Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABUDHABI226
2009-03-05 13:49:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

DEEPENING COOPERATION THROUGH COUNTER-PROLIFERATION TASK

Tags:  PREL PARM KNNP MNUC ETTC AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 051349Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2221
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
USDOC WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
HQ BICE WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000226 


NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, T, ISN/CPI/CHERRINGTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP MNUC ETTC AE
SUBJECT: DEEPENING COOPERATION THROUGH COUNTER-PROLIFERATION TASK
FORCE (CTF) WITH UAE

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 126, B) 08 ABU DHABI 1382, C) 08 ABU DHABI 940,
D) 08 ABU DHABI 727, E) 08 ABU DHABI 325, F) 08 ABU DHABI 323

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000226


NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, T, ISN/CPI/CHERRINGTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP MNUC ETTC AE
SUBJECT: DEEPENING COOPERATION THROUGH COUNTER-PROLIFERATION TASK
FORCE (CTF) WITH UAE

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 126, B) 08 ABU DHABI 1382, C) 08 ABU DHABI 940,
D) 08 ABU DHABI 727, E) 08 ABU DHABI 325, F) 08 ABU DHABI 323

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) The bilateral Counter-proliferation Task Force (CTF)
meeting on March 19 in Abu Dhabi is our opportunity to reinforce
practical steps to strengthen the UAE's counter-proliferation (CP)
regime and follow up on the prior CTF held February 25, 2008 (ref E).
The UAE's record on export control remains positive but there is
room for improvement; we must give credit where credit is due while
tactfully noting gaps that need urgent attention. (The goal is not
to identify gaps so much as to motivate solutions to fill those
gaps.) The U.S. read-ahead papers being prepared should be helpful
in that regard.

Iran in the cross hairs -- but need a clean shot
-------------- ---


2. (S/NF) The UAE is very wary of Iran's nuclear ambitions and
spends a great deal of its defense resources to combat the threat of
missiles that can easily reach its shores. An Iranian missile with a
WMD payload would be a worst-case scenario. At the same time, the
UAE (particularly Dubai) has a robust trading relationship with Iran
that benefits the Emirates economically and in terms of keeping
relations cordial with a much larger nation and potential military
foe across the narrow Gulf. (Note: The UAE is the third largest
exporter to Iran after China and Germany, and the largest in terms of
re-exports. End note.) The UAE literally finds security in keeping
trade relations active. Sifting through the contents of that robust
(and important) traffic to weed out troublesome cargo is a formidable
challenge.


3. (S/NF) Against that backdrop, the UAE is a reliable partner in
enforcing UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran when the parameters
of the case are clear. We have requested the seizure of multiple
shipments -- politically and economically difficult for the UAE --
and found them a very cooperative partner. That said, we rarely find

the UAE looking for ways to proactively identify suspect cargo on its
own. In essence, the UAEG assists in carrying out the letter of the
law on UNSCRs but does not take an aggressive unilateral approach to
the spirit of the law.

Motivating a more proactive posture
--------------


4. (S/NF) This gap derives from both political and capacity
limitations.

-- Fundamentally, the UAE worries that the US (and "the West" at
large) will one day reach an accommodation with Iran, at which point
Iran will be free to exact revenge on its little neighbor for having
provoked it during a time when Iran was unpopular.
-- While Iran's increasingly belligerent posture in the region (and
particularly in the wake of Gaza turmoil) makes the UAE ever more
wary of Iran's intentions, the UAEG must nonetheless avoid
provocations since it is a tiny country in comparison to Iran.
-- A certain degree of political hesitation stems from the importance
of Iran trade, as well as a differential in how Abu Dhabi and Dubai
view the problem (Abu Dhabi looks after national security while Dubai
plays a more economic role).
-- The economic downturn puts a premium on keeping trade flowing.
-- The UAE is a small country (900,000 citizens) doing business as a
much larger state with outsized economic ambitions and high
transshipment volumes; marshalling the personnel resources to
effectively sift through the complex shipping trade is simply
daunting.
-- Even at the more mundane level of staffing the CP effort in key
ministries, the recent departure of our sole CP interlocutor at MFA
(Yacub al-Hosani) degrades MFA's ability to devote sufficient time
and intellectual energy into more thoughtful coordination. (We
should note these shortfalls cautiously without preaching; alas, the
UAE Ambassador to the U.S. has pointed out that the U.S. team is also
awaiting confirmations of new leaders.)
-- Judicial training has also been hampered by competing priorities
as an ambitious UAEG imposes many top-down demands on the Ministry of
Justice.
-- The UAE also hesitates when intelligence is not clear and
convincing (the Iraq experience diminished the credibility of USG
intelligence on WMD and the UAEG had few resources to build its own
source network earlier in the game); as our seizure requests have
validated the quality of our intelligence, the UAEG has become more
comfortable.

