Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ADDISABABA267
2009-02-02 17:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

AU SUMMIT -- AF ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS WITH

Tags:  PREL AU XA SU CD 
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FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3600
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0476
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3229
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0886
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000267 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019
TAGS: PREL AU XA SU CD
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT -- AF ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS WITH
SUDANESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000267

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019
TAGS: PREL AU XA SU CD
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT -- AF ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS WITH
SUDANESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: AF Acting Assistant Secretary Phillip
Carter, joined by Acting USAID Assistant Administrator Earl Gast,
and Sudan Programs Group Director Timothy Shortley, met February 1
with Sudanese Presidential Advisers Nafie Ali Nafie and Mustafa
Ismael and Sudanese Foreign Minister Deng Alor on the margins of
the AU Summit in Addis Ababa. Carter sought to obtain more decisive
action from the Sudanese on Darfur and on implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as well as to urge the
Government to hold off on attacking the South Darfur town of
Muhajariya, which was occupied by Justice and Equality Movement
rebel forces two weeks ago. Nafie accused the United States of
having a hidden agenda -- regime change -- and using Darfur and CPA
as "tools" to accomplish this goal. He said the United States
consistently displayed uneven treatment, confronting the Government
of Sudan but ignoring transgressions by the Government of South
Sudan, Darfur rebels, or others. Carter resolutely denied these
accusations, characterizing them as ludicrous. End
Summary


2. (C) Carter opened the meeting by saying the USG would like
to get a sense from President Bashir's advisers on the direction
of things in Sudan. He noted that the United States and Sudan
share the same goals: a prosperous Sudan at peace with itself and
with its neighbors. Sudan is at a crossroads: the first path
leads from one virtue to the next, with the possibility of finding
resolutions to Darfur and implementing the CPA, while the other,
as represented by the status quo, only leads to an ever steeper
downhill. Darfur is a very potent question which has captured the
attention of President Obama, Vice President Biden, and Secretary
of State Clinton. Carter urged the Sudanese to seize the moment
and use the existing structure for a successful outcome. He
further emphasized that the moment is right, as there is a capable
UN/AU Joint Mediator for Darfur, Djibril Bassole, in whom the
United States has confidence and supports, and who is working in
coordination with the Qataris on the Doha Initiative. Carter
underscored that the United States is very concerned about the

situation in Muhajariya, in South Darfur, which threatens to cause
massive casualties, a humanitarian crisis, and an abrupt halt to
the peace process.


3. (C) Carter asked his Sudanese interlocutors to pause in
military operations against Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
forces which forcibly seized the Muhajariya two weeks ago from
the Government and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)/Minni Minawi,
who signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),to avoid additional
violence which will help no one, and agree to advance the date
for a Doha meeting with JEM by one week. Carter attempted to
underscore to the Government of Sudan (GOS) that there are
consequences to its behavior, including action by the UN
Security Council. He further pressed upon the GOS that at this
moment, the USG is undertaking a major review of policy and
strategy towards Sudan, including more robust options in Darfur,
and any action -- positive or negative -- taken by GOS would
likely influence such a policy. He relayed that the USG is
deeply concerned not only about the lack of movement on Darfur
peace negotiations, but also about the lagging pace of
implementation of the CPA between North and South Sudan, the
slow pace of preparation for 2009 elections, the
continued dispute over border demarcation, and the status of
Abyei, not to mention issues related to the level of support
and cooperation on the bilateral front.


4. (C) Nafie said the main issue for Sudan is bilateral relations
with the United States. The USG does not think nearly so much
about humanitarian affairs and human rights in the Middle East or
other parts of Africa as it does when it comes to Sudan. Darfur,
the CPA, and humanitarian affairs are really tools the United
States is using to undermine the GOS because it is not satisfied
with the bilateral relationship. Addressing Carter, Nafie
said "unless you tell us what your problem really is, we will
get nowhere." Carter replied that issues like Darfur and CPA
implementation have a close correlation with U.S./Sudan
bilateral relations. The USG has labeled what is going on in
Darfur as genocide. The USG has been engaged for nearly two
decades trying to resolve the conflict between the North and
the South. The United States and Sudan need to get these
issues off the table so that they can concentrate on the more
constructive elements of the relationship and on sustainable
economic growth and development.


