ETHIOPIAN PM CONSIDERING PRO-ACTIVE OPTIONS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002817

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN PM CONSIDERING PRO-ACTIVE OPTIONS ON
ERITREA, SUPPORTS KENYA'S JUBALAND INITIATIVE

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Classified By: CDA Roger Meece for reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) SUMMARY. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles told visiting
AF/DAS Wycoff and CDA on November 19 that he wanted to give
the USG a "heads up" that Ethiopia was considering actively
supporting armed Eritrean opposition groups if the
international community fails to take action to isolate
Asmara. Wycoff questioned providing such support, noting the
USG,s interest in regional stability. On Somalia, Meles said
the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has recently informed Kenya
of its support in principle for Kenya's Jubaland initiative
and has agreed to share relevant intelligence. On Ethiopia's
forthcoming elections, Meles pledged that the rule-of-law
would be the bedrock that both assures free and fair
elections and deals with any groups that seek to undermined
the process. He complained that Diaspora money has too much
influence in determining the relative strengths of opposition
parties, although he added that implementation of a law
restricting foreign funding of NGOs would allow for
exceptions on a case-by-case basis. When asked, he justified
the continued imprisonment of opposition leader Bertukan
Midekessa as necessary to demonstrate that Ethiopia has no
"twilight zone" between the legal and the illegal. After
expressing understanding for the ramifications of further
inaction, Meles said he would look into apparent GoE-imposed
obstacles to delivery of U.S. military equipment and supplies
as well as re-examine the GoE,s stance on Leahy vetting
requirements.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED. Wycoff agreed that Eritrea has
shown no signs of changing its behavior but suggested that
the broadening discussion of sanctions, including Ambassador
Rice's personal involvement at USUN, has caught the attention
of Eritrean President Isaias. Wycoff added that the USG has
worked to undercut support for Eritrea, including his own
visits to Gulf countries to enlist their support in such
activities as well as their active support for Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). He said the U.S. is
opposed to Kenya's so-called Jubaland initiative, given the
complexities of Somalia. Our concern is that efforts to
implement such an initiative would backfire causing even
greater instability. On the elections, he said the USG
recognizes the signing of a preamble to an electoral code of
Conduct as a valuable step and would be looking now to the
orderly registration of political parties and individual
candidates. He also advocated that all parties, including
the government, should work to create an environment that was
conducive to the participation in the elections process by
all other parties. He said the U.S. views the role of civil
society as crucial to democracy and that it was natural for
the USG to promote the role of non-governmental organizations
in Ethiopia. The Charge noted that DAS Wycoff,s visit was
intended as a signal of USG intent to follow up substantively
on the November 5 bilateral talks in Washington to intensify
U.S.-Ethiopia relations on several fronts. He also told
Meles of his forthcoming departure from Post. Wycoff held an
on-the-record press conference with domestic and
international press, where he highlighted the comprehensive
nature of the bilateral agenda and USG concerns about the
reduction of political space and the importance of a free and
fair elections process in Ethiopia. END SUMMARY.


3. (SBU) Visiting AF/DAS Karl Wycoff and CDA Meece met with
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi for 90 minutes on
November 19. Meles was joined by Chief of Cabinet Birhanu
Adelu. The USG was also represented by pol/econ counselor
and deputy counselor.

Ethiopia Looking at More Pro-Active Options on Eritrea
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Prime Minister Meles raised Eritrean misbehavior
several times. He said Ethiopia is convinced that Eritrea
realizes it cannot destabilize Ethiopia before the latter's
May 2010 elections and so has decided to target its
destabilization efforts for the period just after the
elections. (NOTE: The 2005 Ethiopian elections themselves
were relatively calm, but post-election tensions stemming
from vote-counting disputes triggered violence and widespread
government reprisals. END NOTE.) He said Ethiopia's response
to Asmara's efforts to destabilize Ethiopia, Somalia and,
more recently, Djibouti and Yemen has been almost exclusively
passive but added that he wanted to give us a "heads up that
we are looking at options." He said, "We would be happy to
stand down if developments outside the area obviate the need
to become more pro-active."


5. (C) Making clear what international community actions

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would persuade Ethiopia to stand down, Meles expressed
particular disappointment that the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) has not taken action to impose a sanctions
regime on Eritrea. He urged the U.S. to redouble sanctions
efforts and especially to reconsider targeting remittances as
what he called a "key instrument" for pressuring Asmara.
Citing as examples his own Amcit, ethnic-Eritrean cousins, he
said, "If the U.S. were to insist that paying taxes to Asmara
is a felony, it would be easier for them to resist the tax.
The Diaspora could say, 'We can't pay you.'"


