Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABUDHABI849
2009-08-25 12:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

SAUDIS REVOKE EMIRATI RIGHT TO TRAVEL TO KINGDOM ON NATIONAL

Tags:  PREL PGOV ETRD SA AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0511
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0849 2371212
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251212Z AUG 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2869
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000849 

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: 08/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD SA AE
SUBJECT: SAUDIS REVOKE EMIRATI RIGHT TO TRAVEL TO KINGDOM ON NATIONAL
ID CARDS

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

REFS: (A) ABU DHABI 611
(B) STATE 73217

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000849

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: 08/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD SA AE
SUBJECT: SAUDIS REVOKE EMIRATI RIGHT TO TRAVEL TO KINGDOM ON NATIONAL
ID CARDS

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

REFS: (A) ABU DHABI 611
(B) STATE 73217


1. (SBU) Summary. On August 19, Saudi Arabia announced it was
revoking the right of Emiratis to travel to the Kingdom on their
national ID cards and requiring passports for UAE citizens traveling
to, from, or via Saudi Arabia. This move runs counter to the
agreement among GCC nations which allows their citizens travel to
other GCC member states using national identification cards instead
of passports. According to the media reports, SARG spokesmen said
the decision was ordered in protest of the UAE map depicted on
Emirati ID which it believes contradicts a 1974 UAE-Saudi border
agreement signed by King Feisal and Sheikh Zayed. This incident
comes on the heels of several other tit-for-tat moves by the two
closely-aligned neighbors, leading some observers to speculate about
a potential deterioration in UAE-KSA relations. End Summary.


2. (U) SARG Immigration Chief told the Saudi Press Agency on August
19 that, "the Kingdom has taken the step because the map...is not in
line with the border agreement signed between the two countries on
August 21, 1974." This, he continued, despite several attempts to
address this issue with the UAEG including official diplomatic
requests urging the UAE to rectify the map. According to the SARG
the UAE failed to respond to this and other KSA attempts to redress
the discrepancy.


3. (U) The UAE MFA publicly announced to its citizens August 22 that
all Emiratis should carry passports when traveling to and from Saudi
Arabia. In the meantime the UAE missions across the GCC are
preparing travel documents for those Emiratis who need to return from
or travel via Saudi Arabia but who were caught without passports at
the time of the Saudi announcement.


4. (C) This current tiff comes after several other possible
tit-for-tat actions between the two Gulf states, beginning in May
when UAE lost its bid to host the headquarters of a new GCC Central
Bank to Riyadh; in response, the UAE, the second largest GCC economy,
pulled out of the GCC monetary union, potentially killing the
project.


5. (C) A few weeks later, more than a thousand trucks backed up on
the UAE side awaiting entry into the Kingdom (ref A). UAE customs
officials reported that the problem was technical and related to the
institution of a new Saudi fingerprinting system. The delays caused
thousands of drivers to be trapped in temperatures of 110 degrees
Fahrenheit, and UAE exports complained of damage to perishable goods;
however there were no indications from either side that the delays
were politically motivated. This did not stop local commentators
from suggesting that the "humanitarian crisis" was a Saudi attempt to
retaliate against the UAE for withdrawing from the GCC Monetary Union
a few weeks earlier.


6. (C/NF) Comment: The vexed question Southern Arabian borders is
never far below the surface, and appears to have emerged once again.
The broader point is that this dispute highlights a generational
shift in the UAE, with the successor generation taking a harder edge
on intra-GCC issues. In 1974, Zayed could make territorial
concessions in the interest of broader unity (and since Zayed had
spent his youth fighting the Saudis over border issues he had the
authority to pull it off). His sons, especially Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) take a tougher line and are less likely to
defer to the Saudis, as evidenced by their decision to pull out the
GCC Monetary Union when Abu Dhabi did not get the headquarters. And
the leadership in Abu Dhabi never misses an opportunity to let USG
visitors know that they regard the Kingdom as being run by difficult
and cantankerous old men surrounded by advisors who believe the earth
is flat. That said, the Saudis and Emiratis remain closely aligned
on issues of regional security especially on the all important
question Iran. End Comment.
OLSON