Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ADDISABABA393
2009-02-13 10:38:00
SECRET
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ANECDOTES ON UNITED WESTERN SOMALI LIBERATION

Tags:  PTER ASEC PGOV MOPS ET 
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VZCZCXRO1409
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #0393/01 0441038
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131038Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3789
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000393 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV MOPS ET
SUBJECT: ANECDOTES ON UNITED WESTERN SOMALI LIBERATION
FRONT (UWSLF)

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000393

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV MOPS ET
SUBJECT: ANECDOTES ON UNITED WESTERN SOMALI LIBERATION
FRONT (UWSLF)

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Pol/Econ Chief has debriefed two Somali-speaking
development workers who have recently traveled throughout
Ethiopia's Somali region regarding reports about the United
Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF). While we cannot
independently verify the information provided, the
consistencies in details conveyed by the two unrelated
sources suggest some degree of credibility. We offer
interagency readers these anecdotes on this emerging
terrorist force.

STRONG UWSLF ENCROACHMENTS
--------------


2. (S) Both sources reported anecdotes of the encroachment of
well-organized and fairly large UWSLF forces into Ethiopia's
Somali region and of a responsive up-tick in attacks against
them both by the Ethiopian military (ENDF) and insurgent
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). While one source
argued that the UWSLF forces throughout Somali region may
compose as many as 3,000 fighters, the other source claimed
that a primary UWSLF concentration located between the towns
of Warder, Degehabur, and Kebri Dehar had at least 700
fighters with another concentration of unknown number located
in Fik zone. Both sources noted that the UWSLF fighters
appeared well organized and in uniform; one argued that they
were Eritrean military uniforms. One reported that they move
about via pack animals and on foot rather than in vehicles,
but reported that they have an abundance of Thuraya satellite
phones.

NATIONALIST ONLF COUNTERING EXTREMIST UWSLF
--------------


3. (S) Both sources noted a widespread recognition among the
local population that UWSLF is an extremist, terrorist
organization aimed at control and imposing a radical version
of Islam on the people. The sources argued that UWSLF's
extremist orientation has led the ONLF to actively fight
against their encroachments. One source added that the
ONLF's fear that the UWSLF presence could further drive the
limited humanitarian assistance that was reaching the people
from being available as another cause for the ONLF's
aggression toward UWSLF. Both emphasized that UWSLF is

ideologically driven and spans across clan lines while the
ONLF is sub-clan based but secular and nationalist. One
source noted that a former ONLF leader had joined UWSLF
recently and had been dispatched from Eritrea to attempt to
breach the gap between the two groups, but was killed by the
ONLF during an attack. They conveyed the popular perception
among locals of close links between UWSLF and al-Shabaab and
argued that UWSLF can and does seek refuge in al-Shabaab
controlled areas within Somalia when countered. In addition
to retreating into Somalia, one source argued that UWSLF
fighters had also retreated to the Shilabo and Danan areas as
well as along the Ethio-Somali border.

CONTINUED ENDF OPERATIONS
--------------


4. (S) In addition to the attacks by the ONLF against UWSLF,
both sources noted that ENDF attacks against UWSLF were also
increasing. In addition, the Somali regional government has
also recently established and trained "special militias" from
among the Ogadeni sub-clan to counter both UWSLF and ONLF.
One source argued that these "special militias" are in
addition to the regular militias partially composed of forced
conscripts from rural villages forced to fight the ONLF.
Col. Gebremeskal, the ENDF commander for Gode and Fik areas
told one source "we will solve the insecurity problem soon;
we are planning to take all necessary measures soon."
Without clarifying whether this was reported by the
commander, the source suggested that the ENDF's approach
would be to launch an assault between Kebri Dehar and
Degehabur first to cut off access to Somalia before advancing
toward Fik.

CLAN DYNAMICS
--------------


5. (S) Dividing the Somali region along clan and sub-clan
lines, one source offered the following analysis of where
popular support lies:

ADDIS ABAB 00000393 002 OF 002



-- Within Warder zone, only the two Ogadeni woredas are
insecure while the Majerteen areas remain secure and do not
require escorts. Ogadeni woredas are mostly insecure due to
the presence of the ONLF, though there is some UWSLF
presence. The Danot area, which is mostly occupied by the
Ogaden/Michael sub-clan is more pro-Ethiopian government
(GoE),largely due to the presence of a former ONLF leader
who shifted to support the GoE.

-- Fik zone is largely populated by the Ogaden/Abdullahi
sub-clan which is predominantly pro-ONLF.

-- The Degehabur area, which is largely occupied by the
Ogaden/Rer Isaaq sub-clan, is divided between pro-GoE and
pro-ONLF areas, with the Degeh Medo area largely pro-ONLF.

-- Within Gode zone, the four non-Ogaden woredas are largely
secure, while the Ogaden/Abdallah sub-clan in Gode and Adadle
woredas leaning pro-GoE and Danan woreda split between
pro-GoE and pro-ONLF elements.

THE PEOPLE IN THE MIDDLE
--------------


6. (S) Both sources reported a prevailing sentiment in Somali
region that people are tired of getting caught in the middle
of fighting between the ENDF, ONLF, and UWSLF. Some groups
who have supported the ONLF are also lending a bit of support
to UWSLF due to their perception that the two groups are
fighting a common enemy in the GoE. At the same time, many
ONLF supporters are reportedly shifting to support the GoE as
they are seeing increasingly that non-Ogadeni Somalis in the
region are not supporting the Ogadeni cause and recognizing
that without broader support the ONLF will not be able to
make change. Additionally, some are recognizing that the
non-Ogadeni areas, where there is relative stability, are
benefiting from that stability through some modest public
social sector investments such as schools, health clinics,
and roads.
YAMAMOTO