6. (C) DAS Wycoff questioned providing support to Eritrean
anti-government armed groups, noting the USG,s interest in
regional stability. Wycoff agreed there is no evidence that
Eritrea has showed improvement in its behavior, although he
added that President Isaias had recently undertaken something
of a charm offensive targeted at European diplomats, a
possible indication that he may be considering options.
Wycoff assured Meles that the U.S. remains committed to
achieving a UNSC sanctions regime against Asmara and
continues to broaden the discussion beyond the P3 and Uganda
with a hard push by USUN. He said the USG was also expanding
efforts to undercut support for Asmara, noting for example he
been sent on a trip to Cairo, Riyadh, Jeddah and other cities
both to promote efforts to undercut flows of support to
Asmara but also to seek concrete support for Somalia's TFG.
He said he has observed that some EU member states, formerly
more supportive of Eritrea, have come to accept that Eritrea
is playing a seriously negative role in the region and that
the UK now believes that Eritrea has become a significant
threat to its own domestic security.


7. (C) Pressed by Wycoff to describe the "pro-active"
measures being considered, Meles said one option would be to
directly support opposition groups that are capable of
sending "armed propaganda units" into Eritrea Meles said
that the groups with the most capability to operate inside
Eritrea are those "that you don't like from the lowlands,
like the Keru" who he said would be "much better able to
survive in Eritrea." (NOTE. The Keru are a primarily Muslim
ethnic group most of whose members live in Eritrea, although
a minority live in Ethiopia. END NOTE.)

Somalia: Ethiopia Offers Kenya Support on Jubaland Policy
-------------- --------------


8. (C) PM Meles revealed that the GoE recently held meetings
with Kenyan officials regarding Kenya's Jubaland initiative
involving the training in Kenya of ethic Somalis to return to
Somalia's south in order to fight Al-Shabab. He said that he
understood that A/S Carson had pressed Kenya to brief
Ethiopia on this Kenyan initiative after it had been broached
with the USG. Meles stated his thanks to the A/S for his
role in ensuring that Ethiopia was consulted on this
sensitive issue. He said the GoE had offered support in
principle for the initiative and had offered to share
relevant information, especially in connection with the
vetting of ethnic Ogaden recruits. Wycoff stated
unequivocally that the USG thought this initiative was a bad
one and that it held more risk of worsening Somalia,s
stability than helping. Wycoff also noted that Kenya had
little experience in executing such initiatives. Meles
agreed with Wycoff's concern that Kenya has no history of
successfully implementing this kind of program and has shown
no evidence of the political will necessary to sustain the
initiative, especially in the complex constellation of clans
found in southern Somalia. Wycoff said the USG finds it more
likely that the initiative would backfire and has expressed
this concern at multiple levels of the Kenyan government.
Meles said he shares this concern and added another -- Kenya
seems to have the money to launch the initiative but not to
sustain it, a concern he said he had felt it prudent not to
express to the Kenyans. Nevertheless, he is impressed that
Kenya has done a good deal of groundwork to prepare the
initiative and said frankly that Ethiopia wants to ensure
that the Ogaden National Liberation Front does not benefit
from the training, an eventuality he feels Ethiopian
involvement could help obviate.


9. (C) DAS Wycoff made clear that the U.S. does not consider
Kenya's initiative to be productive at this point and intends
to stay away from it. He urged Meles to consider that the
TFG has achieved some tenuous viability because it is to a
large extent home-grown rather than imposed from outside
Somalia. Meles countered that the TFG must move forward or
it will sooner or later move backwards. He said many
observers are alleging that TFG President Sharif is a Wahhabi
Muslim, but he has decided Sharif deserves the benefit of the

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doubt. Less personally, he believes the Kenyan initiative
presents a pragmatic opportunity to support the TFG and he
intends to embrace it because the alternatives to the TFG --
Al-Shabab, Hisb al-Islam, etc. -- are much worse. As a
bottom line, he said he believes the Kenyan program could
weaken extremists in Somalia.


10. (C) Meles said the TFG's primary problem is lack of cash
in that the $400 million pledged by donors in Brussels and
elsewhere is being used to finance NGOs in the region instead
of paying TFG troops. He complained that neither the Saudis
nor the Gulf States are giving money. He said the U.S. alone
is directly financing the TFG and is keeping it afloat. Some
internationals, he continued, want to start the Djibouti
Process over again -- a sentiment he understands given the
waste of resources committed by the previous TFG president
but dismisses as counterproductive today. He said the TFG is
developing a budget and that IGAD intends to help raise the
funds needed. He urged the U.S. to push other donors to make
direct contributions as we have done. Wycoff noted that the
USG has also pressed the TFG to develop a budget, transparent
budget process, and focus on developing a capability to
govern, including providing services.


11. (C) Wycoff acknowledged that Ethiopia will have a role to
play in Somalia, including in facilitating a TFG-Al Sunna Wal
Jamma alliance (ASWJ),but urged Meles to play its role with
discretion in order to avoid Ethiopian involvement serving as
a recruiting tool for Al-Shabab. Wycoff added that the U.S.
is also urging the TFG to form a strategic alliance with
ASWJ.

