AU SUMMIT -- AF ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000270

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/C, AND IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU XA SU SO CG RW
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT -- AF ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS WITH
UNDPKO ALAIN LE ROY AND SRSG FOR EASTERN CONGO ALAN DOSS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: AF Acting Assistant Secretary Phillip Carter
met with UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations
Alain Le Roy and UN Special Representative of the Secretary General
for Eastern Congo Alan Doss January 31 on the margins of the AU
Summit in Addis Ababa. Carter brought Le Roy up to date on AMISOM
and support for the Unity Government in Somalia. On Sudan, Le Roy
said the UN would accept U.S. support for a ceasefire monitoring
mechanism. On the Eastern Congo, Ross expressed guarded optimism,
but said it is too early to declare victory. End Summary.


2. (C) On Somalia, Le Roy repeated earlier assertions that an
estimated USD 600 million would be needed for the first year of a
UN Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia, a figure which Carter
characterized as much higher than necessary, possibly by a factor
of eight or nine. Carter mentioned the election of Sheikh Sharif
by a large margin and said a priority of the USG is to ensure
Unity Government troops are paid on time and regularly.
He and Le Roy agreed to meet again to review progress in May.



3. (C) On Sudan, Carter expressed concern about the AU's
proposal for a senior level panel of experts chaired by
South African President Thabo Mbeki which would advise the
Government of Sudan on the modalities of prosecuting war
crimes domestically. He said AU Commissioner Jean Ping had told
him that the AU perceives a clear bias against Africans within
the International Criminal Court. So far, as the United States
is concerned, Sudan has done little to make progress towards
peace in Darfur, help UNAMID deploy or implement the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Le Roy responded the Sudanese
and the AU both think they have done a lot.


4. (C) Le Roy said he understood the Sudan Peoples,
Liberation Movement is making efforts to move Bashir out of the
Presidency. He said he has noticed less cooperation on the
ground from Sudan as the ICC arrest warrant draws near. Le
Roy mentioned AU Deputy Commissioner had told him that he had
nearly convinced Carter of the value of accepting
a UN Security Council Article XVI deferral of the ICC
indictment. Surprised by this assertion, Carter said that the
opposite was true and that he had had told Lamamra, in the
plainest of terms, that the US did not see any reason for a
deferment. When asked if the UN would welcome U.S. support for
a UN Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism in Darfur, Le Roy welcomed
the support and said that all help from Security Council members
is helpful.


5. (C) Doss said the Congolese rebel movement National Congress
for the Defense of the People (CNDP) loyalists to their former
commander, Laurent Nkunda, are waiting to see what happens to
their arrested leader before they agree to integrate into the
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. UN
Mediator Obasanjo and AU Mediator Mkapa are scheduled to meet on
February 5 with DRC President Kabila and Rwandan
President Kagame to work towards finding a political
solution, and intend to let them jointly set the agenda. Doss
said the return of Rwandan refugees is the big issue and it is
still too early to declare victory. Doss plans to take
advantage of the UNSC-mandated increase in force level of the
UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) to move more robust elements
within MONUC to bolster the FARDC, which is still not ready for
combat operations.


6. (C) Doss noted further the aim is to ensure the rebel
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda does not produce
significant casualties. Rwandan forces in Eastern Congo are
moving carefully, with a light footprint and no armor. They
do not want to rush, but they do not want to drag out operations
to further arouse the suspicions regarding Rwanda's
intentions. Kabila is betting the farm on ending the war and
using this success as a platform to run again in 2011. Regarding
the decision of whether or not to extradite Nkunda to the DRC,
Ross speculated it may be best to try him publicly in Rwanda.


7. (C) When asked what the United States could do to help,
Doss said to get Rwanda to let MONUC into the Joint Operations
Center (JOC),as they are still suspicious; to encourage them to
keep operations against the FDLR short and simple in North Kivu
and to proceed carefully in South Kivu, where the situation is
more complex and resentment against the Rwandans is deep. Doss
also said to try not to let the FARDC do any more stupid things.
With further respect to the JOC, Doss said in

ADDIS ABAB 00000270 002 OF 002


a subsequent conversation he has proposed that the Rwandan armed
forces communicate intelligence only to him and MONUC Force
Commander Babacar Gaye.


8. (U) Acting A/S Carter approved this message before
departing Addis.
YAMAMOTO