Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ADDISABABA598
2009-03-12 09:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

USAU: AU SOMALIA ENVOY BWAKIRA ON AMISOM SUPPORT

Tags:  PREL AU SO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000598 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AND IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019
TAGS: PREL AU SO
SUBJECT: USAU: AU SOMALIA ENVOY BWAKIRA ON AMISOM SUPPORT

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000598

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AND IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019
TAGS: PREL AU SO
SUBJECT: USAU: AU SOMALIA ENVOY BWAKIRA ON AMISOM SUPPORT

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: The AU's Special Representative for Somalia,
Ambassador Nicolas Bwakira, told USAU on March 12 that Troop
Contributing Countries and the African Union Commission are
readying to make a strong pitch for stronger equipment and
logistical support for AMISOM troops. They deem that
international support, including from the United States, has
been inadequate, erratic, and slow, preventing AMISOM from
fulfilling its mission and adequately protecting the troops.
Bwakira also expressed what he characterized as a broader AU
concern that U.S. diplomatic efforts in support of AMISOM
were waning. The AU has scheduled a meeting with
international partners on March 23 to address these issues.
On March 11, the Peace and Security Council voted to extend
AMISOM's mandate by three months. End Summary.


2. (C) On March 12, the AU Commissioner's Special
Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Nicolas Bwakira, met
with USAU to review a meeting he had had two days earlier
with senior Burundian government officials. He also provided
a synopsis of the March 11 extraordinary meeting on Somalia
that the AU Peace and Security Council held. The Peace and
Security Council voted to extend AMISOM's mandate for an
additional three months, to June 17. There was no discussion
of changing AMISOM's mandate to increase the troops' rules of
engagement. When a copy of the final communique is released,
USAU will send it via e-mail.


3. (C) Bwakira requested a meeting with USAU in order to
advise us of a March 23 meeting where AMISOM Troop
Contributing Countries (Burundi and Uganda at the Minister of
Defense level) and the AU Commission are expected to make a
strong pitch for stronger equipment and logistical support
for AMISOM troops. The meeting is part of what has now
become a monthly series of exchanges on Somalia.


4. (C) Bwakira revealed that the MODs from Burundi and Uganda
have told him that the equipment and logistic support for
AMISOM troops is inadequate, erratic, and slow. He said they
are likely to single out the U.S. in their criticism of the
level of support (accommodations, ablution units, force
protection, communications, rations, surveillance such as
Night Vision Goggles, personal protection equipment).


5. (C) On the diplomacy front, Bwakira said that there is a
perception on the part of the Troop Contributing Countries
and the AU that the U.S. commitment to a peacekeeping
operation was waning in the first part of 2009. He voiced
concern that U.S. diplomatic efforts are weaker and less
focused, and there is a growing impatience on the African
side to know what the U.S. policy toward Somalia is going to
be. He urged greater U.S. diplomatic pressure on existing
and potential Troop Contributing Countries that would send a
clear message that the United States is as committed as ever
to strengthening AMISOM and to an eventual transition to a
UNPKO. He specifically urged U.S. support of a UNSC
resolution for those PKO forces.


6. (C) With respect to equipment for AMISOM, Bwakira urged
the US -- in the interest of time -- to consider the donation
of critically needed equipment by other African member states
to be reimbursed by the U.S. The slow pace of delivery, and
the lack of adequate equipment and support, is putting troops
at risk, he emphasized.


7. (C) In response to Bwakira, our side said we would convey
this message to Washington. We acknowledged that both
missions have received lists of equipment and support from
the MODs in the past. Given recent events in Somalia,
including the February 22 attack on AMISOM, the Troop
Contributing Countries are clearly examining the level of
support, not just for the augmentation battalions, but for
the existing deployed troops. We are also aware -- and
Bwakira confirmed this -- that the Burundians are committed
to sending their third battalion to Mogadishu, on condition
they are properly supported. Our recommendation is that our
missions in Bujumbura and Kampala approach the respective
MODs to seek clarification on their exact equipment and
support concerns.


ADDIS ABAB 00000598 002 OF 002



8. (C) Responding to Bwakira,s points about U.S. diplomatic
efforts, we pointed out that the USG has been publicly
supportive of newly elected Somali President Sheikh Sharif
and the ongoing Somali political process, and that we have
been continually engaged at the UNSC, with partners, and with
African capitals in support of AMISOM.


9. (C) Comment: USAU enjoys a positive relationship with
Bwakira and he is typically candid with us when we meet. We
got the distinct impression from him that the March 23
meeting will be contentious and will target the USG. For
this reason, we believe it is important that our Ambassador
be prepared to address the concerns that are likely to be
raised by the Troop Contributing Countries and even the AU
Commission.
YAMAMOTO