SUSPICIONS REMAIN HIGH AS CONFLICT, ABUSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002977

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM EAID KDEM ASEC MOPS PREL SO ET
SUBJECT: SUSPICIONS REMAIN HIGH AS CONFLICT, ABUSES
CONTINUE IN SOMALI REGION

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 1797

B. ADDIS ABABA 2941

Classified By: CDA Tulinabo Mushingi for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Contacts in Ethiopia's Somali Regional State report
that although humanitarian access has improved, the
humanitarian situation has declined since 2007, as a result
of continued conflict, restricted humanitarian access, trade
blockage, and repeated seasons of poor rain. Government of
Ethiopia (GoE) police and militia are reportedly conscripted,
include children as young as 14, and receive inadequate
training. GoE human rights abuses including arbitrary
detention, rape, and killing reportedly continue at 2007
levels. The UN's Somali Regional office believes Ogaden
National Liberation Front (ONLF) attacks in November
represent increased capability, strength, and membership of
the ONLF, despite heavy ONLF losses. While the regional
government reports it is prepared to hold free and fair
elections in May 2010, there is little interest in the
elections amongst a cynical population. End Summary.


2. (SBU) During a November 23-25 visit to Jijija, capital of
Ethiopia's Somali Regional State, PolOff discussed
humanitarian access, ongoing conflict, and political dynamics
with regional government representatives, political party
leaders, NGO workers, local elders, and international
organization (IO) officials.

Humanitarian Situation Deteriorating, Access Still Restricted
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) Humanitarian workers from every NGO and
international organization with which PolOff spoke reported
that the humanitarian situation in Somali Regional State has
worsened over the past two years, despite improved access and
coordination. While contacts offered slightly varying
reports based on the zones in which their organizations
operate and services they provide, the clear message was that
the combination of continued conflict between government
forces and insurgent groups, restricted access for
humanitarian workers, blockage of established trade routes,
and several seasons of poor rains has resulted in a
deteriorating health and food security environment and
drained the ability of the local population to absorb these
shocks.


4. (SBU) Somali Regional State Humanitarian Coordinator Abdi
Fattah told PolOff that coordination between the regional
government and humanitarian actors has improved, and the
adoption of the "hubs and spokes" delivery mechanism has
enabled faster delivery and better monitoring of food aid.
However, insecurity in the region still constitutes a serious
challenge to providing needed services, and he admitted there
were significant limits on the ability of humanitarian
agencies to work in the region. According to Abdi, while
many agencies currently operate without difficulty in areas
where the ONLF is present, the GoE believes they may be
targeted. He noted that agencies transporting relief food
and other valuable supplies must be escorted because the ONLF
seizes relief food to feed its fighters, as well as to sell
or distribute to supportive local people. Abdi assessed that
cooperation between the regional government and the Ethiopian
National Defense Force (ENDF) was good at the higher levels,
but poor at the lower levels, resulting in complications for
NGOs seeking ENDF clearance to enter certain areas.


5. (C) Abraham Leno, Director of Mercy Corps' Somali Region
office, told PolOff access for humanitarian actors had
improved over the past six months, but unexpected and
unexplained restrictions continued. Government restrictions
on transport and trade (aimed largely at preventing
insurgents from crossing into neighboring Somalia) prohibit
local people from buying food from accessible markets and
drive up food prices. Abraham added that in areas branded as
"anti-peace" (i.e., where the populous supports the ONLF),
the situation has greatly worsened. In such areas, the
delivery of all social services, including emergency food
and water, has been completely blocked. International Rescue
Committee Field Coordinator Mohammed Ismal told PolOff that

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the GoE continues to limit humanitarian access to
"anti-peace" communities as part of its counter-insurgency
strategy, with the express purpose of weakening communities
that support the ONLF. Humanitarian actors who try to enter
these areas are intensely questioned by military personnel,
and are generally turned away even if they have obtained the
required GoE clearances.

