Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ADDISABABA257
2009-02-02 14:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS PM MELES

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM ECON EAID ET 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000257 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ECON EAID ET
SUBJECT: ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS PM MELES

REF: ADDIS 3462

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000257

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ECON EAID ET
SUBJECT: ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS PM MELES

REF: ADDIS 3462

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Phil
Carter highlighted to Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles over a
two-hour January 30 meeting that while principal themes of
our foreign policy are unlikely to change across U.S.
Administrations, the U.S. will certainly emphasize the
diplomacy and development elements of U.S. interests in
bilateral engagements than we have in the recent past. While
Carter confirmed that the U.S. sees security threats as real
and persistent, our engagement will now shift to support a
more long term sustainable approach to address threats by
supporting a conducive political environment to address
people's needs, and promote transparency, governance,
tolerance, and pluralism. In that context, Carter stressed
that bilateral engagement will highlight human rights,
democracy, and governance issues much more. Surprisingly,
Meles responded by acknowledging that "of course the U.S.
will emphasize democracy and governance issues again; that is
what the United States does." Having clearly been briefed
from Carter's lunch with ruling party officials (septel),
Meles responded rather rigidly to Carter's specific push for
the release from prison of opposition leader Birtukan
Midekssa and to concerns over the recently passed Charities
and Societies Proclamation (CSO Law). While welcoming the
engagement, Meles concluded the meeting with two requests
conveyed to other USG principals over the past year: the U.S.
should continue to raise your concerns about these issues,
but 1) judge Ethiopia against our own cultural and
constitutional framework, and 2) do not judge or criticize
Ethiopia more harshly than you do "others in the region" -- a
clear reference to Eritrea. End Summary.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEWS OF ETHIOPIA
--------------


2. (C) After consulting and seeking Meles's analysis of
dynamics and approaches to Somalia and Sudan (septels) Carter
highlighted that the United States' active consultations with

Ethiopia on regional affairs is a testament to the breadth
and depth of the U.S.-Ethiopia bilateral relationship and how
much we value it. Carter noted that while broad foreign
policy priorities are unlikely to shift significantly across
U.S. Administrations, our tactics, approaches, and areas of
emphasis will likely see changes. Carter noted that our
engagement moving forward will certainly have a greater
balance among the "three D's" with diplomacy and development
playing much more prominent roles in dialogue to become more
in balance with engagement on defense. Carter emphasized
that the U.S. values our relationship with Ethiopia and wants
to strengthen and continue these relations because of our
common interests of rendering Ethiopia, and the Horn of
Africa, more stable, peaceful, and prosperous. Moving
immediately to specifics, Carter stressed that recent
Ethiopian actions -- including the passage of a restrictive
CSO Law, challenges in governance and in the restrictive
environment facing opposition political parties, the absence
of open and public debate, rampant human rights abuses, and
the late-December imprisonment of opposition leader Birtukan
Midekssa -- are not only raising concerns in Congress, but
"give us pause." Carter stressed that while these issues can
be resolved and that the Administration does not want to see
them dominate the bilateral agenda, the current trajectory is
moving them to the front of our bilateral agenda and, until
they are addressed, could affect how we engage the GoE on
future issues.

UNEXPECTED RECEPTIVITY
--------------


3. (C) Clearly having been briefed on Carter's discussion
with ruling party officials earlier in the day, Meles
responded with unexpected receptivity. Meles noted that
Ethiopia is comfortable with the United States' global
approach, but was "never fully comfortable with the last
Administrations over-emphasis on security." Instead, "a more
balanced dialogue will be more helpful and is a good
approach." In preemptively warning against an overly
compensating response, Meles next expressed his hope that the

ADDIS ABAB 00000257 002 OF 003


USG will not make the mistake of overemphasizing democracy
and governance issues or make those issues "an obstacle to
the greater agenda." Such over compensation risks making
things "more of a mess" or "exposing the United States to the
double standards" its policy leaves bare. Therefore, "it is
helpful for all of us to say that the U.S. pursues human
rights, democracy, and governance; no one points to double
standards." Meles noted that Ethiopia "expects" the U.S. to
pursue these issues, and surprisingly, noted that "while the
U.S. did raise such issues in the first years of the Bush
Administration's first term, it clearly wasn't the case in
the Bush Administration's second term."

U.S. POSITION ON IFI VOTES A SORE POINT
--------------


4. (C) Meles argued that among the "three D's," Defense has
never been a problem in the bilateral relationship with the
U.S., but the development relationship has been
"challenging." While Meles was quick to clarify that
relations with USAID have been, and continue to be, fine,
Ethiopia is concerned about the position of the U.S.
Executive Director (USED) at the World Bank. Meles briefly
raised a case several years ago in which the USED was
disinclined to support Ethiopia's inclusion in the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative. More
recently, Meles claimed that the World Bank had reported to
Ethiopia that the USED opposed a pending Protecting Basic
Services (PBS) vote due to concerns over Ethiopia's
macroeconomic policies, which caused the delay in the
project. (Note: Although Meles acknowledged that the World
Bank may have blamed the delay on the USED's alleged
position, he may also have been confused about the details.
A World Bank PBS vote was expected in late-2008, concerns
raised by the Bank's own vice president for Africa has caused
its delay in being voted on until Bank officers address those
concerns; the vote is now expected in the spring. At the
same time, the USED did abstain in a December 2008 African
Development Bank (AfDB) PBS vote, as the USED did in previous
World Bank PBS votes, but delivered a strong message of
concern about the sustainability of the impacts of the
project in light of challenges with the current
macro-economic environment. See reftel for details on PBS and
Post's recommendations. End Note.)


