Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ADDISABABA2107
2009-09-01 08:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

SOMALILAND: UK EMBASSY VIEWS ON ETHIOPIAN

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL SO ET 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002107 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALILAND: UK EMBASSY VIEWS ON ETHIOPIAN
INITIATIVE

REF: ADDIS 2092

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, Michael C. Gonzales for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002107

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALILAND: UK EMBASSY VIEWS ON ETHIOPIAN
INITIATIVE

REF: ADDIS 2092

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, Michael C. Gonzales for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Acting Deputy Chief of Mission met with UK Charge
d'Affaires John Marshall on August 31 to cross-check the
Ethiopian Government's (GoE) report on political mediation
efforts in Somaliland (reftel) and discuss Marshall's August
28-29 visit to Hargeisa in support of that effort. Marshall
assessed that the UK and GoE share common views of dynamics
in Somaliland as well as regarding the Ethiopian mediation
initiative. Marshall noted clearly that changes to the
Somaliland National Election Commission (NEC) are necessary
to formalize and build on the roadmap to a political solution
as laid out in the Ethiopian non-paper. Marshall argued that
he visited Hargeisa over the weekend to reinforce to
President Riyale that the UK backs the Ethiopian approach and
to stress to him the need for changes to the NEC. Marshall's
visit also sought to reinforce to the Somaliland opposition
that the introduction of a caretaker government is not an
option. While Riyale was adamant against changes to the NEC,
Finance Minister and close ruling party confidant of Riyale,
Hussein Ali Duale (Awil),conceded that the UDUB party is
open to changes in the NEC, but only after all parties sign a
Memorandum of Understanding formalizing the Ethiopian
non-paper. Other UDUB members reportedly told Marshall that
changes to the NEC are possible without even being tied to
timing of the MoU.


2. (C) Marshall did confirm that despite Ethiopian State
Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda's assertion that all
party leaders did endorse the non-paper's provision to defer
elections until a panel of experts has been able to address
problems with the voter registry, the opposition parties are
not/not yet on board with this issue. He asserted that he is
confident that unilateral action by President Riyale to make
changes to the NEC in a credible manner would induce the
opposition, under international pressure, to accept more
overtly the provisions of the non-paper. At this point, the
UK plans to let Marshall's push on Riyale to sink in while

the GoE further adds detail to its non-paper. Marshall
suggests that the U.S. defer direct engagement with
Somaliland officials until it becomes clearer whether Riyale
will take action on the NEC. Post reiterates reftel request
for guidance on how to respond to the GoE's request for
increased USG engagement. End Summary.

FLESHING OUT DR. TEKEDA'S COMMENTS
--------------


3. (C) UK Charge John Marshall asserted that the UK and GoE
share common views of dynamics in Somaliland as well as
regarding the Ethiopian mediation initiative. While he noted
that Dr. Tekeda may have exaggerated the collaboration behind
the development of the Ethiopian non-paper, he asserted that
the bulk of the substance contained therein was consistent
with the UK view of what needed to be presented. He argued
that the UK commented on an early draft, but only to remove
overt criticism of Interpeace and of the NEC. Despite press
arguments that the GoE is backing Riyale's position over the
opposition, Marshall argued that the GoE is, in fact, pushing
President Riyale to compromise with the opposition. In
particular, Marshall argued that when Riyale pressed for
another year in office, it was the GoE who reigned him in
calling for a much shorter term extension only to accommodate
technical issues with the NEC, election planning, and voter
registry.


4. (C) Pressed on the degree of buy-in among the opposition
parties for the Ethiopian non-paper, Marshall conceded that
Dr. Tekeda's report may be a bit skewed. Tekeda was emphatic
(with us as well as the UK) that the leaders of all three
parties had agreed to the non-paper's provisions for
deferring the elections and allowing President Riyale to
remain in office until they are re-scheduled. Despite this,
Marshall noted that both Kulmiye and UCID parties deny
supporting such provisions.


