SOMALIA: TFG SECURITY OFFICIALS VISIT ADDIS ABABA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000653

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG SECURITY OFFICIALS VISIT ADDIS ABABA

REF: NAIROBI 479

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (S/NF) Summary. Somalia unity Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) Minister of Internal Security Affairs Omar
Hashi Aden, National Police Chief Abdi Qeybdiid, and General
Mohamed Sheikh Hassan, likely to be the next TFG National
Intelligence Chief, told the Ambassador on March 6 that the
TFG needed financial assistance from Washington as soon as
possible, particularly for the Joint Security Force. The
three officials also said that President Sheikh Sharif's
government was fully committed to the continued deployment of
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping
force. In a separate meeting on March 7, General Mohamed
told PolOff that a council of non-Somali clerics who had
recently visited Mogadishu were pressuring Sharif to adopt a
true cleric-led Islamic state, but that Sharif was doing his
best to resist their pressure. Mohamed said Sharif was using
Qeybdiid and his forces for now because Sharif needed them,
but Sharif planned to replace Qeybdiid as soon as Sharif was
strong enough to stand on his own. Mohamed disclosed that
the three officials met with Ethiopian Military Chief of
Defense (CHOD) General Samora on March 5, and that Samora
promised not to take action against Sharif as long as Sharif
did not support anti-Ethiopian activities within his
government. Finally, Mohamed pleaded again for U.S.
assistance to the TFG's security forces to defeat al-Shabaab
and Hisb Islam. The three Somali officials were in Addis
Ababa at the invitation of the InterGovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) to attend a graduation ceremony for Somali
police cadets who had just completed an IGAD training course.
End Summary.

Hashi: "We need American Support"
--------------


2. (C) Hashi began the meeting by providing a highly
optimistic assessment of conditions within Somalia, but then
noted that it was critical that the international community,
and most importantly the United States, provide resources to
sustain the government. Hashi queried about the USD 5
million he said he had been promised, noting that the money
was long overdue (Reftel). The Ambassador responded that
Washington needed more information from the officials,
including force structure and commander's names, so that the
Joint Security Force could be vetted in accordance with U.S.
requirements. Hashi and Qeybdiid said that providing the
information was not a problem, but Hashi suggested that
Washington talk to the Gulf states about providing funding
that "did not have strings attached." Hashi joked that if he
waited for Washington's vetting, "the commanders will all
have died before they were cleared."

Officials: "We Support AMISOM"
--------------


3. (C) At the Ambassador's urging, the three officials said
that they were in full support of AMISOM, and that they
wanted the force to remain in Somalia. Hashi said that the
reason Sharif was going to visit Burundi and other regional
capitals was to convince those governments that Sharif wanted
AMISOM to continue and to request additional troops. The
Ambassador recommended that TFG officials show more public
support for the peacekeepers inside Somalia to the Somali
population. He emphasized that AMISOM's purpose was to
support the TFG, and that it was in their interest to back
the deployment.

International Clerics Pressuring Sharif
--------------


4. (S/NF) In a separate and somewhat more candid meeting on
March 7, General Mohamed told PolOff that the committee of
non-Somali international clerics who were attempting to
negotiate between the unity TFG and the opposition were also
pressuring Sheikh Sharif to establish what the clerics
considered to be a true Islamic state ruled only by Sharia
law which would replace the TFG. According to Mohamed, the
clerics told Sharif that he should take the following steps.
First, the Islamic Courts should be restored. Second, a
committee of Somali clerics should be established to oversee
the implementation of Sharia law. Third, a committee should

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be established to draft a new charter and constitution that
would comply with Sharia and replace the TFG Charter.
Fourth, the TFG parliament should be dissolved within six
months. Fifth, Sharif should call for an election to approve
the new government. Sixth, AMISOM should be withdrawn from
Somalia as soon as possible.


5. (S/NF) Mohamed said Sharif was attempting to resist this
pressure, but it was a "tug of war," and these were people
Sharif could not simply ignore. Mohamed criticized the
non-Somali international clerics, commenting that "who were
these foreigners to tell us, the Somalis, what to do in our
country?" He said if these clerics wanted to form such an
Islamic state, then they should do so in their own countries
like Qatar, Yemen, and U.A.E." He said Somalia would not be
the "lab rat" for Islamic experiments. He noted that the
Union of Islamic Courts tried that in 2006, and it failed.

Mohamed: "Qeybdiid Useful for Now"
--------------


6. (S/NF) Mohamed, commenting on the previous day's meeting
between the Ambassador, Omar Hashi, and Qeybdiid, said Sharif
needed Qeybdiid's forces for now to counter al-Shabaab and
Hisb Islam in Mogadishu. Mohammed said that during the early
March fighting in Mogadishu, it was Qeybdiid's troops who did
most of the fighting against the opposition. Mohammed said
Sharif instructed his allied ARS and Islamic Courts militias
to stay out of the fight because some of those militias were
already hesitant to fight their former allies in al-Shabaab
and Hisb Islam. Mohamed predicted that Sharif would remove
Qeybdiid when Sharif was strong enough to stand on his own.

Readout of First Meeting with ENDF General Samora
-------------- --------------


7. (S/NF) Mohamed said that he, Hashi, and Qeybdiid met
with Ethiopian CHOD General Samora on March 5 for the first
time, but that the meeting was an uneasy one. He said Samora
took a hard line with them, criticizing them for confiscating
equipment Ethiopia left behind in Mogadishu intended for the
non-ARS wing of the unity TFG. Samora's message to the
Somalis was that Ethiopia would not take action against
Sharif's government as long as Sharif did not tolerate
anti-Ethiopian activities within his government, according to
Mohamed. In response, Hashi told Samora that Sharif wanted
good relations with all his neighbors, and in particular with
Ethiopia, and promised to take no action against Ethiopia,
Mohammed said. (Note: According to TFG Ambassador Abdi Karin
Farah, the Ethiopian government was initially opposed to
meeting with the officials because they were in Ethiopia at
IGAD's invitation rather than at Ethiopia's request. End
Note.)

Another Plea for Washington's Assistance
--------------


8. (S/NF) Mohamed, in anticipation of being named by Sharif
to replace Mohamed Warsame Darwish as head of the National
Intelligence Service, raised the issue of support from
Washington for the TFG's security services, emphasizing that
support was critical to establish an effective government.
PolOff responded that Washington was looking at providing
some level of support to the Joint Security Force, but
emphasized the importance of transparency within the TFG's
security structure. PolOff explained U.S. vetting
requirements, and reiterated that the TFG needed to provide
details, including names, before assistance could be
approved. Mohamed said he understood, and promised to convey
to Sharif that Sharif needed to appoint "clean" commanders to
the security services.

Comment
--------------


9. (S/NF) It is notable that Hashi and Mohamed were
traveling with Qeybdiid, their former enemy, and it is
probably an indicator of Sharif's weakness that he needs to
rely on Qeybdiid, who stands for everything Sharif has been
fighting against for the last several years. Hashi and
Mohammed are close advisors to Sharif, and former leaders in
the Union of Islamic Courts. Qeybdiid served in Siad Barre's
government, the Transitional National Government (TNG),and

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the TFG under former President Abdullahi Yusuf. He is also
an infamous warlord accused of corruption and gross human
rights violations who was captured and held by U.S. forces
for several months in 1993 while he was a key lieutenant of
Mohammed Farah Aideed. End Comment.
YAMAMOTO