Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ADDISABABA2168
2009-09-08 16:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

SOMALILAND AMBASSDOR TO ETHIOPIA LOOKS FOR U.S.

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL SO ET 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 002168 

//// C O R R E C T E D COPY, ADDED CLASSIFIED BY STATEMENT ////

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALILAND AMBASSDOR TO ETHIOPIA LOOKS FOR U.S.
ACTIVISM ON ELECTIONS DISPUTE

REF: (A) ADDIS 2107 (B) ADDIS 2092

Classified by: PolOff Kirk McBride for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 002168

//// C O R R E C T E D COPY, ADDED CLASSIFIED BY STATEMENT ////

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALILAND AMBASSDOR TO ETHIOPIA LOOKS FOR U.S.
ACTIVISM ON ELECTIONS DISPUTE

REF: (A) ADDIS 2107 (B) ADDIS 2092

Classified by: PolOff Kirk McBride for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY . Somaliland Ambassador to Ethiopia Hassan
told Charge on September 4 that he believes the UK/Ethiopian
mediation on the Somaliland elections dispute has potential,
when more fully developed, to produce a government-opposition
agreement that would allow the staging of elections. He
urged the U.S. to also play a more active role in resolving
the dispute, especially by engaging with the opposition.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Somaliland Ambassador to Ethiopia Mohammed Hassan
met on September 4 at his request with Charge and Pol/Econ
Counselor. Hassan urged the U.S. to play a "defusing role,"
along with Ethiopia and the UK, in the ongoing electoral
dispute in Somaliland. He said the British and Ethiopian
mediation efforts were promising, but argued that U.S.
intervention alone could persuade opposition supporters not
to resort to violence.


3. (C) Hassan said that in his "personal view," the
"Somaliland government will have no problem with the
UK/Ethiopian proposal," although he added that the proposal
would need to be refined in order to yield compromises on
three key issues -- the status of the National Elections
Commission (NEC),the status of the NGO Interpeace, and the
role of the proposed body of experts. He said, again
qualifying his comments as "not speaking for the government,"
that these problems can be solved.


4. (C) On the NEC, Hassan thought it is "too late" to change
all seven members. He said two members had become
particularly problematic to the opposition --- one ironically
nominated by the opposition in the first place and the other
nominated by the president. He thought these two might be
replaced as part of a comprehensive agreement.


5. (C) On Interpeace, Hassan said bringing back the NGO
after the government expelled it would be delicate. He
thought it could be achieved, however, if Interpeace would
agree to lower its profile with its staff acting as advisors
to the envisioned body of international experts rather than
as a virtual NEC, as he thought they had behaved in producing
the existing registration list.


6. (C) Hassan sees an expansive role for the proposed
international body of experts. He suggests that both the
government and the opposition would agree to empower the
experts to name the election date. He sees the experts as
otherwise advising the government on all aspects of the
elections process. He believes the opposition will
ultimately accept that the Riyale government would remain in
office after September 27 because the election clearly will
not take place as scheduled and the Somaliland Constitution
does not allow for the seating of an unelected, caretaker
government.


7. (C) Charge pressed Hassan on the sequencing of the
various elements he sees coming into play -- naming of a
group of international experts, revision of the NEC, return
of Interpeace, and signing of a memorandum of understanding.
Hassan had given little thought to this and replied only by
saying that the British were pressing for a rapid return of
Interpeace as a means of persuading donors to release pledged
funds. Hassan did acknowledge that an understanding among
all parties on at least some of these points would be needed
before the memorandum of understanding could be signed.


8. (C) Hassan closed by saying again that "an active U.S.
role would be highly desirable," specifically to include
witnessing the signing of the prospective British-Ethiopian
Memorandum of Understanding.
MEECE