(S) A LONG HOT SUMMER FOR UAE-SAUDI RELATIONS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000981

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PINS GCC PBTS SA AQ AE
SUBJECT: (S) A LONG HOT SUMMER FOR UAE-SAUDI RELATIONS

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

REF (A) ABU DHABI 611; REF (B) ABU DHABI 849; REF (C) ABU DHABI 853;
REF (D) 05 ABU DHABI 3851

Summary and Comment
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1. (C) This summer witnessed a sharp uptick in tensions between the
UAE and Saudi Arabia, beginning with the UAE's May decision to pull
out of the GCC Monetary Union (after the Headquarters went to Riyadh
when the UAE had lobbied for Dubai). Shortly thereafter the Saudis
effectively closed a major border crossing, and later refused to
allow UAE citizens to enter on ID cards (a GCC norm) because of an
irredentist rendering of the UAE border on the back of the card.
While Emiratis almost universally interpret these actions as being
evidence of the Kingdom's overbearing attitude toward smaller Gulf
states, the UAE leadership was careful not to escalate the conflict
and worked the issues quietly behind the scenes. The success of this
approach has been confirmed by the fact that Saudi Prince Mohammed
bin Nayef Al-Saud paid a lengthy visit on UAE Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Zayed last week in Rabat. According to one of MbZ's courtiers,
the MbN call constitutes a significant step toward reconciliation.


2. (S/NF) While the UAE pays lip service to the idea of GCC unity,
the reality is that Abu Dhabi is deeply skeptical of multilateral
approaches particularly on military matter. And while publicly
expressing close ties with Riyadh, the UAE privately regards the
Kingdom as its second greatest security threat after Iran (Israel is
not on the list). This is based on historic enmity between the
Wahabi tribes of the Najd and the Maliki Bedouin/merchants of the
UAE, as well as deep seated if rarely articulated anxiety about what
might happen if Saudi Arabia came under a more fundamentalist regime
than the Sudairi/Abdullah reign.


3. (C) Fortunately for the US, the UAE and Saudi Arabia see
eye-to-eye on Iran (and the UAE sees Saudi as a bulwark against
Qatari and Omani accommodationism and Kuwaiti wobbliness). That
said, the underlying border dispute between the UAE and the Kingdom
is real, and unlikely to get better over time. This is an issue that
bears our continued attention. End Summary and Comment.

UAE - More than an Extra on International Stage
-------------- --


4. (C) Since the death of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nayhan in late
2004, his sons President Khalifa bin Zayed , Crown Price Prince
Mohammed bin Zayed, and Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed, have
demonstrated less willingness to defer to the Saudis on all issues.
Recent examples of Emirati activism in the regional and international
arena include: UAE withdrawal from the GCC Monetary Union in May when
Riyadh was chosen over Abu Dhabi to host the Union's central bank;
Emirati granting of debt relief to Iraq in June; and, the UAE's
successful diplomatic campaign to host the headquarters of the new
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi -- beating
the Germans.


5. (C) The younger Emirati successors find themselves increasingly
at odds with what they view as geriatric Saudi leadership as they
attempt to step out from the shadow of their giant neighbor and carve
out a uniquely Emirati identity, seeking greater leadership
opportunities, within the region and the international community.


It's Not Ancient History to Houses of Saud and Nahyan
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6. (U) The struggle between the Al Saud and Al Nahyan dynasties can
be traced to 1810 when the Al Saud, already in control of most of
eastern Arabia, took control of the Buraimi Oasis, the traditional
home of the al Nahyan, at the time poor herdsman and pearl fishermen.
The Al Saud brought with them a puritanical form of Islam --
Wahabism -- which Emirati leaders still complain about today as
responsible for extremism and intolerance in the region.


7. (U) For 150 years control of the Buraimi Oasis fell in and out of
Al Saud control. In 1952 Sheikh Zayed, then the son of the Ruler of
Abu Dhabi, refused a 42 million dollar bribe from the Saudis to give
up Abu Dhabi's claim on Buraimi; the amount was recorded in the
Guiness Book of World records as the highest bribe ever offered. In
1955 the Saudis were expelled by force by Abu Dhabi and Omani troops
with the support of Britain. When the UK announced the end of its
treaty arrangement with the trucial emirates in 1968, Saudi King
Faisal again set his sights on Buraimi, claiming the area stretching
eastward to the coast of Abu Dhabi was rightfully Saudi.

