ETHIOPIAN MFA OFFICIAL: TFG PRESIDENT SHARIF IN A

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 000605

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN MFA OFFICIAL: TFG PRESIDENT SHARIF IN A
BIND

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C/NF) Summary. Ethiopian MFA Official, and former
special envoy to Somalia, Abdetta Dribssa told PolOff on
March 12 that, in his view, Unity Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) President Sheikh Sharif would have no choice
but to ask the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
peacekeepers to leave Somalia within the next few months if
Sharif wanted to keep the backing of the newly established
council of Somali clerics and remain president. Abdetta said
Sharif could not survive without "Ethiopian guns" or
"someone's else's guns," particularly if AMISOM withdrew,
because Sharif did not yet have sufficient forces directly
loyal to him to maintain his position. Abdetta also said
that former Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
(ARS)/Djibouti Hawiye/Habir Gedir militia commanders in
Mogadishu were refusing to integrate their forces with TFG
forces, where they would be more directly under Sharif's
authority than each of their respective commander's, leaving
Sharif in a difficult position because Sharif's own
Hawiye/Abgal clansmen were not yet unified behind him.
Finally, Abdetta believed that increased U.S. diplomatic and
financial support to Sharif and the TFG was essential if the
TFG was to survive. (Note: Although Abdetta ceased to serve
as Ethiopia's official envoy to Somalia once the Ethiopian
troops withdrew earlier this year, he continues to have
responsibility for the Somalia portfolio within the MFA. End
Note.) End Summary.

"Sharif Will Ask AMISOM to Leave Somalia"
--------------


2. (C/NF) Abdetta predicted that within two or three
months Sheikh Sharif would have no choice but to ask AMISOM
to leave Somalia. Abdetta said the early March edict by the
Somali council of clerics that called for AMISOM to leave
Somalia within 120 days from March 1 had "trapped" Sharif,
and that to continue to maintain support for his presidency
from within Somalia, Sharif would have to comply with the
council's wishes. Otherwise, he said, Sharif would be
declared an illegitimate leader. Abdetta added that support
for the departure of AMISOM was widespread from within
Sharif's ARS/Djibouti allies.


3. (C/NF) Abdetta said Sharif agreed to the establishment
of Sharia law, another of the cleric's demands, because he
had no choice. He said although Sharif himself hoped to use
the announcement as a tactic to disarm extremist opposition
to the TFG, he questioned how long it would be before Sharif
would be forced to implement a more hard-line type of Sharia,
one that would certainly not be viewed as moderate by the
international community.

Joint Security Forces a Fiction?
--------------


4. (C/NF) Abdetta asserted that Sheikh Sharif could not
survive without "Ethiopia's guns" or "someone else's guns,"
particularly if AMISOM withdrew. He said Sharif had few
forces that were directly loyal to him, and noted that when
the Ethiopian military left Mogadishu, the ARS/Djibouti could
not muster "200 troops" to backfill the Ethiopians in the
city. When PolOff pressed Abdetta on the 2,700 man Joint
Security Force (JSF) which was reported to include 1,350
troops from the TFG and 1,350 troops from the ARS/Djibouti,
Abdetta responded that "those numbers are nice round figures
for the international community to believe in." He asked
rhetorically, "has the international community counted those
forces for themselves?" and "who is in Mogadishu to verify
such claims?"

Sharif's Militia Commanders Refusing Integration
-------------- ---


5. (C/NF) Abdetta went on to explain that ARS/Djibouti
Habir Gedir militia leaders in Mogadishu were refusing to
integrate their forces with those of the TFG. He said in
recent weeks Sharif had instructed ARS/Djibouti militia
leaders, including his own Minister of the Interior Sheikh
Abdiqadir Ali Omar, who controls one of the largest ARS
militias in Mogadishu, to prepare their forces for
integration with TFG forces. Abdiqadir responded that his
forces were "clean" (meaning that they were proper Muslims)

and that he would never "dirty" them by mixing them with the
others. At the same time, Abdetta said, the commanders did
not want to give up direct control of their militias.
Nevertheless, Abdiqadir and others were taking money from
Sharif to help pay their fighters, but Abdetta added that
little of the money was going to pay the troops, and most of
it stayed in the leader's pockets.


6. (C/NF) Sharif's real problem, according to Abdetta, was
that his own Hawiye/Abgal clan was not unified in any
respect, and certainly not yet unified in support of Sharif.
He stated that Sharif's position would improve somewhat if he
is able to solidify Abgal support. Abdetta questioned
whether the various components of the Hawiye/Habir Gedir
would ever truly trust Sharif, or fully support him.

"Sharif is an Opportunist"
--------------


7. (C/NF) On the question as to whether Sharif was an
opportunist or a pragmatist, Abdetta insisted Sharif was an
opportunist seeking power. He said Sharif would align
himself with whoever stood the most chance of advancing
Sharif's position, noting that this trait was not unique
among Somalis. He observed that Sharif was adept at playing
the "good listener," and always stayed on message in meetings
with other Somalis or with the international community.

US Support to Sharif Needed
--------------


8. (C/NF) Although Abdetta assessed that political
conditions in Mogadishu were deteriorating with less room for
Sharif to maneuver outside of the more stringent Islamists'
demands on him, Abdetta stressed that increased diplomatic
and financial support to the TFG from the United States was
absolutely essential if the Unity TFG was to have any chance
of surviving. He then asked where the USD 5 million was that
had been promised by the United States for the JSF. He said
to begin to establish truly integrated security forces, the
United States would need to provide funding dispersed as part
of some mechanism through AMISOM, and soon.

Comment
--------------


9. (C/NF) The notion that Sharif's hands have been tied by
the more hard-line elements within his own ARS/Djibouti
allies, and from the broader Somali religious community, is
becoming a more frequent refrain from Somali watchers and
Somalis themselves around Addis Ababa, and we share the
concern. One of Sharif's closest advisors, General Mohamed
Shiekh Hassan, privately told PolOff on March 7 essentially
the same message noting that Sharif was in a "tug of war"
with the "hard-liners," and he was uncertain who would win
(SEPTEL). End Comment.
YAMAMOTO