GoE Highly Suspicious of Humanitarian Actors' Motives
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Relief workers reported that the GoE is highly
suspicious of all non-government actors, resulting in a tense
environment and unnecessary access barriers. Mercy Corps
Program Coordinator Abdi Aden told PolOff the perception of
regional and military officials is that all NGO workers are
reporting on human rights, security, and political conditions
to their headquarters. Farah Omer Beto, Director of the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the
Somali region, noted that the GoE fears NGO workers will
personally witness the strength of the ONLF, as well as the
government's human rights abuses. Mercy Corps' Leno
explained that his staff must appear completely ignorant of
political or security matters to avoid arousing suspicion.
Save the Children (UK) Regional Manager Mohamed Mohamed noted
that both sides (government and insurgent) suspect
humanitarian actors of supporting the other side, leaving
local communities unsure if they can trust aid workers and
participate in relief programs without provoking the ire of
one or both sides.


7. (C) Such suspicions have resulted in direct action against
humanitarian workers. IRC's Mohammed reported that two IRC
water engineers had been arrested on suspicion of being
journalists. (Note: There is no official prohibition
against journalists' travel in the region. End note.) Mercy
Corps reported that NGO personnel have been compelled by ENDF
and police personnel to report ONLF activity, and have faced
beatings and death threats from these entities if they do not
comply (Ref A). In another incident, militia members
demanded that a Medecins Sans Frontieres driver provide them
with transport, in violation of MSF's policy and thereby
jeopardizing the driver's job.

Human Rights Abuses Reportedly Continue at 2007 Levels
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Many contacts in the Somali region were unwilling to
discuss human rights abuses, with UN Security Chief Joseph
Macapili noting that UN personnel are not permitted to
discuss human rights issues because of the risk of expulsion
from the region. All sources who discussed human rights told
PolOff the ENDF, police, and militias continue to commit
human rights abuses at the levels similar to 2007. (Note:
Reports of human rights abuses in the region peaked at this
time, after ONLF attacks on a Chinese oil facility prompted
an increase in GoE counter-insurgency measures. End note.)


9. (C) Sultan Abdulhadir, an Ogadeni clan elder from
Waradheer zone, told PolOff that government forces continue
to withhold food and block legitimate trade from "anti-peace"
communities, and continue to engage in mass arrests, rapes,
and killings of ONLF supporters. He reported that the only
tactic government forces have ceased to utilize is the
burning of villages. (Comment: In 2008, Human Rights Watch
published satellite photos of villages prior to and after
such burnings, publicizing the international community's
ability to monitor this particular tactic. End comment.) He
added that the Jijiga prison, nicknamed "Ogaden Prison" for
the volume of Ogadeni clansmen detained there, holds some
3,000 suspected ONLF supporters. The prison was designed to
hold 600 prisoners. Ahmed Maah, a UNICEF Child Protection
Specialist who had personally visited the prison, said the
prison currently holds over 200 children between ages 12 and

18. Of these, 100 are children who are accused only being
associated with the ONLF.


10. (C) UNICEF's Ahmed stated that both government forces
(notably local militias) and the ONLF recruit child soldiers.
He stated that in Fik zone, he had routinely witnessed
children as young as 14 carrying guns and serving in local
militias. The Special Police appear to be more sensitive to
the issue, but Ahmed stated there are likely children aged

ADDIS ABAB 00002977 003 OF 004


16-17 serving in the Special Police. Ahmed explained that
children as young as 14 are recruited into the local militias
because of the quotas the GoE enforces. Their families are
threatened by recruiters who allege they have sons in the
ONLF, and must therefore contribute a son to the militia. If
the only son remaining at home is a child, the family has no
choice but to send him to join the militia. Sultan
Abdulhadir also stated that both special police and militia
members were forcibly recruited, and that Somali Regional
State Security Chief Abdi
Mohamed Umar (a.k.a. Abdi Illi) was personally leading
recruitment efforts.


11. (C) Ahmed also reported significant problems with the
special police, describing arbitrary detention and rough
handling of suspected ONLF supporters or criminals. It was
unclear to him whether this lack of professionalism was a
result of poor training, or whether the Special Police had
been ordered to engage in such tactics to coerce the local
population. Mercy Corps' Abdi said both the Special Police
(who are paid and receive some training) and the militia (who
are unpaid and receive no training) are abusive to the local
population.