Rule of Law to Deal with Those Who Would "Discredit the
Process"
--------------


12. (C) Wycoff acknowledged that U.S. and Ethiopian officials
had held "fulsome discussions" in Washington on November 5-6
and characterized his visit as a clear signal that the USG
would follow up aggressively across the full range of
bilateral issues. He said he would be meeting with key
actors in the Ethiopian electoral process -- including the
National Election Board of Ethiopia, the minister of
communication, and opposition party leaders -- and would urge
them all to facilitate full engagement in the process.
Wycoff noted that it was incumbent on all parties to create
an atmosphere that was conducive to participation in the
elections by all other parties. Wycoff praised the signing
by four major political parties, including Meles' ruling
EPRDF, of a preamble to an electoral code of conduct as a
positive step, adding that the U.S. would be very attentive
during the imminent "crunch time" for the legal registration
of political parties and individual candidates. He told
Meles the U.S. views the role of civil society as very
important to the democratization process and expressed
concern about recent Ethiopian legislation that would limit
the capacity of Ethiopian civil society groups that receive
foreign funding to engage in political advocacy and conflict
mitigation.


13. (C) Meles straightforwardly defended the legislation,
saying Ethiopia also welcomes the role of civil society but
suggesting that Ethiopia defines it a bit differently than
does the U.S. He said civil society groups should be
domestic and should be funded domestically, from the members
of the groups themselves and other Ethiopian citizens. He
added, however, that once the ongoing re-registration process
concludes for domestically funded groups, waivers from the
new law's funding restrictions will be considered for other
groups on a case-by-case basis. Wycoff replied that the U.S.
would be watching this registration process closely and urged
Meles to consider a flow of money between the American people
and the people of African nations, including Ethiopia, to be
a natural consequence of the role of civil society and
relations between our peoples.


14. (C) Meles pointedly criticized the Ethiopian Diaspora,
especially its U.S. members, for launching "a massive
campaign to ostracize opposition parties who take part in the
process." Obviously referring to the continuous involvement
in the code of conduct talks of the opposition "All Ethiopian
Unity Party," Meles said, "One party changing its view
doesn't mean there aren't tougher nuts to crack." He said,
"We will assume that all political parties participating in
the elections are doing so legally, but the rule-of-law will
apply and those parties looking only to discredit the process
will be addressed."


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15. (C) Wycoff raised the continued imprisonment of
opposition leader Bertukan Midekessa, and Meles replied at
length. Recounting the familiar history that Bertukan had
joined in a group request for pardon after convictions
stemming from the violent aftermath of the 2005 elections,
Meles characterized her later disavowing of the pardon
request as an attempt "to prove there is room in Ethiopia to
operate in a twilight zone between the legal and the illegal,
and we had to prove her wrong." He said he had "expressed
frustration" with European Union representatives recently
because, in his view, they insist on reacting in just the way
Bertukan wants rather than persuading her that she need not
be in prison.

Meles Open to Expediting Military Supplies,
Less Helpful on Leahy Vetting
--------------


16. (C) Wycoff announced that AFRICOM Commanding General Ward
and DASD Huddleston would soon be arriving in Ethiopia in
follow-up to the November 5 talks and suggested that the U.S.
would like to dispense with two problems, apparently of a
procedural or technical nature, before those visits. Wycoff
explained the nonwaivable Leahy Vetting requirements that
must be met before the U.S. can provide training or equipment
to foreign militaries, assured Meles there is no U.S. attempt
to direct equipment to particular individuals or units, and
said there nevertheless seems to be a reluctance on the part
of the GoE to allow that vetting. Charge Meece explained
that shipments of military equipment were backlogged in
Djibouti because the names of Ethiopian National Defense
Force (ENDF) officers to whom the equipment would be
delivered had not been submitted to the USG for Leahy
vetting. Meece described the second problem as another
backlog in Djibouti, this time involving a cement shipment,
destined for a DOD project in the Ethiopian town of Arba
Minch, that is languishing for lack of Ethiopian paperwork.


17. (C) Meles said he would investigate the Leahy vetting
obstruction, but added that the problem is likely that
Ethiopia sees the DOD/ENDF cooperation as institutional
rather than personal and may be further compounded by the
fact that the equipment is likely not assigned by the ENDF to
particular units. He asked whether the equipment could be
transferred to a second unit, after being delivered to a
first, at ENDF discretion. Wycoff replied that vetting
requirements, once met, might not preclude such transfers but
would have to be addressed on the basis of each specific
case. He was aware of cases where such equipment transfers
had been approved in other countries.


18. (C) On the Arba Minch issue, Meles said, "We'll see if we
can find a shortcut." (Note: On November 20, Meles advisor
Birhanuto called CDA to suggest that the embassy submit a
note verbal on the matter directly to the minister of
finance, bypassing the ministry of foreign affairs, and said
that the problem should then be solved. End Note.)


19. (C) CDA Meece ended the meeting by assuring Meles that
the U.S. hopes to intensify relations with Ethiopia on
several fronts relating to defense, elections, intelligence,
and more. He also announced his own forthcoming departure
from Post. Wycoff noted that the gap in having a permanent
Ambassador in Addis was purely a matter of assigning the best
possible person to the job and should not be perceived as a
political signal of any kind.


20. (SBU) Wycoff held an on-the-record press conference with
domestic and international press, where he highlighted the
comprehensive nature of the bilateral agenda and USG concerns
about the reduction of political space and the importance of
a free and fair elections process in Ethiopia.


21. (SBU) DAS Wycoff cleared on this message.
MEECE