The bottom line for the UAE is that provoking a big and fanatical
neighbor is a risky proposition, and it needs every scrap of
multilateral cover available for its actions.


5. (S/NF) These capacity and political constraints partly explain why
the UAEG would like us to stop cargo at prior ports of call and we
should frequently remind the UAE why we rely on it: 1) geography puts
it in center court, 2) the UAE's robust economic role means huge
trade volumes -- and consequent obligations, 3) CP is more in the
UAE's interest than more distant states not easily threatened by
Iran, and 4) intelligence takes time to develop and is more precise
when a ship approaches the final port of call. Reminding the UAE
that it is a likely target can create a firm resolve.

Opaque legal culture
--------------


6. (C/NF) The Export Control Law passed in August 2007 continues to
guide UAE efforts, but remains in a state of revision. Information
in early December (ref B) was that implementing authority for the law
would be assigned to the same inter-agency committee that oversees
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) obligations, coordinated by the
Ministry of Interior (MoI). With the amendment not yet published in
the Official Gazette and absent clear confirmation of MoI's role,
however, we hear that a new iteration may assign implementing
authority to another body. We will want to confirm the status of the
law further in CTF discussions (always wary of UAEG comments that the
law is not as important as practical CP steps, which they often say
should be our primary focus).


7. (S/NF) Late February press reports note the acquittal of persons
accused of transporting Zirconium -- likely referring to the first
case prosecuted under the Export Control Law (refs D and F). We must
continue to stress that laws and law enforcement are critical to long
term success, implementing bodies must be clear and active, ongoing
judicial training is vital to ensure enforcement, awareness among
private sector companies is a necessary force multiplier, and a
record of strict penalties would make the law a key contributor to
UAE security in a dangerous neighborhood. Emphasizing UAE interests
over those of the U.S. or the UN help make the case for UAEG action.
Positing the UAE as the potential victim of Iran's intentions can
also reinforce caution on dual use items; Iran should not get the
benefit of the doubt when military usage is possible/probable.

Helping spread the message
--------------


8. (C/NF) UAEG officials frequently comment that USG endorsements of
UAE actions have been positive and that it is the Administration's
duty to so inform the Congress. We need to delicately remind senior
CTF members what while our sensitive coordination -- which they have
asked us to keep out of the public eye -- indeed has many successes
which we report through proper channels, measures monitored directly
by the Congress (like the Export Control Law) are also critical to
getting the word out that the UAE is serious. The UAE needs to help
with its own PR.


9. (C/NF) The connection which some in the U.S. draw between
peaceful nuclear cooperation and the UAE export control record makes
it all the more important that the UAE CP regime be robust not only
at the highly classified levels but also in the public eye.
Establishing clear enforcement mechanisms for the law, briefing
industry on the law, and pursuing cases under the law would help
provide that awareness.

The CP smorgasbord -- training
--------------


10. (C) Training opportunities outlined in the read-ahead paper
offer a good menu from which we need to encourage the UAEG to
partake. In addition to those opportunities, the UAEG has agreed to
host in-port portions of the PSI exercise LEADING EDGE later this
year. Leveraging that exercise to address critical questions like
disposition of seized cargo (including legal ramifications),cautious
scrutiny of dual-use goods, and broader inter-agency (and
international) coordination should help advance UAEG capacity in the
CP field. These are delicate questions best addressed in the context
of practical exercises and case studies.


11. (S/NF) The CTF agenda can guide useful discussion if we approach
it carefully. We must be cautious not to preach to an audience that
on its terms is operating near full capacity, nonetheless clear on
our views as to how the UAEG can (and must) do more. We should offer
institutional answers to the questions we pose (legal avenues for
cargo disposition [ref C], clear rationale for inspecting
over-flights [if raised], simplified processes for providing
training) while also pointing out staffing gaps that hinder the UAE
effort institutionally. We must balance overload (a buffet with so
many items that the UAEG simply cannot digest the offerings) against
the need to ensure thoughtful mention of items that will require
follow-up throughout the year.

OLSON