Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABUDHABI378
2009-04-14 12:28:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

Fraud Summary - Abu Dhabi

Tags:  KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9244
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0378/01 1041228
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141228Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2361
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 2954
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 8235
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1575
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0509
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0136
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ABU DHABI 000378 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP; CAIRO FOR RCO; POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION UNITS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC AE
SUBJECT: Fraud Summary - Abu Dhabi

REF: 08 State 74840

ABU DHABI 00000378 001.2 OF 006


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ABU DHABI 000378

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP; CAIRO FOR RCO; POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION UNITS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC AE
SUBJECT: Fraud Summary - Abu Dhabi

REF: 08 State 74840

ABU DHABI 00000378 001.2 OF 006



1. Country Conditions

Note: Many aspects of this report should be viewed in tandem with
the Fraud Summary from Consulate General Dubai. While the two posts
in the UAE see somewhat different applicant pools (Notably, Dubai is
the primary NIV processing post for persons in Iran, while Abu Dhabi
handles all IV processing in country.),many of the lessons learned
from one post can be applied at the other.

Fraud in Abu Dhabi is low. Concern about visa fraud in the UAE is
generally limited to visa applications from Third Country Nationals
(TCNs) living in or visiting the UAE. UAE citizens ("Emiratis") are
a minority in their own country, comprising less than 20 percent of
the population. South Asians, mainly Indians and Pakistanis, make up
50 percent of the population. The next largest expatriate ethnic
groups are Filipinos (19.6 percent),Arabs from other parts of the
Middle East (13 percent) and Iranians (2.5 percent.)

Expatriate workers (many from high fraud countries) are the most
likely to perpetrate general NIV fraud. Organized fraud efforts,
such as document vendors or visa "touts," are uncommon in the UAE.
Most IV applicants are Iranian and fraud is at times evident in
fianc (K),and employment (E) visa applications. Post faces the
challenging task of verifying information provided by Iranian
applicants in visa interviews. For example, family relationships are
evidenced by documents Post views as susceptible to fraud. Post has
no viable means to regularly verify the authenticity of documents
and information presented by Iranians and relies heavily on the
personal interview - and staff's knowledge of Iranian culture and
procedures - to determine application validity.

The UAE is a major regional and global transportation hub, and with
this comes the potential to become a transit point for alien
smuggling (particularly to Europe),travel of imposters, production
of false documents, and other classic types of travel/immigration
fraud.

Airline and immigration officials note a number of male fide
passengers routinely attempting to transit the UAE, but report very
few passengers carrying fraudulent U.S. documents. This may change

as the UAE's two major airlines (Dubai-based Emirates and Abu
Dhabi-based Etihad) expand their direct service to the U.S. Both
airlines, along with several U.S. carriers also offer daily direct
service between the UAE and USA. There are plans for greater
aviation links in the future.

Both Posts in the UAE (Embassy Abu Dhabi and Consulate General
Dubai) adjudicate a significant number of Iranian applicants.
Approximately 50% of the total NIV workload in Dubai and 80% of the
total IV workload in Abu Dhabi is Iranian. Consulate General Dubai
is the primary global NIV application point for Iranians resident in
Iran. Embassy Abu Dhabi is the second largest post for processing of
Iranian immigration cases. General discontent with the Iranian
political regime and continued increase in unemployment rates and
inflation continues to drive desire for Iranians to migrate. Post
anticipates a continued increase in both immigrant and nonimmigrant
Iranian visa applications, with a concurrent potential for increased
fraud.




2. NIV Fraud - Abu Dhabi

There is generally little fraud associated with applications from
UAE citizens. Among the expatriate community that applies for visas,
detected fraud efforts are generally unsophisticated and include
questionable bank statements, letters of employment, etc. Post does
not rely on such documents and does not 221-g applicants
specifically for them. If an applicant cannot clearly establish
entitlement to the visa, post makes use of Section 214(b).
Photo-substituted documents are very rare. In general, detecting
Iranian visa fraud in the few NIV cases Abu Dhabi sees remains
complicated by the lack of direct knowledge of Iranian documents and
systems. Concern about security and technology transfer issues add
to our overall vigilance.