1974 Border Agreement
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8. (U) Never actually published, Saudi Arabia "registered" the text
of its 1974 border agreement with the UAE with the UN in 1993. It
can be found in the UN Treaty Series titled, "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and United Arab Emirates Agreement of the delimitation of boundaries
(with exchange of letter and map);" signed at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
on 21 August 1974 by Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz al Saud, King of Saudi
Arabia, and Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan, President of the
United Arab Emirates.


9. (U) According to the terms of the agreement, the KSA gave up its
claim on the al Buraimi Oasis (located in eastern Abu Dhabi and
including the traditional home territory of the Nahyan Abu Dhabi
ruling family). Abu Dhabi, in turn, gave up a 23-kilometer strip of
land near Khor al Odeid, cutting off any land connection between
Qatar and the UAE. Under the agreement both parties have "joint
sovereignty" over the entire area linking the territorial waters of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the high seas. (Note: Many argue that
the Saudis primary target here was to isolate Qatar. Disagreement
over interpretation of territorial waters also allowed Saudis to
dispute the UAE-Qatar Causeway project in 2005. End Note).


10. (U) The 1974 Agreement granted Saudi Arabia 80 percent of the
land area encompassing the giant al Shaybah oil field, discovered in
1968 by Emiratis, and, unusual for this type of agreement -- 100
percent hydrocarbons rights to exploration and drilling of the entire
field, including the 20 percent that remained inside UAE territory.

Did Zayed Sign Under Duress?
--------------


11. (C) Leading up to Sheikh Zayed's death in November 2004 and
since, the Emirati leadership has increasingly and publicly tested
the Saudis will to reconsider parts of the 1974 agreement, which they
believe Sheikh Zayed signed under duress. The ruling generation
feels the Saudis mistreated Sheikh Zayed; the agreement was the
price the Saudis insisted on in return for recognizing the new
nation. It is also possible Zayed feared that if he failed to agree
to the 1974 borders, the Emirati confederation would be swallowed up
by the Saudi state.

Is the Treaty in Force?
--------------


12. (C) We understand that the Saudis view the treaty as being in
full force, and likely refer to Article 9 "this agreement shall enter
into force immediately on signature." In addition to disputing the
substance of the treaty, the UAE has taken the position that the
agreement is not in effect because the UAE has not ratified it as
called for in the UAE constitution.

The Causeway Controversy
--------------


13. (C) In 2005 tension emerged between the UAE and Saudi Arabia over
a decision by the UAE to build a causeway connecting Abu Dhabi to
Qatar over the Khor al Odeid waters (The UAE held it had not ceded
the territorial waters associated with Khor al Odeid). President
Khalifa is reported to have been "furious", and tried to use the
Saudi objection to the causeway to reopen negotiations on the entire
1974 agreement. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef appears to have
by 2005 assumed the role of SARG point person on this issue and
refused to reopen the issue (Ref D). (Note: The Prince Nayef
connection is notable as KSA actions taken this summer (below)
against UAE concerning border and immigration issues in July and
August were executed by arms of the Ministry of Interior. End Note.)


So What's Happened Lately?
--------------


14. (SBU) On May 27 the UAE pulled out of the GCC Monetary Union in
response to the selection of Riyadh as the new organization's
headquarters. As the second largest GCC economy, the UAE's move may
well tank the entire project. Most economic observers agree,
however, that Saudi Arabia is the only GCC country with the
sufficient banking infrastructure and know-how to host a central bank
for a common Gulf currency.


