MELES OFFERS PLANS "A" AND "B" ON SOMALIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000261

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC MARR SO ET
SUBJECT: MELES OFFERS PLANS "A" AND "B" ON SOMALIA

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In the first U.S.-Ethiopia bilateral meeting on
Somalia since Ethiopia's January 26 withdrawal from Somalia,
Prime Minister Meles laid out Ethiopia's views on a best case
scenario "Plan A" and containment strategy "Plan B" regarding
Somalia in a January 30 meeting with Acting Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs Phil Carter. Meles argued that
al Shabaab's clan base has largely diminished leaving only
the hard-liners in place. If Somalia's Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) has funds, and moves constructively toward
establishing security and governing, the international
community can play a constructive role toward promoting
progress and stability in Somalia. If the TFG remains
feckless, however, al Shabaab will likely control much of
southern Somalia, Ethiopia will employ a containment strategy
along the border, and the U.S. and international community
must devise a sea-based evacuation strategy for the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to avoid them being "chewed
up." End Summary.

AL SHABAAB HAS LOST ITS CLAN BASE, WHICH OFFERS AND OPENING
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2. (C) Prime Minister suggested that the best case scenario
for Somalia now is to go back to the pre-2006 circumstances
in which al Shabaab has a presence, but not control of
Somalia and the TFG remains the prevailing framework for the
country. Meles argued that the likelihood of such a scenario
is difficult to judge, but he was clear in his analysis that
as Shabaab has lost much of its previous clan base. Whereas
the Habr Gedir/Ayr sub-clan had previously been al Shabaab's
base, Meles posited that the Ayr have since become
disillusioned with al Shabaab because their support for the
group has brought the clan little if any tangible benefit
leading many clan leaders to reject the groups extremist
approach. Similarly, while al Shabaab had previously found
great support among Somalia's Wahhabists, recent affronts to
sheikhs and desecration of Muslim graves by the group has
eroded its Wahhabi support, leaving al Shabaab with a "shaky
social base." Meles pointed to uprisings by Somalis against
al Shabaab, the receptivity of such groups to materiel and
information support from Ethiopia, and the split within the
Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) leading some
to negotiate with the TFG as manifestations of al Shabaab's
loss of support. Whereas all "Islamists" tried to join the
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) bandwagon in 2006, most have now
decided to go their own way, Meles argued.


3. (C) In addition to losing its clan support, al Shabaab has
also begun to find lagging support even among its own
fighters in recent weeks as payments to soldiers have begun
to fade. Meles was unsure whether the waning payments
resulted from a reduction of the flow of payments from their
sources or from problems with the financial sector used to
effect the payments, but was clear that the result was
diminished commitment among fighters. As a result, this
dynamic makes it easier to counter al Shabaab as it is
cheaper to pay off their fighters to join the other side. As
a result, if the TFG has access to funds to pay its security
force, and demonstrates the political will both to use those
funds appropriately and move forward on governance, the
fragile government could attract many Shabaab fighters,
leaving only the hard-liners behind and returning Somalia to
a pre-2006 styled environment.

"PLAN B" IS CONTAINMENT AND DAMAGE CONTROL
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4. (C) If this best case scenario fails, Meles argued, "Plan
B" must be to find a way to prevent AMISOM from being "chewed
up" and to contain al Shabaab. For Ethiopia, the Prime
Minister asserted, dealing with al Shabaab means establishing
a containment force along the Ethiopia-Somalia border. Such
a force would link up closely with Somali clans along the
border within Somalia (including southern Somalia,
Somaliland, and Puntland) to provide a modicum of security
for Ethiopia to resist al Shabaab's affronts. Meles was
clear; "saving AMISOM is now beyond Ethiopia's means."
Still, Meles argued that AMISOM's extraction must be
sea-based as a withdrawal by air would leave the group too
vulnerable to the MANPADS which have saturated the country.

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MAKING "PLAN A" WORK
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5. (C) Prime Minister Meles was emphatic that the
international community must not discuss "Plan B" with the
Somalis as they would certainly interpret it to reflect a
loss of confidence and commitment to keeping Somalia stable,
resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Carter briefed
Meles on the United States' exploration of the viability of a
joint security force composed of the old TFG and ARS elements
which now comprise the government of national unity to
counter al Shabaab and constrain them. Meles agreed that an
approach would be vital, assuming that the new Somali
leadership dynamics did not exacerbate Hawiye-Darood tensions.


6. (C) Meles argued that making "Plan A" work requires 1)
bolstering AMISOM, and 2) establishing a viable indigenous
security force that would be paid predictably and
transparently. Meles focused on modalities for paying
security forces, noting that Ethiopia had been paying TFG
forces on behalf of the TFG in the latter months of
Ethiopia's presence in Somalia. Meles insisted that payment
modalities must be transparent and timely, and that payments
must be made "as closely to the grassroots" as possible.
Meles suggested embedding within AMISOM an international
(possibly Scandinavian) paymaster who is trusted by both the
donors and security forces. Meles argued against a UN
paymaster as the UN agencies within Somalia have become
"acclimatized to the ways of doing business in Mogadishu."
Only once security is established, Meles argued, can the
Somali government focus on building institutions.
YAMAMOTO