WHAT NEXT FOR ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA? THE VIEW FROM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000392

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: WHAT NEXT FOR ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA? THE VIEW FROM
ADDIS ABABA

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

Introduction
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1. (S/NF) In response to a tasking by Acting Assistant
Secretary for Africa Phil Carter, Embassy Addis Ababa offers
its perspective on where things stand in Somalia,
particularly with regard to Ethiopia's future involvement,
and where they might go next. While predicting anything in
Somali politics is a practice fraught with peril, we
nevertheless offer this analysis in response to Acting A/S
Carter's request.

Somalia's Future Remains Uncertain
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2. (S/NF) The ENDF withdrawal, followed by the election of
a Hawiye president, Sheikh Sharif, who has the potential to
increase support for the Transitional Federal
Government/Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
(TFG/ARS) "unity" government among larger elements of the
Hawiye clan, gives rise to the hope that the country has
turned a corner, and that the worst of the violence is over.
Certainly, the opportunity for better conditions in Somalia
is again at hand if the Somalis decide to take it, with help
from the international community, or the United States.
Still, we caution that the ability of the international
community to influence the process in a positive fashion is
limited. A quick survey of the dynamics in Somalia today
calls into question just how much hope we can reasonably
assume as there are a number of key factors that threaten to
undermine the TFG, and more likely, continue the status quo
of civil war, with a strong probability of fueling an
increase in fighting over the next several years. Although,
it might be too easy to predict more violence in Somalia, it
is also too easy to ascribe all of the recent fighting in
Somalia to the two-year Ethiopian military intervention.
Al-Shabaab no longer has the Ethiopian card to play, but the
struggle for power among the different groups and clans in
Somalia remains as real as ever. Some of the more critical
dynamics to watch include the following.

--The TFG/ARS "unity" government remains a government on
paper only with no functioning ministries, no standing
military (only a handful of police and security forces),no
real ability to provide for its own security, or ability to
defeat the extremists. Rather, its former seat, Baidoa fell
to hostile forces within hours of the Ethiopian withdrawal,
and Sheikh Sharif's early February return to Mogadishu as
president was facilitated primarily by friendly Hawiye
militias who are not under the government's direct control,
and who could turn on the TFG with little warning. The TFG
Joint Security Force remains an unrealized goal, and we would
expect that at best this force will only be capable of
providing a static defense of government facilities.

--In the words of UN Special Envoy for Somalia Ahmedou
Ould-Abdallah, Sheikh Sharif "is a young inexperienced school
teacher" with no particular qualifications for or experience
with governance, and who "has no real understanding of how
the western world works." Whether Sharif is truly a
pragmatist to the point of abandoning his extremist
background once and for all, as many observers have concluded
remains, in our view, an open question.

--With the perceived ascendancy of the Hawiye to political
power for the first time in Somali history, the non-Hawiye
clans, most importantly many Darood, are beginning to express
concerns fearing Hawiye retribution for past offenses.
Significant participation from the non-Hawiye clans probably
will depend in large part on how genuinely inclusive Sheikh
Sharif is in the formation and operation of his government.
The TFG's predecessor, the Transitional National Government
(TNG) failed because the Darood, with Ethiopian backing, felt
excluded and saw it as a Hawiye government.

--Al-Shabaab and the other extremist factions in central and
southern Somalia remain outside the political process and
have vowed to continue fighting in spite of Sheikh Sharif's
election. While al-Shabaab does not appear to be capable of
taking control of Somalia, as of yet there is no other power

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in Somalia capable of finally defeating al-Shabaab,
suggesting that the status quo is sure to continue for some
time.

--It is becoming increasingly likely that in the coming weeks
and months a number of prominent personalities associated
with al-Shabaab, a U.S. designated terrorist organization,
may "reconcile" with Sheikh Sharif and take positions within
the TFG/ARS. Such a move risks alienating key constituencies
within Somalia, as well as the Ethiopian government.

--Fighting between al-Shabaab and the Alhu Sunnah Wala Jama
(ASWJ),an emerging dynamic in recent months that is taking
on the appearance of a religious civil war co-mingled with
clan infighting, is also occurring outside the political
process. ASWJ does not speak with one voice, making a
determination of its political aspirations difficult, but
ASWJ leaders associated with the fighters in Galguduud view
Sheikh Sharif as little different than al-Shabaab, and claim
to have no interest in the TFG. They have vowed to continue
fighting the extremists irrespective of what happens with the
TFG. Nevertheless, we have much to learn about this group
including how much support they have from the population, and
the exact nature of the relationship between ASWJ religious
leaders and the militias they are supporting.

Implications for AMISOM
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3. (S/NF) The potential consequences for AMISOM of the
ENDF's withdrawal, and of a deterioration of security in
Mogadishu, are severe, and warrant consideration of
contingency planning in a worst case scenario whereby the
peacekeepers are forced to evacuate. Until the ENDF left,
Ethiopian commanders were providing AMISOM with security, a
quick reaction capability when AMISOM was ambushed, and
tactical intelligence of imminent attacks. AMISOM is now
blind, has no capability to fulfill its mandate, and is
largely restricted to its bases out of safety concerns except
for a few limited areas in Mogadishu. The force continues to
be attacked on a near daily basis, and in the previous weeks
the attacks have included roadside bombs, mortars, suicide
bombings, and direct assaults by al-Shabaab fighters. Prime
Minister Meles and the leadership of the African Union have
placed the responsibility for AMISOM's security squarely on
Washington's shoulders. It is the view of Meles and the AU
leadership, that AMISOM would have withdrawn from Somalia
with the Ethiopians if it had not been for U.S. pressure to
stay, and promises of support for additional battalions.