5. (C) Meles argued that Ethiopia has now signed a letter of
policy intent with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
"if the policies are good for reducing poverty, they should
be good enough for the U.S. to support." Despite Carter's
counter that such is not necessarily the case, Meles repeated
that the U.S. should support projects proposed for support in
the international financial institutions (IFIs) as long as
the policy "delivers on poverty reduction." In a thinly
veiled warning, Meles stated that he hoped "the U.S. can be
pragmatic, or else it should let sleeping dogs lie." Meles
concluded by claiming that the USG's concerns are not shared
by others in the international community.

PUSH BACK ON SPECIFIC CONCERNS
--------------


6. (C) Carter confirmed that the Administration will aim to
be pragmatic in its approach, but emphasized that the United
States will not avoid tough issues. Carter stressed that
issues such as the implementation of the CSO Law and the
detention of Birtukan Midekssa are concerns that can be
resolved and must be to allow engagement to move on to
broader issues of mutual interest. Carter specifically
expressed concern that despite six months of persistent
concerns being raised by NGOs and donor partners -- led by
the U.S. -- Ethiopia still chose not to address these issues
in the law's design, but to placate partners with assurances
that they will be factored into how the law is implemented.
Similarly, Carter stressed that Birtukan's detention is a
symbol of the shrinking political space more broadly.


7. (C) Meles disregarded Carter's points arguing that
problems often arise when countries take positions without
adequate information or that are out of step with their own
principles. "Releasing Birtukan would be the most
undemocratic thing I could do," Meles argued, as he obtained
her pardon on false pretenses and she instigated her own
pardon revocation to force the hand of the international
community against the Ethiopian Government (GoE). This

ADDIS ABAB 00000257 003 OF 003


tactic was the same used by the opposition in sparking the
post-election violence in 2005, Meles asserted. "If I
release Birtukan, I would be violating and undermining the
rule of law and it would be very damaging to Ethiopia's
democracy and institutions." "Ethiopia is right on this in
principle, and those asking for Birtukan's release are
wrong." Regarding the CSO Law, Meles argued that the one
critical provision of the law is that determination that
advocacy on rights-based issues and political process is the
sole province of Ethiopian citizens. Meles was emphatic that
that was a matter of principle on which the GoE was
unyielding and that any approach for the GoE to revise it
would be a "dead end." Meles argued that "half of the
diplomats in Addis Ababa think that are like Peace Corps, but
so much of the foreign aid into this country distorts things
and is unhelpful." Looking to the Ambassador, Meles
concluded "my friend here will deny it, but we know what
people are doing here."

ESTABLISHING THE TONE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS
--------------


8. (C) Establishing the tone of the new Administration,
Carter acknowledged the Prime Minister's arguments but
emphasized that the United States Government disagrees with
his analysis. Carter repeated that the USG views the CSO
Law, the media law of July 2008, and pardon revocation of
Birtukan Midekssa as indicators of the shrinking political
space and opportunities for dialogue in Ethiopia. Carter
stressed USG concerns about prospects for democratic progress
and stability as Ethiopia approached national elections in

2010. He emphasized that the USG rejects the notion that
foreign support to civil society groups addressing democratic
rights issues poses a threat to democratization. Carter
rejected Meles's assertion that foreign funding to enable
domestic advocacy is undemocratic and stressed that these
concerns risk affecting our development program with
Ethiopia.


9. (C) Meles confirmed hearing the message that Carter
brought, and confirmed Ethiopia's eagerness to engage,
consult with, and seek assistance from the United States,
especially regarding institutional capacity building for
improved governance. He then quickly lamented persistent
U.S. criticism -- particularly from Congress -- about
Ethiopia's record when neighboring Eritrea's record is
significantly worse without drawing the ire, criticism, or
legislative attention of Congress. In light of being such a
close friend of the U.S., Meles argued, "we expect a level of
understanding and not to be treated worse than others in the
region." Meles further lamented the propensity of the
international community to criticize without factoring the
constitutional and cultural context of a particular country.
Highlighting Ethiopia's assessment that the new U.S.
Administration may be more receptive to democrats in Congress
who are critical of Ethiopia, Meles was pleased to receive
Carter's confirmation that the U.S. will measure Ethiopia in
light of Ethiopia's own cultural and constitutional context.
YAMAMOTO