MELES ON SUDAN: ICC AND U.S. ENGAGEMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000259

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC SU ET
SUBJECT: MELES ON SUDAN: ICC AND U.S. ENGAGEMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (S/NF) In a January 30 meeting, Ethiopian Prime Minister
Meles told Acting AF Assistant Secretary Phil Carter and
AF/SPG Director Tim Shortley that with the expected ICC
indictment of Sudanese President Bashir either 1) someone
within Khartoum would take advantage of the move to attempt
to remove Bashir, or 2) such an attempt will either fail or
be aborted. While Meles gave the chances of success for
option 1 as nearly zero due to the close knit ties among
senior National Congress Party (NCP) officials, he argued
that the result would leave the Bashir government a "wounded
animal" that is more desperate. Meles argued that to the NCP
leadership, their approach is "perfectly rational." He
explained that the Government of Sudan (GoS) thought it had
moved left bad relations with the U.S. behind when they
signed the Naivasha Agreements, only to, in their view, have
the USG move the goal posts As a result, Meles suggested
that the NCP believes that the "U.S. will get them one way or
the other" and if they see their options as either "to die
today or die tomorrow, they will chose to employ delaying
mechanisms allowing them to die tomorrow." As such, they
have no need to resolve problems with the South because it
will bring no benefit to them. Facing such calculus, Meles
analyzed the GoS approach as to 1) postpone a vote on the
South, 2) buy time in Darfur, and 3) "hope for a miracle in
2011." Meles suggested that if he were the U.S., he would
either 1) remove the NCP regime or, if that weren't an
option, 2) make clear to the GoS that the U.S. is not out to
get it and explicitly lay out what is expected of the GoS on
Darfur and the South to avoid continued challenges. End
Summary.

DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF ICC INDICTMENT
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2. (C) Prime Minister Meles told Acting A/S Carter that the
International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of Sudanese
President Bashir could provide a signal to someone in
Khartoum to attempt to remove Bashir through a coup.
Although noting that he has been hearing many rumors of such
desires from within Khartoum, Meles said that he did not give
too much credence to most of these, but highlighted the
implications that such rumors have for the climate in
Khartoum. Still, Meles argued that such an option, if
attempted, would likely have a 100 percent chance of failing
due to the close connections and mutual support for one
another among senior NCP officials which would suppress any
coup attempt. If Bashir remains in power, either because no
such coup attempt is made or an attempt fails, the indictment
will leave the Bashir regime a wounded animal that is more
desperate than ever.

THE PERSPECTIVE FROM KHARTOUM
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3. (C) While acknowledging Carter's point that Khartoum's
actions seem to undermine their own long-term interests,
Meles argued that from their own perspective, the NCP's
actions are perfectly rational. While the "Islamic agenda"
may have motivated the regime ten years ago, today they are
interested only in money and power, Meles posited. While the
GoS thought that they had moved away from a climate of bad
relations with Washington when they signed the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement in Naivasha, they perceive the United States
as having shifted the goal posts on them since. As a result,
Meles argued that the GoS believes that "the U.S. will get
them one way or the other," and from that perspective, they
are already in a corner. Believing they will lose, they
perceive no benefit to them of resolving the problems of
South Sudan. Instead, Meles argued that the NCP's strategy
is to postpone a vote on the South, buy time on Darfur, and
"hope for a miracle" in 2011. Seeing the U.S. position
leaving them with the options of either "to die today or die
tomorrow, they will chose to employ delaying mechanisms
allowing them to die tomorrow."


4. (C) Meles was explicit that the GoS does not trust the
United States, but acknowledged that "to some extent they are

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immune to" a rational discussion with clear benchmarks that
allow them an out. Still, Meles claimed that the GoS has
suggested that if they get a way out, they may take it.
While acknowledging that the GoS "may try to string (the
U.S.) along," Meles argued that the real issue is whether
there is a possibility of U.S.-NCP negotiations. If that is
an option, Meles advised, it could lead to rational
discussions.

ETHIOPIA'S ADVICE FOR MOVING FORWARD
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5. (S/NF) Meles offered that if he were the United States, he
would look at two options. First, which he clearly conveyed
as the preferred choice, would be to "remove the Bashir
regime." Acknowledging that such an option was unlikely,
Meles advocated for making a clear representation to the GoS
that the United States is not/not "out to get them" and
laying out clear benchmarks of actions expected of the GoS on
both Darfur and South Sudan that would be necessary to "avoid
continued challenges" with the U.S. Meles concluded the
discussion by highlighting that "they don't trust the Obama
Administration," and "they trust the Obama Administration
less than the Bush Administration," and with a clear
reference to U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice and former
Senior NSC Director for Africa Gayle Smith "...especially
some friends of mine."
YAMAMOTO