN through the African Union, but that
he did not know what action, if any, had been taken to
respond to their request. Gandhi also told the Ambassador
that TFG President Sheikh Sharif had decided to allocate any
money the government received, whether from the international
community or from internally generated revenue, for payment
to the TFG's security forces. For the near term, he said,
Sharif had taken a one million USD loan from Somali
businessmen to pay troop salaries for one month. He also
said Sharif had just visited Sudan and Libya to request funds
to pay the security forces.

Gandhi: No Official TFG Dialogue with Insurgents
-------------- --


3. (C) Gandhi said the TFG was not currently engaged in any
official dialogue with the insurgents or with Hassan Dahir
Aweys or Muktar Robow. However, he said, unofficial
discussions were going on between Somali businessmen and the
insurgents, as well as between clan elders, civil society
members, and the insurgents. The various parties were
attempting to convince the insurgents to "choose dialogue"
over violence, but he reiterated that there were no
"official" discussions underway.

Gandhi: Vetting for the JSF an Issue
--------------


4. (C) Gandhi observed that the international community had
many questions but offered little direct assistance,
particularly for the TFG security forces, and he hoped he
would see the much needed assistance "before he died." In
response, Embassy officers explained U.S. vetting
requirements for security assistance, and encouraged Gandhi
to provide the required information in order to facilitate
U.S. support. Gandhi said he did not understand U.S. vetting
requirements and he suggested that in the near future he
might meet with U.S. officials at length to understand
exactly what information the TFG needed to provide, and what
he should expect from the U.S. government. The Ambassador
offered that U.S. officials were available to meet with
Gandhi at any time.

Okello: Somalis Must Take Ownership of Process
-------------- -


5. (C) In a separate meeting on March 24, AMISOM Force
Commander Major General Francis Okello told the Ambassador

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that in his view, the international community was doing its
part to help the TFG, but said it was "up to the Somalis" to
take the initiative and make the process work. He said the
problems originate within the TFG itself, and only the
Somalis can resolve those issues. Okello was particularly
worried about recent public statements by members of the TFG
and others who had come out opposed to any increase in the
number of AMISOM troops. He said the situation was
"worrying" and that while it had not yet boiled over, the
temperature in Mogadishu was rising. He opined that elements
within the TFG were trying to pull the government apart for
their own reasons. (Note: The TFG Foreign Minister's March
20 request to the UNSC for additional AMISOM troops prompted
an outcry against AMISOM by various individuals and groups
within Somalia, some of whom are members of the TFG. TFG
President Sheikh Sharif, however, continues to publicly
support AMISOM. End Note.)

Okello on the Way Forward
--------------


6. (C) The priority should be on supporting the TFG
security forces, Okello insisted. He thought it was too
early to tell whether Sharif would survive, but he observed
that in Somalia one needed "muscle" to push one's views.
Therefore, the international community should support the
TFG first, AMISOM second, he said. He assessed that neither
the international community nor AMISOM could install a
government in Somalia, and neither could they go into the
countryside and fight the insurgents. He said the focus of
the international community should be on the stability of the
TFG, not on timelines for a possible UN mission that will not
be able to defeat al-Shabaab.

Okello: TFG Joint Security Force Not Yet Stood Up
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7. (C) General Okello said the TFG Joint Security Force was
not yet established and was waiting for the Joint Security
Committee to begin its work. He complained that the JSC was
taking far too long to get the process moving. The command
and control system and the organizational structure for the
JSF did not yet exist, Okello said, noting that "there was
yet no framework from within which integration (of TFG and
ARS forces) can occur." He also commented that the ARS
militia commanders were refusing to integrate their forces
because they considered TFG forces too "diluted," and not
proper Muslims. He said that when integration did begin, he
expected the process to take several months at least.


8. (C) Okello noted that both the TFG and ARS had submitted
lists of names of soldiers to AMISOM to be placed into the
JSF when it is established. He said AMISOM was now in the
process of going over the lists of names "one by one" to
verify each individual's information and then issue them an
ID card. Okello said AMISOM had issued approximately 800 ID
cards to date. Okello added that the TFG was paying 3,300
former TFG troops and 3,100 former ARS troops from which the
soldiers for the 2,700 man JSF would be taken.


9. (C) Regarding the TFG and ARS forces now deployed in
Mogadishu, Okello said that command and control was not
vertical, but was "confused." He said while the various
individual units had commanders, who those commanders
reported to was often unclear. When queried whether the
current command and control situation within Mogadishu could
absorb the approximately 580 trained Somali troops now
waiting in Uganda to return to Somalia, Okello replied "no,"
but said AMISOM could take the troops and mentor them until
the TFG was ready to receive them.

Okello: AMISOM's Mandate is Sufficient
--------------


10. (C) AMISOM's current mandate was sufficient, Okello
noted, adding that the mandate and rules of engagement
allowed him to protect his forces and strike at any imminent
threat. He noted that in some respects AMISOM was operating
under more of a Chapter VII mandate, but doing it quietly to
avoid controversy. He said there was no point in giving
AMISOM a more expansive mission that his force would never
have the capacity to fulfill. At present AMISOM was
primarily occupied with protecting its bases and supply lines
to the port and airfield, he added.

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11. (C) Okello thought that a force strength of 6,000
troops for AMISOM was probably enough. He emphasized that
more support for the TFG security forces was desperately
needed so that the TFG could establish its control over
Mogadishu. He asserted that more support for the TFG
security forces was a higher priority than "more AMISOM."
Okello stated that AMISOM could "contain" an assault on the
TFG in Mogadishu as long as AMISOM's supply lines were not
cut. At the same time, the TFG forces should be "between"
AMISOM and the insurgents. Currently, Okello said, in most
cases TFG police were deployed adjacent to AMISOM forces,
although the Burundian troops were more exposed. Regarding
his own future, Okello, who has already served in Somalia for
more than a year, expected he would be replaced by another
Ugandan general in three to five months.


12. (C) Nevertheless, Okello made a plea for better
equipment, particularly armored vehicles, secure
communications, and real-time intelligence of impending
threats against his forces. He said he was deeply concerned
about the increasing level of sophistication in insurgent
attacks, as well as the presence of foreign fighters. (Note:
In the March 23 closed morning session at the AU, Okello told
the assembly that the situation had turned critical, the
foreign fighter pipeline was increasing, the fighters were
obtaining better arms, and that the situation was "beyond
concern" and had become "dangerous." End Note.)

Comment
--------------


13. (C) Gandhi comes from the Somali Diaspora and was most
recently a lecturer in Paris with no apparent military
background. Although he is intelligent and thoughtful, he
lacks a fundamental understanding of defense and military
related issues, and our discussions with him suggest he is
not receiving information regarding the status and
disposition of what are, at least on paper, forces under his
authority. General Okello, on the other hand, has a good
grasp of the situation and is a strategic thinker determined
to make a difference in Somalia, but frustrated by the many
obstacles to progress.


14. (C) Comment continued. Although the JSC appears to be
slow in getting started and much work remains to be done to
stand up the JSF, in our view, U.S. support for the force
will be critical if it is to get off the ground, and give
Sharif's government a chance to succeed. End Comment.
YAMAMOTO