Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABUDHABI189
2009-02-23 12:50:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

ABU DHABI "BAILS OUT" DUBAI VIA UAE CENTRAL BANK

Tags:  EFIN EINV ECON PREL PGOV AE 
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O 231250Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2163
INFO AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000189 


SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/RA (SCOVITCH),NEA/ARP (BMASILKO) AND
EEB STATE PLEASE PASS USTR (BUNTIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2019
TAGS: EFIN EINV ECON PREL PGOV AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI "BAILS OUT" DUBAI VIA UAE CENTRAL BANK

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000189


SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/RA (SCOVITCH),NEA/ARP (BMASILKO) AND
EEB STATE PLEASE PASS USTR (BUNTIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2019
TAGS: EFIN EINV ECON PREL PGOV AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI "BAILS OUT" DUBAI VIA UAE CENTRAL BANK


1. This is a joint Embassy Abu Dhabi - Consulate general Dubai
cable.


2. (C) Summary. The Dubai government announced on February 22 that
it would float a USD 20 billion bond to support its debt repayment
schedule and that the UAE Central Bank will subscribe to half of the
five year bond, which will pay a four percent dividend. The public
announcement seeks to alleviate immediate fears about Dubai's
insolvency and puts an end to months-long speculation about if, when
and how wealthier Abu Dhabi would support its flashier and indebted
brother. Despite the injection, Dubai's financial health remains
questionable in the medium-term. UAEG officials say widespread
rumors that Dubai would be allowed to collapse did not reflect the
importance of mutual political and economic integration. End
Summary.


3. (C) The Dubai Department of Finance announced on February 22 that
the UAE Central Bank had subscribed to half of a USD 20 billion
long-term bond to cover a portion of public sector debt estimated at
USD 80 billion, but rumored to be as high as USD 150 billion. The
five year unsecured fixed rate paper will yield four percent annually
and is likely to support Dubai's efforts to meet its short- term debt
obligations, including an estimated USD 12 billion of debt maturing
in 2009.


4. (C) The announcement comes on the heels of a February 21
restructuring of Bourse Dubai debt. Dubai refinanced the USD 3.8
billion obligation by injecting additional equity (about USD 1
billion),agreeing to new terms with the original lending syndicate,
and tapping additional UAE-based banks. The UAE banks that took on
fresh exposure, already stretched by high loan-to-deposit ratios, are
rumored to have received government cash injections to ensure a
successful closing (nfi). The restructured loan priced at 350 basis
points over LIBOR, an unusually reasonable figure considering Dubai
credit default swap (CDS) spreads were exceeding 1000 basis points.

The two deals demonstrate the complex and opaque dance taking place
between Dubai and Abu Dhabi, but indicate a shared commitment to
avoid worst case scenarios. Time will tell if the bailout brings a
degree of investor confidence back to Dubai, or simply slows the
bleeding temporarily.


5. (S) Dr. Omar Bin Sulaiman, Vice Chairman of the UAE Central Bank
and Governor of the Dubai International Financial Centre, told the
Consul General on February 23 that he had orchestrated the much
needed federal bailout, after a "rough" period of relations between
Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Bin Sulaiman said the Central Bank's
involvement was a very intentional confidence building signal.
According to Abu Dhabi insiders, Dubai resisted any public
acknowledgement of federal and/or Abu Dhabi aid to the troubled
city-state, a condition set by Abu Dhabi's ruling Al Nahyans. Bin
Sulaiman said the second USD 10 billion tranche would be offered to
banks and institutional investors, and that several large US banks
had already expressed interest. (Comment: The widespread on Dubai
CDS makes this unlikely at acceptable interest rates. End Comment.)

COMMENT
--------------


6. (C) The unsecured bond fundamentally does little to improve
Dubai's overall financial outlook and transparency. (Note: Emirati
officials report ongoing high-level debate about how much financial
transparency is needed to respond to weak investor sentiment. End
Note.) It is unclear how the Dubai government (and/or "Dubai Inc.")
will utilize the USD 10 billion injection, as debt obligations and
payment schedules remain opaque. Dubai Inc. is clearly under
pressure to review its operations to find every cent of cash; project
cancellations and redundancies have given way to consolidations.
Rumors abound that Dubai entities may be forced to sell off foreign
assets, even at a significant loss, in order to support current
obligations. Without a significant improvement in emerging market
risk appetite by international credit markets, Dubai will likely face
the same situation in 12 months time, if not possibly sooner.


7. (C) For now, the announcement stems rampant speculation about how
and when Abu Dhabi would bail out Dubai (reftel). Although the
wealthier Abu Dhabi approved this highly risky commitment of UAE
Central Bank reserve assets, the price demanded of Dubai was public
recognition of its dependence on the UAE federal government, and
thereby the resources of Abu Dhabi. The federal cover allows Abu
Dhabi to project the political-economic balance of power between the
two emirates without overreaching or appearing opportunistic. The
initial bailout highlights that the cohesion of the UAE federation,
economic integration, and their mutual financial integrity trump the
ongoing rivalry between the two emirates. Abu Dhabi's involvement is
not without a degree of self-interest, as Abu Dhabi investors and
businesses are heavily exposed to Dubai and a failed Dubai would
likely drag down Abu Dhabi's own ability to borrow. End Comment.

OLSON