UAE PRIME MINISTER ON IRAN

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000555


NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER ETRD KNNP IR AE
SUBJECT: UAE PRIME MINISTER ON IRAN

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 138, B) ABU DHABI 130, C) ABU DHABI 126


Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) UAE Prime Minister, Vice President, and Ruler of Dubai
Mohammed bin Rashid (MbR) al-Maktoum used his newly-instituted
web-based dialogue with the public to reply to a variety of questions
on June 1. The official UAE news agency WAM released select replies,
including a portion on Iran in reply to a questioner from Saudi
Arabia. The WAM release included English translation, which in our
reading tracks closely with the original.


2. (SBU) MbR's comments on Iran begin by noting that the UAE does
not, in principle, interfere in the internal matters of other
nations, adding that "Iran's nuclear program is an internal matter of
the nation of Iran, as long as our brothers in Iran continue to
reassure the world that the program is peaceful." He then cited the
UAE goal of a WMD free Middle East. MbR reiterated the UAEG desire
for a peaceful settlement to its territorial dispute with Iran (three
islands),highlighting "long-standing" trade relations with Iran as
not contradictory to the territorial dispute but in fact a normal
situation between neighbors. "Trade relations between any two
nations always lead to better relations and facilitate the resolution
of conflicts. After all, is it easier to resolve your conflicts with
friends or with enemies? Friendly relations allow nations to contain
the issue and prevent having it develop into a crisis," which may in
turn "allow third-parties to intervene and pursue their interests" at
the expense of the primary parties.


3. (S/NF) MbR's comments project a tone of collegial trade with an
almost benign neighbor whose promises about the peaceful nature of
its nuclear program can be accepted at face value. On June 2 the
Ambassador called UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) to
clarify whether this was a true reflection of UAE foreign policy,
stating that he was calling without instructions from Washington but
out of concern for the tone projected by the official remarks. AbZ
said his reading of the text suggested that Iran's pursuit of nuclear
power was an internal matter only to the extent that it was
"peaceful"; the text itself is clearly open to a much broader
interpretation.


4. (S/NF) Comment: The UAE's balancing act on Iran policy is a well
known phenomenon, with strong trade interests and the desire to avoid
provocation that might lead to a confrontation weighed against real
concerns among the leadership about Iran's intent. Part of that
balancing act involves reconciling Dubai's overwhelmingly commercial
focus with Abu Dhabi's more geopolitical orientation. In this case,
MbR's Dubai centric vision clearly won out. While AbZ clearly felt
compelled to defend the statements of his "boss" (at least according
to a UAE Government organizational chart),it is doubtful he would
have made these sorts of remarks himself. End comment.


OLSON