5. (C) Shortley, seeking to clarify Nafie's point, asked if
it was the Sudanese government's perception that the United
States is seeking regime change. Nafie said with emphasis
"exactly: the United States is always squeezing us, and we have

ADDIS ABAB 00000267 002 OF 003


no mutual interest." Sudan appreciates the USG's efforts on
negotiating the CPA, but does not appreciate the systematically
uneven approach which favors the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM) to the detriment of the North. Sudan feels that
promises have not been kept. The government had been adamant
about using a scientific approach to allocate oil revenues
between North and South, but the United States insisted on a
50- 50 split, and when the North went along, it got no
recognition. Sudan accepted the US's plan for partitioning the
oil-rich region of Abyei, but when the SPLA violated the
terms of the agreement, the United States said nothing.


6. (C) Nafie said the government thinks the CPA is a big
achievement, and believes implementation is going well. He
accused the SPLA of spreading all over Sudan, which
he characterized as a violation of the agreement which went
unremarked by the United States. The only two outstanding
problems with CPA implementation are border demarcation and the
census/referendum law. When Carter asked if a date had been set
for the 2009 elections, Nafie replied that both sides are
committed, but it is the electoral
commission which decides the date. Regarding demarcation,
the eastern sector is completed, there is one remaining point of
disagreement in the central sector, and one remaining point in
the western sector. As of now, there is nothing to jeopardize
implementation of the CPA: if problems arise, it will be
something superimposed on us. When Shortley asked for
clarification, Nafie confirmed that he was speaking about the
International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant for
President Bashir.


7. (C) On North/South issues, Nafie said the National Congress
Party is "committed to whatever our brothers in the South
decide." As for Darfur, he described it is a creation of
the West. According to Nafie, Darfur is a typical conflict
like what exists throughout Africa, complicated by Sudan's own
internal situation. "It is our problem to resolve. We
are very keen to resolve it. We don,t think you fully
appreciate our efforts." Nafie went on to say the Government
of Sudan appreciates USG efforts on the DPA. The DPA was very
fair. A two-week signing deadline was issued at the time of its
completion. Those who refused to sign would be labeled
terrorists. Nevertheless, the United States turned a blind eye
when most of the rebel groups refused to sign. "If there is
anyone who can claim we have not been helpful, let them come
forward with documentation and prove it. We fully support the
Bassole/Doha process and come to the table without
preconditions so long as others do the
same." Turning to Muhajariya, Nafie said he had heard Carter
suggest that Sudan not take back territory lost to JEM. He
added that Muhajariya is deep inside Sudan, close to South
Kordofan, on the road to Abyei, and far from the border with
Chad, whence the rebels came. "We will not hear talk of you
telling us not to fight JEM."


8. (C) Deng, who is a southerner, spoke little in the meeting,
but when prompted by Nafie, said he does not see eye to eye
with Nafie on the CPA implementation issue. He said Nafie's
statements were not helpful to improve bilateral relations.


9. (C) Carter said it is difficult to disprove the negative,
summarizing that Sudanese authorities clearly have a deep
distrust of the United States and its motives. Carter
dispelled Nafie,s claims as ludicrous. Darfur is not a
simple African conflict and it has horrified a broad spectrum
of the American public. Responding to Nafie's claims of
American plotting, "All of our work over the past two decades
is proof we are not trying to overthrow you." As for the
immediate crisis facing Muhajariya, Carter told his
Sudanese interlocutor that the US was also pressuring them to
cease military actions and proceed to Doha immediately.
Shortley said in a first meeting with the new Secretary,
Sudan was discussed, and the Secretary asked for a strategy.
The United States can either have a deeper engagement with
Sudan or more mistrust and a degradation of relations
noting that -- it is easy for the Department of State to
recommend deeper engagement which builds on the high points of
the CPA and DPA signings. However, Shortley
stressed that the Government of Sudan must build confidence
with the new U.S. Administration and its actions over the
coming days will have a significant impact. On
CPA implementation, much work remains. On Darfur, only a
minimum level of implementation has been accomplished.