H-1B (Temporary Skilled Worker) and L-1 (Intercompany Transfers of
Executives/ Managements) visa fraud remain areas of concern. Some
cases have been returned to DHS with recommendations for revocation.
In the recent past the majority of cases sent for revocation
involved Indian nationals who have grossly exaggerated their work
experience when filing for H-1B petitions through friends or family

ABU DHABI 00000378 002.2 OF 006


in the United States. The Embassy occasionally works with the
anti-fraud units in Chennai and Mumbai to verify educational
documents, upon which labor petitions are partially based. While no
organized fraud efforts have been detected, Post remain conscious of
the fact that South Asian nationals may apply in the UAE to evade
well-established anti-fraud units in India and Pakistan.

Although Abu Dhabi has had no specific reports of domestic servant
abuse or trafficking in the A3 (Domestic Servants of Diplomats),G5
(Domestic Servant of Government Official) or B1 (Temporary Visitor
for Business) categories, we remain vigilant to potential abuse of
these visa categories.


3. IV Fraud - Abu Dhabi

Immigrant visa fraud is not prevalent but is at times found in K
(fianc) petitions, E (employment-based) applications, and F
(family-based) petitions. In fianc petitions, proof of a true
relationship is often difficult to ascertain. Some of these cases
involve Iranian fiancs who speak only Farsi engaged to Americans
who speak only English. There are often significant discrepancies in
age between the applicant and the petitioner, even as much as 20 to
30 years. Applicants often provide generic "couples photos", usually
taken outside of Iran, to provide evidence of a relationship.
Legitimate fianc cases nearly always include numerous photos from
the engagement party, which is held in Iran and includes extended
family. The majority of Iranian K-1 petitioners obtained U.S. status
through marriage to an American. Frequently, those marriages lasted
only the time needed to obtain LPR status. Petitioners have also
often been married numerous times and sometimes have already
petitioned for one or two previous fiancs (or spouses) from Iran.
Post continues to see numerous Internet relationships, first-cousin
relationships and relationships with large age differences.

Post has seen a number of fianc visa cases involving Iranians which
raised concerns about "marriages of convenience," perhaps involving
exchange of money, entered into for the sole purpose of immigration.
In these cases, consular officers discovered during interviews with
the Iranian fianc that a close American citizen relative - often an
uncle or aunt residing in the same U.S. city as the petitioner - was
responsible for introducing an American (who is most often not
Iranian-American) to his/her relative in Iran and suggesting
marriage. This appears to be well outside the practice of a simple
"arranged marriage", which Post accepts as a norm within Iranian
culture and frequently legitimate, particularly when the petitioner
is Iranian-American. The Iranian-American matchmaking relative is
also yabwQ8ing enters the U.S. on a K-1 visa causing several other siblings
to subsequently find their "soul mates" in the U.S., usually through
the family of the original sibling's petitioning fianc or through
personal profiles posted on the Internet and in Internet chat rooms.


Post occasionally receives e-mails from disgruntled K-1 petitioners,
relaying stories of their fianc arriving in the U.S. and shortly
thereafter either leaving them or meeting and marrying someone else.
Often these e-mails from USC K-1 petitioners request the Embassy to
take action against their fiancs who were issued visas.

In addition, every year Post returns several K-1 (fianc) petitions
to DHS for review after determining that the couple had already
married. This issue is particularly prevalent with Iranian
applicants. Iranian couples engage in religious ceremonies in Iran
(which are legal marriages in that country) and then apply for
fianc visas. Determining if a couple is already married is very
difficult. Interviewing officers depend on the personal interview,
but we realize that some applicants may be successfully concealing
these marriages. These already married K-1 petitioners often claim
that their U.S. lawyers advised them to petition as a fianc because
"the process is quicker." The existence of "temporary marriage
contracts" in Iran is also problematic as they are treated as a
legitimate marriage just as a "normal" marriage.