5. (C) Marshall also gave insights into the administrative

ADDIS ABAB 00002107 002 OF 003


challenges facing the electoral process. Specifically, he
argued that the duplication of names and integrity of the
information that went into the voter registry will require
extensive remediation. He argued that while it is useful to
retain the useful elements of the Interpeace registry effort,
he admitted that once the panel of experts is in place, it is
possible that they decide that starting afresh may make more
sense than trying to clean a fundamentally flawed list.
While he acknowledged the problem within the NEC of its slant
toward the ruling party, Marshall expressed greater concern
about the broader dysfunction of the NEC since its
establishment. He argued that the members have failed
fundamentally in making decisions or taking actions required
to prepare for the national elections. Marshall emphasized
that remedying this will be a key function for the panel of
experts to monitor even if a new NEC is established.

REFORMING THE NEC IS CRITICAL
--------------


6. (C) Marshall made clear that reforming the NEC -- both in
its composition and its substantive preparations for the
elections -- is critical for the successful implementation of
the Ethiopian initiative and UK support. Marshall confided
that before even disclosing his planned visit to Hargeisa to
anyone but Dr. Tekeda, Somaliland Foreign Minister Abdullahi
Duale called him to request that he not/not visit. After
working the issue out, Marshall's first meeting upon arriving
in Hargeisa was a one-on-one session with President Riyale.
Marshall recounted Riyale's formality in which he remained
seated at the desk in his office while Marshall was directed
to a seat at the table extending perpendicularly from the
desk. Marshall admitted that the objective of the one-on-one
session was to privately convey to Riyale the need to change
the NEC. Riyale, in turn, was emphatic that he would not
move on either altering the NEC or allowing Interpeace to
return to Somaliland. Despite starting the meeting with a
request for another, follow-up meeting the following day,
Marshall received a call the next day reporting that Riyale
was ill and would not be available to meet. Marshall
assessed that the move was to express Riyale's displeasure
with hearing the message, but expected that it may require
time and reinforcement before fully sinking in with the
president.


7. (C) Marshall noted that he met with Somaliland Finance
Minister and close ruling party confidant of Riyale, Hussein
Ali Duale (Awil),after meeting with the president. Awil
reportedly showed greater flexibility on the question of
changing the NEC, but was adamant that such a change to the
NEC could only be done after all parties have signed the
Ethiopian MoU. Marshall pushed back noting that the NEC
changes are a necessary -- and hopefully sufficient --
confidence building measure needed to secure the opposition
parties' support for the MoU. Marshall further stressed the
value of changing the NEC in 1) re-engaging the donor
community, whose support has been seriously eroded by the
current political crisis, 2) offering a popular gesture to an
increasingly restive public, and 3) gaining the confidence of
the opposition that the ruling party is prepared to engage
sincerely. Despite this entreaty, Awil retained his
entrenched position and theatrically accused Marshall of
taking a decision that risks plunging Somaliland into chaos.
The Charge reported later seeing several UDUB party members
and parliamentarians who actually showed receptivity to make
changes to the NEC and recognized the need to do so before
signing the MoU.

NEXT STEPS
--------------


8. (C) Marshall was clear that changing the NEC is critical
to making the Ethiopian initiative work and he reported that
the Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry
confirmed to him on August 31 that Ethiopia shares this view.
For the time being, he suggested, it is important for the
UK's clear message to Riyale to sink in. Marshall admitted
that the UK government has long provided assistance and
support to Somaliland without conditions and even when doing
so meant having to ignore problematic dynamics. He suggested
that the nature and tone of the UK message to Riyale
certainly must have been a surprise which will take time to
internalize.

ADDIS ABAB 00002107 003 OF 003




9. (C) In the interim, he argued that the GoE will have to
flesh out details of their non-paper to render it a much more
specific MoU for eventual signature. From the UK side, the
DfID office in Nairobi has begun discussing ideas for an
eventual Terms of Reference for the panel of experts with
counterparts from the donor community. Still, Marshall
recognized that many donors have limited engagement on
Somaliland in recent months in light of the poor handling of
this crisis by Somaliland officials. As such, he suggested
that a change of the NEC may be required to re-engage the
donors adequately to produce a quality Terms of Reference and
secure additional donor assistance.


10. (C) In response to a specific question as to how, or if,
the USG should engage at this point to support efforts,
Marshall's initial reaction was to urge the USG to defer
direct engagement with Somaliland officials until it becomes
clearer whether Riyale will take action on the NEC. Once
Riyale's intentions become clearer, he suggested that a call
from Assistant Secretary Carson or PDAS Yamamoto to Riyale
may be of greater utility.
MEECE