Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABUDHABI330
2009-04-01 12:38:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
UAE REACTION TO REQUEST FOR MANAS ALTERNATIVES
how-toVZCZCXRO6334 PP RUEHDE DE RUEHAD #0330 0911238 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 011238Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2316 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1366 RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0007 RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0102 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0100 RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RHMFISS/9AF SHAW AFB SC RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0089 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0463 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 8217
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000330
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS AE KG AF IR
SUBJECT: UAE REACTION TO REQUEST FOR MANAS ALTERNATIVES
REF: STATE 030022
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000330
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS AE KG AF IR
SUBJECT: UAE REACTION TO REQUEST FOR MANAS ALTERNATIVES
REF: STATE 030022
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (S) Summary: The UAE Chief of Staff (CoS) asked for more details
on the Manas operations before he endorses a US led site survey, in
his mind, USG use of Safran AB is questionable. Transit of US forces
may be doable, but expanding to NATO use seems out of the question.
End summary.
2. (S) Amb Olson and USLO Chief met with UAE Chief of Staff Lt Gen
Hamid Thani al Rumaithy to deliver reftel demarche and assess the
receptivity of the UAEG to the USG's use of Safran Air Base for
personnel and cargo transload missions in support of military
operations in Afghanistan. In opening comments, Amb Olson reviewed
and referenced Gen Hamid Thani's trip to Wash DC (19/20 Mar) and his
meeting with Gen Petraeus. It was at this meeting that Gen Petraeus
first notified the UAEG that the USG may be asking for help in
handling the Manas mission. Amb Olson re-emphasized the criticality
of that mission and said that even as negotiations continue the
long-term reliability of the Manas air bridge is questionable. Amb
Olson refered to his 20 March meeting with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Mohammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ),in which Ambassador had previewed
a possible USG request for support. At that time, MbZ stated that if
the USG helped the UAE with the Iranian threat, the UAE would help
the USG with the war in Afghanistan. Ambassador noted that
considerable progress had already taken place on Iran cooperation:
the CentCom J2 had visited, and a joint J2/J3/J5 team was planning to
come in April.
3. (S) Amb Olson asked CoS for assistance with Manas alternatives,
underscoring that the USG has a site survey team ready to move
forward. He also stated that preliminary analysis showed that Safran
Air Base may be a suitable location (especially because of its remote
location, which would allow us to completely conceal the presence of
US ground forces).
4. (S) Gen Hamid Thani's reaction was his typical stoicism. He said
that in a practical sense he needed to have a better understanding of
the purpose of the mission, more details on USG requirements, and a
description of the activates that would take place there. At this
time both AMB Olson and Col Sprague (USLO) described the Manas
trans-loading mission to the CoS. Gen Hamid Thani stated, "frankly I
prefer not to have forces further South toward SAFRAN. It's already
busy with the Air Force, Critical National Infrastructure Authority
and UAE helos in support of border patrol." He went on to say "your
requirement is important. There could be three or four other
alternatives, but we need more details." (He looked to his Director
of Staff, BG Farris, and between them they mentioned Minhad AB but
quickly agreed it's already quite busy as well ref Australian and
Canadian build-up and a potential NATO AWACS deployment) CoS stated
that "with more details, I can speak to my Air Force leadership (on
alternatives)." Ambassador raised the possibility that NATO, in
addition to US troops might be involved. The COS said the US was one
thing, NATO quite another. (Comment: We took this to mean no to
non-US NATO troops.)
5. (S) Gen Hamid Thani changed the subject to ask Amb Olson's
thoughts on the G-20 summit in London. After a brief exchange, Gen
Hamid Thani thanked the Amb for his time and asked again for more
details on the Manas request; only then could he support the site
survey.
6. (S) Comment: We believe that the request for access/use of SAFRAN
AB came truly as a surprise to the UAE CoS. We may be asked to
consider other alternatives in the UAE. However, this was a gut
reaction, and in other instances the COS has moved away from initial
reticence after consultation with his component commanders.