Employment-based IV petitions are also watched closely for fraud.
Post is receiving a steady stream of E-3, "specialized skill" visa
applications. It is often difficult to verify that the Iranian
applicants possess the claimed work experience. Frequently the
applicants are "self-employed" and thus can state that their
experience matches the experience required in the employment

ABU DHABI 00000378 003.2 OF 006


petition. Contacting previous employers in Iran is time-consuming
and ineffective. In many cases, the businesses have closed or the
current manager has no record of the applicant's employment. At
times, the petitioner is either a family member or a close friend of
the petitioner. Post has also seen cases of the U.S. business
misrepresenting the services it offers in the petition to justify
the need for hiring the Iranian employee. The personal interview is
of great importance in these cases.


At times, falsified Iranian documents have been submitted to support
an application. The applicants had different birthdates listed on
their original petition and in their birth certificates (Shenas
Namehs). Of particular note is that the Shenas Namehs provided were
new (duplicate),and were not the original document provided at
birth. The birth date on the original document made the individual
over 21 years of age whereas the new birth date made the age of the
applicant under 21. The birthdates were intentionally changed so
that the applicant would qualify for the visa. Post is not clear
what Iranian identity authorities require to issue a duplicate
Shenas Namehs. Post notes that "unmarried" sons and daughters of
LPRs/AmCits have also submitted duplicate Shenas Namehs. Post
suspects that in many of these cases, the applicant is married and
has obtained a duplicate Shenas Nameh to conceal their marriage data
so that they qualify for a particular visa class. Post has
discovered that the applicants were in fact married. Post later
sees petitions from American Citizens, who immigrated to the U.S. as
"unmarried sons or daughters," for a spouse and children from that
same period of time.


4. DV Fraud - Abu Dhabi

All DV applicants in the UAE are TCNs - often from high-fraud
countries including Bangladesh, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. Conoffs
and LES have worked with fraud officers in Dhaka, Lagos, and other
posts to authenticate documents, particularly birth certificates and
education credentials. The most common reason for a DV application
to be disqualified is failure to include names of all family members
at the time of the original application.


5. ACS and Passport Fraud - Abu Dhabi

The American Citizen Services unit does not generally encounter U.S.
passport fraud. Post is vigilant about possible false citizenship
claims and forwards all CRBA applications of children born in Iran
to U.S. Embassy Bern for adjudication.

Individuals regularly appear at Embassy Abu Dhabi requesting
authentication of educational documents from diploma mills and
unaccredited institutions located both inside and outside the United
States. Often the unaccredited certificates or degrees have been
duly accredited at the state level and bear the authentication seal
of the U.S. Secretary of State. We continue to receive educational
documents that were accredited by the District of Columbia even
though the college or university is not located there. Educational
documents accredited in a state different than the state of issue is
a useful fraud indicator because this often implies that the
document was rejected in the state listed on the diploma (i.e.,
Florida),so the individual submitted the document to DC for
accreditation.

Third country nationals often submit these documents as UAE labor
and immigration law requires them to provide evidence of their
expertise and education in a particular field. The authentication
process only certifies "the genuineness of the signature and seal or
the position of a foreign official" and does not verify the validity
of the document. However, the UAE government and local companies
often presume that the Embassy seal is a verification of the
document's content and the subject's qualifications.

CA/OCS/PRI has confirmed that the Embassy is under no obligation to
authenticate these documents bearing the seal of the Department of
State. Post uses U.S. Department of Education and Council for
Higher Education databases to verify accreditation of educational
institutions. Post refuses to authenticate documents from
non-accredited institutions.


6. Adoption Fraud - Abu Dhabi

Post adjudicates very few local adoption cases. Adoption per se does
not exist under Sharia law in Islamic countries, including the UAE.
A court may only grant guardianship. The Department has advised that
guardianship does not carry the same status as adoption for purposes
of U.S. immigration, and thus Posts may only issue IR-4 visas for

ABU DHABI 00000378 004.2 OF 006


children whose adoption will be finalized in the US.

