Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ADDISABABA321
2009-02-05 15:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

AU SUMMIT -- AF ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS WITH EU

Tags:  PREL PGOV AU SU CD 
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INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0495
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3248
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000321 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU SU CD
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT -- AF ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS WITH EU
SPECIAL ENVOY TORBEN BRYLLE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000321

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU SU CD
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT -- AF ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS WITH EU
SPECIAL ENVOY TORBEN BRYLLE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Begin Summary: AF Acting Assistant Secretary Phillip
Carter, joined by Ambassador Yamamoto and Sudan Programs
Groups Director Timothy Shortley met with EU Special Envoy
Torben Brylle January 31, on the margins of the AU Summit in
Addis Ababa. Carter discussed the potential impact of the
impending International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant
for Sudanese President Bashir. Brylle and Carter agreed that
a coordinated and measured approach should be adopted to
enable continued engagement with all of the involved parties.
End Summary.


2. (C) Brylle said Sudan had failed to demonstrate the
political will to solve its issues and had not undertaken the
broad action to warrant a deferment. He noted that the GOS
adopted a two track approach of 1) guarding themselves
against the ICC arrest by rallying support and sympathy from
the Arab world and 2) embarking on a semblance of opening the
political space through the Sudan People,s Initiative (SPI).
He emphasized that the EU, like the rest of the
international community, could not support an Article XVI
without real actions and change on the ground.


3. (C) Brylle dismissed the AU rhetoric that an ICC
indictment will undermine the peace process, pointing out
that "the train had left the station" and the moment for an
Article XVI was long gone. Though Carter and Brylle agreed
that an ICC indictment could impact the Darfur peace process
as some rebel movements may refuse to negotiate under the
pretext that GOS would be an illegitimate government, both
dismissed the idea of it bringing the process to a halt.


4. (C) Both discussed the aftermath of the ICC indictment,
underscoring that a measured approach should be the strategy
of all interlocutors to minimize the adverse impact. Brylle
suggested the P3 adopt a low-key stance while still holding
Sudan to past agreements of CPA implementation, facilitating
UNAMID deployment, and urging it to act responsibly and
refrain from attacking civilians. Carter raised the issue of
how the international community would engage with Sudan, with

an indicted president. Brylle explained in his capacity as EU
envoy, he is obliged to maintain communication with the
government; he predicted that lack of engagement could
engender more damaging consequences.


5. (C) Carter noted that the United States would continue to
engage with the Government of Sudan following the ICC warrant
against Bashir. His main concern was that Sudan refrain from
engaging in reprisals and ensure the security of foreigners
operating in Sudan. Brylle cautioned that though Vice
President Taha and Salah Gosh have said they would not
overreact, the international community should prepare for
"trouble days." He said he also recently spoke to the
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) cautioning them to
exercise restraint and not overreact. (Note: As reported
SEPTEL, Bassole has given indications that, assuming the
arrest warrant is issued, JEM may seek to attack Khartoum in
an effort to capture Bashir. End note.)


6. (C) Carter and Brylle agreed that the impact of the ICC
indictment on the CPA needed to be taken into consideration.
Carter noted that progress and backsliding in Darfur would
continue to fluctuate, but he sees lack of CPA implementation
as the real security threat, with far more disconcerting
consequences. He deplored the delays in elections
preparation, and raised concern about the linkage of the CPA
to Darfur, and a possible dubious JEM/SPLM alliance. Brylle
admitted that the international community had not been
vigilant in its follow-up of the electoral law and elections
preparations. He said he recently received a briefing that
painted a bleak picture and it was unlikely that elections
could be held in 2009. He elaborated that if the analysis and
conclusions of the briefing were right, then the country
might be heading to civil war. He intimated that in his
opinion, the SPLM has not done a thorough analysis of the
dynamics of the situation, but are simply focused on the
referendum.


7. (C) Brylle said a comprehensive look at Sudan was the
solution, and Darfur was only one element. He reported that
the EU was preparing technical seminars to look at governance

ADDIS ABAB 00000321 002 OF 002


and the consequences of the referendum in 2011. He
underscored that the Southerners would benefit from an
in-depth look at the positive aspects of unity, as well as
the consequences of secession. Shortley informed that the
United States has also funded a similar project through the
U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP). Carter proposed an EU/U.S.
collaboration on this project for better impact.


8. (C) Brylle also noted the issue of reconstruction and
development. He suggested the P3 urge Bassole to add this
very important component into the peace process. He said
unless people genuinely see a possibility for improvement in
their lives, the peace process may not achieve its goal, and
we risk a renewal of hostilities.


9. (U) Acting A/S Carter approved this message.
YAMAMOTO