USAU: AU COMMISSIONER LAMAMRA DISCUSSES GUINEA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002952

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STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AF/W, AND IO/UNP
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU
SUBJECT: USAU: AU COMMISSIONER LAMAMRA DISCUSSES GUINEA,
MADAGASCAR, SOMALIA, UN

REF: OUAGADOUGOU 1048

Classified By: Ambassador Michael A. Battle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for African
Affairs Karl Wycoff met with the African Union (AU)
Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra, on
November 20 in Addis Ababa to address a range of issues. On
the topic of Guinea, Lamamra said that while the AU had
discussed deploying a support mission there, one has not been
put in place. He lamented the strained relations between
Madagascar negotiators and expressed the need to put such
drama aside and move on. Lamamra discussed Somalia at
length, explaining that the current stalemate necessitates
serious consideration of other options. That said, the AU
stands by the Djibouti Peace Process. Asked about speeding
the flow of funds to Somalia, Lamamra said the
PriceWaterhouseCoopers mechanism works well for donor funds
to reach Somalia. He also said that UN-AU coordination is
going well, allowing for normal challenges associated with
collaboration between organizations. END SUMMARY.

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GUINEA
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2. (C) Guinea topped the list of topics that DAS Wycoff
discussed with African Union (AU) Peace and Security
Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra at a meeting at the AU in Addis
Ababa on November 20. When DAS Wycoff advocated for an AU
political/military observer mission to Guinea, Lamamra talked
around the issue, speaking at length about various aspects of
the Guinean situation, including the clear mandate of
mediator and Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore to accept
nothing short of junta leader Dadis's departure. Lamamra
noted that both sanctions and mediation were being applied,
and that Compaore "is proposing something consistent with
what we think." (NOTE: Lamamra made this comment on the eve
of Compaore's proposal saying that government members,
including Dadis, could run for office if they resign at least
four months before elections. It was not apparent whether or
not Lamamra knew of this element of the proposal at the time
of our meeting. See reftel. END NOTE.) He stated the need
to maintain pressure on Guinea, but said that while deploying
a support mission had been discussed, one has not been put in
place.


3. (C) Lamamra did say that the AU had discussed two concepts
with the President of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS): (1) Sending a modest mission to Guinea to
assist the Inquiry Commission. (2) Setting up a force to
protect those in charge of any transition that takes place.
Given that a three-person advance team from the UN's Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights already had gone to
Guinea, Lamamra did not see the need for a military and
police component at this time. If that becomes necessary,
however, the AU will act quickly to help. DAS Wycoff and
Ambassador Battle reiterated the advantages of sending a
mission expeditiously.

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MADAGASCAR
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4. (C) Turning to Madagascar and its belabored efforts to
establish a transitional government, Lamamra addressed the
problem of the mediators involved. Now that mediation is
over, the AU feels it is time to move on and employ
full-time, lower-level people to manage the next phase.
However, he opined that continued infighting among mediators
who are interested in advancing their own careers has
complicated the situation. UN Chief Mediator Tieble Drame,
for example, reportedly went to Madagascar after negotiations
without the UN's knowledge. The AU is trying to clarify
whether Drame had a UN mandate to do so. Lamamra scoffs at
such drama and believes that those involved must present a
united front to the Malagasy parties. We "need to ensure
that the rules of the game are well-defined and the division
of work is accepted by all parties," he said. DAS Wycoff
noted that the U.S. intended to remain involved in promoting

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an early return to constitutional government, advocated for
enhanced coordination among the mediators to ensure maximal
effect, and stressed the importance of coordinated pressure
on all parties for them to honor their commitments.

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SOMALIA
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5. (C) On the topic of Somalia, Lamamra emphasized that while
the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is not losing, it is not
winning either. While the UN is now more involved than
before, he said the impact of the UN's involvement on the
overall situation is not very visible. The UN provides food
and medicine, for example, but a Mission headquarters and
level-three hospital are still lacking. In addition, troop
protection is faulty and there are not enough armored
personnel carriers. Lamamra acknowledged that zero risk is
not possible, but more could be done to reduce risks. DAS
Wycoff and Ambassador Battle noted that the U.S. had been the
prime supporter of AMISOM and intended to continue to play a
key role, including in enhancing UN support, on the ground,
for AMISOM. We noted that the U.S. was ordering more
equipment, including armored cars, for AMISOM forces, as well
as preparing the next Ugandan battalion for deployment.