Post does see several IR-4 visa applications originating from Iran
each year and expects to see more Iranian-based adoption requests in
the future. Adjudicating such cases is relatively difficult since
U.S. legal requirements for completing an adoption and Iranian legal
proceedings and documentation for guardianship do not easily
collaborate. Post again stresses the challenge of authenticating
Iranian documents, especially provincial documents which are often
more local in nature and vary from the standard documents normally
submitted for visa adjudications or for adoption cases in other
countries. The potential for fraud exists. Post is working with
other posts, such as Ankara, to ensure consistent adoption
processing.


7. Use of DNA Testing - Abu Dhabi

Post has rarely had to request this for determinations of
relationship in IV cases or for CRBA/passport determinations.


8. Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud - Abu Dhabi

Post processes Visa 92 (asylum) cases, which are not usually found
to be fraudulent from the perspective of the consular officer's
responsibility to determine the family relationship. However, based
on interviews with the applicants, it appears that in many cases the
underlying basis for the original asylum claim was likely to have
been false. For example, Post receives following-to-join visa
requests based on successful asylum claims by Iranians who had
reportedly converted from Islam to Christianity, claiming
persecution in Iran. Interviews with following-to-join family
members often result in disclosures that the "conversions" were not
real. Often the interview reveals that the applicant has very little
knowledge of the conversion and answers frequently appear to be
coached. Post advised the Department and DHS/VSU about such concerns
and continues to complete Visas 92 processing per Department
guidance. DHS/VSU has advised that they have reported our concerns
to appropriate DHS offices and established an internal dialogue
about the phenomenon.


9. Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel
- Abu Dhabi

As Dubai and Abu Dhabi emerge as major airline transportation hubs
between Europe, the U.S., Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and
East Asia - and with growing networks of direct flights to many
locations in those regions - there is and will continue to be an
expected increase in the level of fraudulent travel through the
country. Over 80 percent of the UAE population is composed of TCNs
and there are direct air links to almost every corner of the world,
including service to at least seven U.S. cities.

While there are no known major networks in the UAE itself, both Abu
Dhabi and Dubai are popular transit points for fraudulent travelers
(most frequently transiting to Europe.) It is unlikely that UAE
nationals will become involved in the fraud industry; rather, this
will more likely arise from within the TCN communities that see
opportunities to assist persons entering the UAE illicitly or
transiting to other parts of the world.


10. DS Criminal Fraud Investigations - Abu Dhabi

Post does not have an A/RSO-I for investigations. However, there is
a strong relationship between the consular section, RSO, and the DHS
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Visa Security Unit(DHS/ICE/VSU).
All offices at the Embassy mutually support one another in
maintaining the integrity of the passport and visa processes.


11. Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry -
Abu Dhabi

UAE immigration authorities knowingly issue passports to UAE
nationals born outside the UAE that incorrectly show their place of
birth to be in one of the country's seven emirates. The UAE
Government instituted this practice to combat discrimination in
administering the UAE law against dual nationality. The decision to
allow this practice is usually attributed to the former President
and father of the nation, Sheikh Zayed. In 2002, Post consulted with
the Department, which determined that these passports are not valid
travel documents under U.S. law and can therefore not be used to
travel to the United States. Generally, bearers of such passports
are qualified visa applicants with legitimate travel plans to the
United States. As well-intended as this UAE government policy may
be, it nonetheless complicates Post's efforts to identify UAE

ABU DHABI 00000378 005.2 OF 006


nationals who are potential security threats to the United States or
have other visa ineligibilities.