7. (S) Action Request: Embassy Abu Dhabi recommends USCENTCOM
summarize the Manas concept of operations to be executed at the UAE
location and include a summary, with mid-level detail, of logistical
requirements. With this information, we believe the UAE may approve
the site survey(s).
OLSON
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS AE KG AF IR
SUBJECT: UAE REACTION TO REQUEST FOR MANAS ALTERNATIVES
REF: STATE 030022
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (S) Summary: The UAE Chief of Staff (CoS) asked for more details
on the Manas operations before he endorses a US led site survey, in
his mind, USG use of Safran AB is questionable. Transit of US forces
may be doable, but expanding to NATO use seems out of the question.
End summary.
2. (S) Amb Olson and USLO Chief met with UAE Chief of Staff Lt Gen
Hamid Thani al Rumaithy to deliver reftel demarche and assess the
receptivity of the UAEG to the USG's use of Safran Air Base for
personnel and cargo transload missions in support of military
operations in Afghanistan. In opening comments, Amb Olson reviewed
and referenced Gen Hamid Thani's trip to Wash DC (19/20 Mar) and his
meeting with Gen Petraeus. It was at this meeting that Gen Petraeus
first notified the UAEG that the USG may be asking for help in
handling the Manas mission. Amb Olson re-emphasized the criticality
of that mission and said that even as negotiations continue the
long-term reliability of the Manas air bridge is questionable. Amb
Olson refered to his 20 March meeting with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Mohammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ),in which Ambassador had previewed
a possible USG request for support. At that time, MbZ stated that if
the USG helped the UAE with the Iranian threat, the UAE would help
the USG with the war in Afghanistan. Ambassador noted that
considerable progress had already taken place on Iran cooperation:
the CentCom J2 had visited, and a joint J2/J3/J5 team was planning to
come in April.
3. (S) Amb Olson asked CoS for assistance with Manas alternatives,
underscoring that the USG has a site survey team ready to move
forward. He also stated that preliminary analysis showed that Safran
Air Base may be a suitable location (especially because of its remote
location, which would allow us to completely conceal the presence of
US ground forces).
4. (S) Gen Hamid Thani's reaction was his typical stoicism. He said
that in a practical sense he needed to have a better understanding of
the purpose of the mission, more details on USG requirements, and a
description of the activates that would take place there. At this
time both AMB Olson and Col Sprague (USLO) described the Manas
trans-loading mission to the CoS. Gen Hamid Thani stated, "frankly I
prefer not to have forces further South toward SAFRAN. It's already
busy with the Air Force, Critical National Infrastructure Authority
and UAE helos in support of border patrol." He went on to say "your
requirement is important. There could be three or four other
alternatives, but we need more details." (He looked to his Director
of Staff, BG Farris, and between them they mentioned Minhad AB but
quickly agreed it's already quite busy as well ref Australian and
Canadian build-up and a potential NATO AWACS deployment) CoS stated
that "with more details, I can speak to my Air Force leadership (on
alternatives)." Ambassador raised the possibility that NATO, in
addition to US troops might be involved. The COS said the US was one
thing, NATO quite another. (Comment: We took this to mean no to
non-US NATO troops.)
5. (S) Gen Hamid Thani changed the subject to ask Amb Olson's
thoughts on the G-20 summit in London. After a brief exchange, Gen
Hamid Thani thanked the Amb for his time and asked again for more
details on the Manas request; only then could he support the site
survey.
6. (S) Comment: We believe that the request for access/use of SAFRAN
AB came truly as a surprise to the UAE CoS. We may be asked to
consider other alternatives in the UAE. However, this was a gut
reaction, and in other instances the COS has moved away from initial
reticence after consultation with his component commanders.
7. (S) Action Request: Embassy Abu Dhabi recommends USCENTCOM
summarize the Manas concept of operations to be executed at the UAE
location and include a summary, with mid-level detail, of logistical
requirements. With this information, we believe the UAE may approve
the site survey(s).
OLSON