STRATEGIES TO NEGATE "DEFAMATION OF RELIGION"

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002313

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, IO, DRL, AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KISL KEDM OPDC NI
SUBJECT: STRATEGIES TO NEGATE "DEFAMATION OF RELIGION"
RESOLUTION (S/ES: 200922459)

REF: A. STATE 128320

B. ABUJA 02216

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission James P. McAnulty
for reasons in sections 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) Mission Nigeria provides the following information in
support of the Department's strategy to engage the Nigerian
Government (GON) to reverse its support of the United Nations
(UN) "defamation of religions" proposal and back the U.S.
alternative.

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INFLUENTIAL POWER BLOCKS
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2. (C) GON officials view themselves as representing an
independent and influential country in Africa. They often
demonstrate such independence, however, by voting against
first world powers, including the United States and the
European Union (EU). Therefore, any appeal to senior
officials will convey the idea that they could truly
demonstrate leadership and influence by working with African
colleagues to gain support of an alternative to the
"Defamation of Religions" resolution.


3. (C) Foreign Ministry officials often assert that their
country's votes must reflect the "African consensus."
Therefore, to the extent that the U.S. can sway a number of
other key African nations away from support of the
"Defamation of Religions Resolution," we may be able to
dilute or break such consensus.


4. (S) The position of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) often influences the votes of several key
African nations, including Nigeria, even though GON officials
usually do not acknowledge such influence. As a nation with
a significant Muslim population and the largest one in
sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria often feels compelled to vote
with the OIC.

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KEY GON OFFICIALS
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5. (S) Nigeria's Permanent Representative to the United
Nations and MFA International Organizations Director
Ambassador M. K. Ibrahim both wield influence on UN votes.
Therefore, any outreach efforts should include them.
Nonetheless, they are likely to point to more senior
officials, such as Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe, as calling
the shots on important UN votes. Maduekwe, in turn, will
occasionally say that the office of the Presidency makes the
final call, as he alleged after Nigeria's vote on the
Goldstone Report. Given President Yar'Adua's continued
hospitalization in Saudi Arabia, the ultimate decision-maker
on this issue remains unclear. While Vice President Goodluck
Jonathan is officially second in command to Yar'Adua, he will
remain reluctant during his boss's absence to make decisions
perceived as differing from the views of the Secretary to the
Government of the Federation (SGF) and the National Security
Advisor (NSA),who wield considerable power at the
Presidential Villa. On this issue, however, the NSA is
likely to support whatever position OIC members assume.

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NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
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6. (C) Several human rights non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) follow human rights issues closely in Nigeria, but
they generally do not exert much influence on GON
decision-making. The one exception, on religious issues, may
Qdecision-making. The one exception, on religious issues, may
involve the Co-Chairpersons of the Nigerian Inter-Religious
Council (NIREC) -- Christian Association President Archbishop
John Onaiyekan and Jama'atul Nasril Islam President Sultan of
Sokoto Alhaji Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar III.


7. (C) Nigerian leaders remain quite sensitive to public
criticism from foreign governments, particularly the United
States and EU Member States. For example, when the U.S.

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Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) placed
Nigeria on its list of "countries of critical concern," the
government strongly encouraged USCIRF Commissioners to return
to Nigeria to discuss their concerns with senior officials.
Any high-level approach to the GON may wish to indicate that
Nigeria's vote on the UN "Defamation of Religions Resolution"
could influence whether Nigeria remains on the USCIRF list of
countries of critical concern.

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MISSION'S RECOMMENDATION
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8. (S) Given the likelihood that the decision on Nigeria's
vote will occur at the level of the Foreign Minister or
higher, Mission recommends an appeal directly to Foreign
Minister Maduekwe to attempt to dissuade Nigeria from voting
for the Defamation of Religions resolution. If Maduekwe
demurs and insists that the decision remains "above his
level," then the appeal should occur through a senior
official in the office of the Presidency, such as the
Secretary to the Government of the Federation. A parallel
approach through the NIREC Co-Chairpersons may be advisable
as well.

SANDERS