Ethiopia Will Remain a Player in Somalia
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4. (S/NF) No matter what happens in Somalia, we expect that
Ethiopia's national security interests will continue to drive
its involvement in Somali affairs despite having withdrawn
its forces in late January. Ethiopia's goal in Somalia since
the rise of the Islamic Courts in 2005 has not changed, and
that has been to deny the extremists from gaining political
power in, or broad-based haven from which to launch attacks
on Ethiopian interests from, Somalia by whatever means
necessary. As Prime Minister Meles has repeatedly told us,
he can live with extremists in Somalia, but not a Somalia
controlled by extremists. Senior Ethiopian civilian and
military officials have said that their military strategy
post-withdrawal will be to station increased numbers of
troops along the Somali border to guard against infiltration,
while reserving the right to raid in and out of Somalia as
they deem necessary "to keep al-Shabaab off balance." We are
already seeing this strategy manifest itself with more troops
on the border and the early February incursion by Ethiopian
forces. At the same time, the Ethiopian military has
continued its long-standing practice of providing arms,
ammunition, and intelligence to proxies who will fight
al-Shabaab. Our Ethiopian and Somali contacts confirm that
the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has been
providing support to Barre Hirale's militia, some Rahanweyn
militias, and more recently to ASWJ militias in Galguduud.
Ethiopia is also stepping up its engagement with Somaliland
and Puntland to try and contain the extremists.


5. (S/NF) Ethiopia's political goals in Somalia are likely

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to remain subordinate to its security interests. We assess
that Ethiopia will not tolerate a strong and forceful
government in Somalia that would be able to pose a security
threat to Ethiopia again. Similarly, we believe that
Ethiopia understands that Somalia would never accept a Somali
government that is a puppet of Ethiopia. As such, we assess
that Ethiopia's political goals in Somalia are to have a
stable and viable government over which Ethiopia has some
influence, but which cannot pose a threat to Ethiopia.
Regarding its political involvement in Somalia, Ethiopia most
likely will give lip service to the TFG, but in practical
terms our interactions with Ethiopian officials over the
previous several months suggests that the Ethiopian
government has largely given up on the TFG with the late-2008
leadership impasse after nearly two years of elevated and
intense, behind the scenes involvement. In the view of one
Ethiopian official, they "have been burned too many times by
Somali political promises," referring to Meles' repeated
attempts to force former President Abdullahi Yusuf and former
Prime Ministers Mohammed Gedi and Hassan Hussein "Nur Adde"
to work together, including by bringing them to Addis Ababa
to sign agreements that were never honored. Prime Minister
Meles appears to have lost faith in the ability of TFG
leaders, old or new, to establish an effective government
that is capable of restoring stability to Somalia or, at the
very least, stand up to al-Shabaab, and is tired of the
incessant and violent clan struggles for power. However,
Ethiopia's security operations will have a potentially
negative impact on the political environment, intended or
otherwise, not the least of which is its support to groups
that are outside of, and potentially hostile to, the TFG.
Should the new unity government under Sheikh Sharif tolerate
anti-Ethiopian activities from among its own members, or
accommodate al-Shabaab, Ethiopia could easily turn against
the TFG as it did in 2000-2001 with its predecessor the
Hawiye led Transitional National Government (TNG) that
consequently never got off the ground.

Moving Forward with Ethiopia as a Partner on Somalia
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6. (S/NF) However one views the net impact of Ethiopia's
involvement in Somalia, Ethiopia will continue to be a major
player with the potential to act as a positive force or act
as a spoiler. Pushing Ethiopia to act positively in step
with U.S. policy will not be an easy task because the
Ethiopian government in the last year has moved further out
of synch with Washington to the point where Prime Minister
Meles and his senior officials no longer listen to, and
instead are openly scornful and dismissive of, any U.S.
perspective on the subject. As one senior MFA official told
the Ambassador recently, "the only thing the United States
did right on Somalia in the last five years was support the
deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, but it took you too
long." While Meles and company are seemingly blind to their
own mistakes, not the least of which is getting stuck in
Somalia for two years when they intended to stay only a few
weeks, they now blame Washington for the current state of
affairs, including for the rise of the Islamic Courts in 2005.


7. (S/NF) In our view, moving forward with Ethiopia on
Somalia will require hard work, patience, and a clear
articulation from Washington on where we want to go, and how
Ethiopia fits into that picture. At the same time, a strong
message to Meles may also be necessary should his actions
appear to be undermining U.S. efforts to establish a national
government in Somalia.

Comment
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8. (S/NF) Our view is not designed to dissuade Washington
from engagement on Somalia, on the contrary we think a
coordinated inter-agency, comprehensive, long-term,
broad-based regional approach to the crisis that aligns both
our counterterrorism interests with our efforts to support
the emergence of a democratic Somali national government is
long overdue. If the interagency does endorse such a strong
U.S. role in supporting the re-emergence of stability,
security, and governance in Somalia, the USG must also make
available adequate resources to play that role. We cannot
help stabilize Somalia on the cheap or with bureaucratic red

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tape preventing us from acting quickly to seize
opportunities. We should also understand going in that
despite our best efforts, the experiment may not work.
Certainly, sustained and extensive support from the
international community, and the United States, to the Somali
political process, whether through the TFG or some future
hybrid, will be a critical factor in the success or failure
of the Somali government, but at the end of the day, the
international community cannot care more about the political
process than the Somalis to make the experiment work.
Whether the Somalis will take this opportunity remains to be
seen. Despite the odds, Embassy Addis Ababa is ready and
willing, in cooperation with our regional and international
partners, to move forward in advancing stability and
democracy in Somalia. End Comment.
YAMAMOTO