6. (C) Lamamra offered his strategic perspective on Somalia.
First, he believes that Somali President Sheikh Sharif should
expand his political base and aim for greater cohesion. This
is difficult, however, given that so-called allies often come
together simply to get a piece of the pie or show they chose
the right side. Second, Lamamra explained that Sharif
"tolerates" AMISOM since it is useful, but does not
necessarily like it or want to be associated with it. To
complicate matters, Uganda and Burundi see AMISOM as theirs,
not the AU's, underscoring the need to diversify AMISOM's
composition. In this context, Lamamra sees a strong need to
"stimulate thinking about other options." It is for this
reason that he asked the UN to prepare a potential scenario
for an operation in Kismayo.


7. (C) Responding to a question about the Djibouti Peace
Process, Lamamra stated that the AU does not favor a revision
in the process and believes that the sooner Somalia can hold
elections, the better. Before stating this position,
however, he discussed the belief held by Egypt, Eritrea, and
Qatar that the Djibouti process has not worked and should be
revisited. While the African Union Commission accepts
Qatar's role in Sudan as helpful, it is much less certain of
Qatar's participation in Somalia given allegations that the
Gulf country supports the Somali insurgency via Eritrea.
Lamamra believes that reestablishing diplomatic ties between
Qatar and Ethiopia would balance Qatar's relationship with
countries in East Africa. For its part, Egypt "wants
leverage by having good relations with Asmara." Given such
dynamics, Lamamra believes that a regional approach is
required to make headway in Somalia. DAS Wycoff noted that
the U.S. and most other countries opposed any effort to
reopen the Djibouti Peace Process at this point and that the
U.S. was pressing Eritrea to stop its support for Al Shabaab
and other violent extremists, including through a possible UN
Security Council (UNSC) resolution. Both the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU
had made clear their position vis-a-vis Eritrea and the U.S.
supported this position. DAS Wycoff also noted the
importance of having the AU and UN work together smoothly on
Somalia, noting that the appointment of a new AU Special
Envoy for Somalia offered an opportunity for improvement in
this area.


8. (C) When DAS Wycoff pressed Lamamra to find ways to speed
up the flow of money to the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) and AMISOM, Lamamra said that UN Trust Fund procedures
are slow, taking up to two years, but the
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) mechanism offered much promise
for faster action in the future. He explained that
accounting problems are responsible for the slow disbursement
of funds. "If it were corruption, it would have been
clearer. It's technical," he said. Lamamra also emphasized
that the Somali government must take ownership of how funds

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are allocated by deciding what it needs and working more
closely with partners. DAS Wycoff noted that it was critical
to find ways to streamline the procedures and find ways to
remove obstacles to the flow of funds. Delays were hampering
support for AMISOM and the TFG.


9. (C) Lamamra revealed plans by the Spanish Government to
initiate a high-level forum of international partners to
demonstrate their political commitment to Somalia and to
discuss the way forward. He speculated that this forum might
be convened during the first quarter of 2010 once Spain has
the European Union presidency.

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UN-AU COORDINATION
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10. (C) Asked about the efficacy of UN-AU coordination,
Lamamra said that while it could be better, it is going well.
He noted that the volume of joint activities is
ever-increasing, and that personalities and differing
methodologies factor in, but one "cannot expect an entrenched
organization and a nascent one with ambitions to get along
without difficulty." The UN Secretary General has agreed
that he should meet frequently with AU Chairperson Jean Ping,
as should Lamamra and his counterpart. Lamamra mentioned
plans for the AU to present the Mbeki report on Sudan to the
UNSC as an example of upcoming cooperation.


11. (U) DAS Wycoff has cleared this message.
MUSHINGI