The UAE otherwise has modern, professional and secure nationality
and identity documents and well-established procedures for obtaining
and maintaining vital civil records, at least for those born within
the last 30 years. Given that the modern state of the UAE only came
into existence in 1971, it is more difficult to rely on any
documents created before that date. However, almost all records on
individuals and their families are now updated and established. UAE
passports are ICAO compliant, and since they are valid for 5 years,
Post has no particular problems with older versions of the UAE
passport.

The UAE has also launched a mandatory national identity card program
for all residents of the UAE. Several hundred thousand Emiratis,
starting with those in the armed forces and the police, now have
such cards. The identity card is scheduled to be mandatory for all
residents - Emirati and TCN alike - by 2010. The ID cards carry all
biometric data and fingerprints on an electronic chip and are
intended to eventually be used as driver's licenses, for banking
purposes, for residency status verification, and more. More
information on the UAE national ID card can be found at the Emirates
Identity Authority's website at
http://www.emiratesid.ae/mainenglish.html.

In 2003, the UAE began implementation of iris scanning at its
airports for certain nationals. Individuals who are deported from
the UAE, or are the subject of travel bans, are enrolled into the
iris-scan lookout system prior to their removal/departure from the
UAE. At time of entry into the UAE, travelers of certain
nationalities are required to undergo iris scanning, and over 30,000
persons have been intercepted using the new technology. Iris
scanning is also being deployed at land border crossings, and is
currently active on the Omani border.



12. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities - Abu Dhabi

Generally, Post has a good working relationship with the host
government including cooperation on fraud issues as they arise. The
UAEG, however, remains unresponsive to the serious passport place of
birth concerns described above in paragraph 11.


13. Areas of Particular Concern - Abu Dhabi

Post again highlights the known inadequacy of the UAE passport in
regards to true place of birth for UAE nationals born outside the
UAE. (See paragraph 11.)

Post's primary concern in IV work remains our limited ability to
verify Iranian documents and information provided in interviews.
Post relies on "Shenas Namehs" to confirm names, birthdates,
marriages, divorces, and other data. Post has seen several cases in
which duplicate Shenas Namehs are submitted to verify identity. In
many cases, Post has found that the duplicate document does not
retain the same data as the original and that opportunities exist
for altering data.

With no USG presence in Iran it is difficult to conduct research to
verify suspicious information or documents. Post is concerned about
fraud in Iranian cases and sees the potential for abuse (with
possible security ramifications) of the U.S. immigration process.
Post is working on improving our knowledge of Iranian documents. We
are working with the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, our counterparts from
other missions with presence in Iran, and with colleagues from other
U.S. Missions that handle Iranian visa work to gather Iranian
legitimate documents and analyze valid trends. Despite efforts made
approximately 4 years ago to gather Iranian documents, Post have not
had a set on documents against which to verify Iranian claims.
Efforts are being made through the Swiss and the British Embassies
to gather valid and current Iranian documents.

Post suspects that the Iranian community has caught on that working
for the Government of Iran often results in a delay of visa
issuance. Additionally, Post suspects local Iranian travel agencies
(which facilitate Iranians visiting the UAE, including
accommodations in Dubai and transportation to Abu Dhabi) informally
brief applicants on what to expect and say during visa interviews.
Most recently, Post is working with CA/VO/L/C (the State group
responsible for clearing Security Advisory Opinions) to clarify
guidelines for the use of Security Advisory Opinions for Iranians
with previous government and/ or military experience.


ABU DHABI 00000378 006.2 OF 006





14. Staffing and Training - Abu Dhabi

Abu Dhabi does not have any dedicated fraud prevention staff. Visa
team members - LES and officer alike - look for fraud on a
case-by-case basis. When the possibility of fraud is suspected,
Post works to investigate that case. With an Iranian- American IV
Chief and 3 Iranian LES staff, much IV fraud work can be done in
native language and by investigating original sources in Iran. The
DHS Visa Security Unit provides excellent assistance on fraud
prevention matters and provides training to our consular staff, UAE
immigration, and others for the detection of fraudulent documents,
travel, imposters, DHS database reviews, and the whole range of
fraud issues.

Olson