15. (SBU) In July more than 2000 trucks backed-up on the UAE side of
the Saudi Border awaiting entry to the Kingdom (Ref A). UAE customs
officials reported that the problem was technical and related to the
institution of a new Saudi fingerprinting system. The delays caused
thousands of drivers to be trapped in temperatures of 110 degrees
Fahrenheit, ruining many UAE perishable exports. Although neither
side gave any public indication that the delays were politically
motivated, local commentators suggested the "humanitarian crisis" was
a Saudi attempt to retaliate against the UAE for withdrawing from the

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GCC Monetary Union.


16. (U) On August 19, the SARG announced that Emirati citizens would
have to use their passports to enter the Kingdom, rather than the
identity cards traditionally accepted for GCC nationals. Saudi MOI
officials explained the decision as a protest of the UAE map depicted
on the front of Emirati national ID cards showing a land border
between UAE and Qatar. The SARG move was in violation of a GCC
agreement allowing member states to enter other GCC countries with
only national ID cards. SARG Immigration Chief told the Saudi press
that "the Kingdom has taken the step because the map...is not in line
with the border agreement signed between the two countries...despite
several attempts to address this issue with the UAEG including
official diplomatic requests urging the UAE to rectify the map."
In a move no doubt meant to trump Prince Nayef, President Khalifa
took the moral high ground by announcing in early September that the
UAE would continue to allow Saudi citizens to enter the Emirates on
their national ID cards (Ref C).

Generation and Religious Gap
--------------


17. (S/NF) As formerly Bedouin, Arab Gulf oil producing states, the
UAE and Saudi Arabia indeed share a similar culture and history.
Differences in age, religious attitudes, and approach to modernity
among the two successor generations of Al Saud and Al Nahyan,
however, should not be discounted. The leadership in Abu Dhabi never
misses an opportunity to let visiting senior USG officials know that
they regard the Kingdom as run by cantankerous old men surrounded by
advisors who believe the earth is flat.


18. (S/NF) While Emirati officials acknowledge and lament the
presence of a Salafi or Wahabi strain of Islam in the UAE (note:
most Emiratis are from the Maliki school, although in the two
emirates ruled by the Qawasim, the Hanbali school predominates),
senior Abu Dhabi ruling family members have made clear their concern
about extremism and have taken concrete actions to minimize both the
presence and influence of extremist Islam in the Emirates. Although
part of controlling terrorist incitement falls to the security
services, perhaps nowhere are UAEG efforts more recognizable that in
the sphere of educational reform.

UAE Forges Ahead to Create Its Own Identity
--------------


19. (S/NF) A UAE determined to succeed in establishing a national
identity not necessarily in conflict with, but separate from, its big
GCC neighbor has inevitably lead to an erosion of Saudi influence
over UAE decision-making. These so called squabbles should not be
dismissed as mere bickering. Distrust among GCC countries (which
goes back to tribal days) weakens the effectiveness of the GCC as a
collective and as an effective moderate player in the region.


20. (S/NF) The UAE is clearly out in front of the other GCC nations
on the war in Afghanistan, where it is the only Gulf nation with
troops ground fighting the Taliban (and joins Jordan as one of two
Arab states with military forces aiding the coalition). In Pakistan,
the Saudis and the Emiratis actually back different sides, with the
Emiratis supporting the U.S. position to back the elected Prime
Minister's government. When it comes to Middle East Peace, the UAE
leadership is privately forward thinking, but still prefers to be in
line with the Saudis for guidance on its public stance.


21. (S/NF) Comment: On what is perhaps our most pressing concern,
Iran, the Emiratis report that they continue to work with the Saudis
to convince the other GCC members to take a stronger public stance to
pressure Iran on its nuclear program With each member demonstrating
a clear preference for conducting bilateral rather than multilateral
relations with other powers, as well as each other, real collective
action presents a challenge. Ironically, although the UAE and KSA
are of one mind about what the perceive to be the existential threat
from Tehran, other GCC members, also fearful of Iran, take their own
bilateral approach with Iran which is quite different and appears
entrenched, particularly in the case of Oman and Qatar. Where
UAE-KSA tensions certainly have implications for U.S. priorities in
the region, on our most pressing priority at this moment, although
the UAE and KSA are united, it is unclear they can produce meaningful
collective GCC words or deeds from the GCC. End Comment.

OLSON