10. (C) Nafie said "we have not claimed we are not interested
in a deeper dialogue. We need to be able to agree on a measure

ADDIS ABAB 00000267 003 OF 003


for success or failure. We have the Assessment and
Evaluation Committee which could serve as a model of how
an unbiased, independent arbiter can judge results, separating
rhetoric from reality."


11. (C) Mustafa spoke about when he accompanied Deng to the
United States to meet with Secretary Rice. Deng wrote on a
piece of paper the three things Sudan wanted most from the
United States -- lifting the State Sponsor of Terrorism
designation, lifting sanctions, and managing a basket of
bilateral issues, while Mustafa himself wrote down
the three things he thought the United States most wanted
from Sudan -- peace in Darfur, the CPA, and bilateral issues.
He said Rice had expressed understanding and agreed
strongly with both lists. He would like to see the roadmap
of the new Administration, and asked if today's meeting was the
beginning of a new roadmap or just a transition point.
According to Mustafa, public opinion in Sudan will not accept
JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim taking over the town of Muhajariya.
"What is your strategy? You are asking us not to fight. Are
you also telling Khalil to quit Muhajariya? He has been
occupying the town for two weeks. He hand picked this town as
his new military base of operations for its location deep inside
Sudanese territory and for its relative proximity to Abyei.
Should we be required to accept this?"


12. (C) Carter said the United States wants what the GOS: A
Darfur at peace, with UNAMID troops returned to their native
countries, and displaced Darfurians back in their homes to
resume their livelihoods. The USG has issued a statement
condemning the JEM provocations and Sudanese bombing. Carter
stated that "Doha can move your interests forward.
Military action will only hurt your image, and your cause."
Mustafa said the best thing for Muhajariya would be for JEM to
leave, for UNAMID to stay, and for Minni Minawi to return.
Mustafa opined that if the United States does not tell JEM to
leave Muhajariya, some people will logically draw the
conclusion that the United States told them to do it during
their recent visit to the United States. Nafie added it is not
the Government of Sudan who created this situation. JEM's
actions are a provocation and if we do nothing, the situation
will get much worse, he said. A convoy of reinforcements
with approximately 100 vehicles had been found on its way to
the town and, while the army had stopped it, the convoy was
bound to make another run at the town. Nafie stated
again that the GOS cannot allow Muhajariya to remain in
JEM's hands.


13. (C) Carter vigorously rejected Khalil's insinuation that
the USG knew of let alone approved JEM's decision to occupy
Muhajariya and urged the Sudanese again to hold off. Nafie
said "we will try a quick, clean job on Muhajariya and then we
will go to Doha." Carter again urged Sudan to step back from
confrontation and seek first a peaceful resolution in Doha, but
Nafie again demurred. Carter then said it was the Government of
Sudan's responsibility to contain the violence and prevent the
conflict from spilling over into the Chad/Sudan relationship.
Nafie claimed that the Government of Sudan had no interest in
seeking the overthrow of Chadian President Deby.


14. (C) Shortley said that Djibril Ibrahim, JEM spokesman and
brother of JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, will fly from London to
meet with Bassole and his brother in N'Djamena and continue
onward to Doha for negotiations of the draft framework and
cessation of hostilities. On the ICC, Carter said we need
to continue to work towards resolving problems regardless of
the outcome of the ICC arrest warrant: We have no choice but
to move CPA implementation and resolution of Darfur forward.


15. (U) Acting A/S Carter approved this message before
departing Addis.
YAMAMOTO