ONLF Initiates Coordinated Attacks, Suffers Heavy Losses
-------------- --------------


12. (C) UN Security Chief Macapili told PolOff the
coordinated ONLF attacks on GoE and military installations
across the Somali region on November 11 were a strategic
victory, despite heavy ONLF losses. The level of
coordination and large number of insurgents involved
surprised many in the region, and the UN Department of Safety
and Security believed the attacks represented increased
capability, strength, and membership of the ONLF. Macapili
added that the attacks, launched three days after the GoE
released a statement that the ONLF presented no threat to
government interests in the Somali region, was likely
designed to demonstrate the ONLF's relevance and tactical
abilities. Attacks were carried out in 21 locations across
five zones, but Macapili described four of these attacks as
"very well planned" and the remaining 17 as "hit and run"
attacks that may have been included on late notice. Macapili
reported approximately 200 ONLF and 50-100 government forces
were killed in the attacks. (Comment: UNDSS's figures on
attack locations and casualties match estimates received by
other Mission sources. As is common, the GoE and ONLF
respectively released figures demonstrating few losses on
their own side, and greater losses on the opposite side. End
comment.)


13. (C) In response to these attacks, Macapili stated the
ENDF has relocated 49 military trucks to Fik zone, 75 trucks
to Degehabur zone, and 55 trucks to the remaining three
conflict zones. Additional personnel and munitions have been
moved into Jijiga as well. Speaking of the insurgency more
broadly, UNDSS does not consider the ONLF a great threat to
humanitarian operations, as ONLF insurgents generally only
stop and question humanitarian convoys, and the ONLF is not
linked to radical Islamic rebels elsewhere in Somali region
or Somalia. The United Western Somali Liberation Front
(UWSLF) presents a greater threat to humanitarian actors, and
has in the past stolen vehicles and valuable supplies from UN
and NGO workers. UNDSS believes the UWSLF may be linked to
al-Shabaab. Macapili said UNDSS has solid evidence that
al-Shabaab is operating near Dolo Odo in the
Somalia-Kenya-Ethiopia tri-border region, and may be present
inside Ethiopia. Ethiopian insurgents based along the
Ethiopia-Somalia border between Dolo Odo and FeerFeer may be
cooperating with al-Shabaab.

Low Expectations for 2010 Elections
--------------


14. (C) Campaigning for the 2010 parliamentary elections
began in earnest in late November, with the ruling Somali
People's Democratic Party (SPDP, which caucuses with the
EPRDF) holding rallies in nine major towns, each drawing
approximately 500 attendees. No opposition party events had
been held at the time of PolOff's visit. Somali opposition
party officials reported that their members have been
harassed by SPDP officials and party cadres in Jijiga (Ref
B),and Jijiga contacts expressed that opposition parties

ADDIS ABAB 00002977 004 OF 004


were not able to engage in significant campaign activities in
the region. All non-government contacts with whom PolOff
spoke reported that people in the Somali region have little
interest in the upcoming election, and those in rural areas
are not even aware of election plans. Elder Sultan
Abdulhadir explained that years of GoE and ENDF manipulation
of voting in the region have turned voters off to the
process. In past elections, there have never been outside
observers in Sultan's Waradheer zone, and he reported a
stronger presence of ENDF forces around polling places than
in other parts of the country.


15. (C) In contrast, Ahmed Cali Geedi, SPDP Director of
Public Relations, told PolOff that the Somali Regional State
is fully prepared to hold free and fair elections in May

2010. In contrast to previous years, when Somali region
voting has been held later than in other parts of the country
as a result of logistical problems, the SPDP and EPRDF have
announced that in 2010 voting will be held on the same day
nationwide. (Comment: This decision is likely based on
pressure the EPRDF has felt to demonstrate unity with and
greater development in the Somali region. End comment.)
Ahmed stated that electoral workers and voters would not
experience problems reaching polling places and reporting
vote counts, as they have in past elections, but could not
provide any details on how this problem had been remedied.

Comment
--------------


16. (C) The general sentiment offered by contacts in the
Somali Regional State is that while government outreach and
humanitarian access have improved, these efforts have made
little impact on the humanitarian and human rights situation
in the region. Health and food security have worsened,
conflict between government and insurgent forces continues,
humanitarian actors have difficulty achieving trust from the
local population while their motives are considered suspect
by actors in the conflict, and people have little hope for a
free and fair election. While the GoE and donors have touted
improvements to humanitarian operations in the Somali region,
these improvements do not appear to the local population to
have positively impacted their well-being. End comment.
MUSHINGI