Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABUDHABI174
2009-02-19 11:26:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT AND ATTENDANCE AT IDEX 2009
how-toP 191126Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY DCIS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY AOC AMCOM RESTONE ARSENAL AL PRIORITY NAVY IPO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY PEO SOLDIER FT BELVOIR VA PRIORITY OMC-K KUWAIT KU PRIORITY CDRUSASAC FT BELVOIR VA//AMSAC-CG// PRIORITY INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 2150 CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000174
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS MASS IR IZ AF PK AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT AND ATTENDANCE AT IDEX 2009
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON, REASON 1.4 (b,d)
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000174
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS MASS IR IZ AF PK AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT AND ATTENDANCE AT IDEX 2009
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON, REASON 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) We look forward to your visit to the UAE and
participation in the 9th International Defense Exhibition and
Conference (IDEX).
--------------
Punching Above Its Weight
--------------
2. (C) Over the past five years the UAE has emerged
as a regional powerhouse, using its financial clout and diplomatic
activism to expand its influence from North Africa through the
Levant to the Indian Sub-Continent, and indeed globally in
financial circles. The bilateral relationship has been carefully
nurtured from a strong mil-mil base emerging out of the first Gulf
war into a much broader relationship in which the full range
of USG Agencies work closely with Emirati counterparts. We consult
extensively with the Emiratis and seek their advice, especially on
tricky regional issues. Our trade relations have grown (they are
our largest export market in the Middle East region) and although
the UAE, and particularly Dubai, is feeling the pinch of the global
financial crisis, we have not seen an immediate impact in the
security field. Abu Dhabi's oil reserves generally suffice to keep
defense programs on track, although some discretionary construction
projects may be slowed down. In the broader economy, the frenzied
pace of construction which we saw only six months ago has slowed
considerably.
--------------
UAE and the Region
--------------
3. (S) The UAE has generally played a helpful role in a number of
areas:
Iraq:
-- First GCC Country to cancel Saddam era debt and to re-establish
an embassy: other GCC nations followed;
-- Supportive of Iraqi participation in the GCC+3;
-- Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ)
came away from a meeting with PM Maliki more convinced he has Iraqi
national interests at heart, and also convinced about the
importance of the US security agreement with Iraq.
Afghanistan:
-- UAE SOF has been quietly deployed as part of OEF since 2002, and
has recently come out of the closet as part of ISAF (UAE is
permitting press coverage emphasizing a humanitarian mission);
-- UAE SOF plans to deploy aviation components to Afghanistan (4 x
AH-64 Apache Longbows, 3 x UH-64L Blackhawks, 1 x Twin Otter, and
2 x CH-47F Chinooks);
-- MbZ sees the Afghan deployment as a way of transforming and
hardening his forces, but also recognizes the political imperative
for moderate Arabs to publicly support the fight against Al-Qaida
and the Taliban.
Pakistan:
-- UAE has taken a leading role in the Friends of Pakistan
initiative, and is signaling that it will contribute financial
support, provided multilateral arrangements are put in place;
-- The Al Nahyan family had a long-standing relationship with
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and this has transitioned
to support for her husband, Asif Ali Zardari.
Iran:
-- For the Emiratis, Iran is a primordial obsession, and all
security conversations soon turn to the Iranian threat (Iran is
46 seconds from the UAE, as measured by the flight of a ballistic
missile);
-- Abu Dhabi leadership believes the international community is
seized with the nuclear issue, but insufficiently focused on
Iran's efforts to destabilize the region or rebuild past
"Persian" influence;
-- Important to consult closely with the Emiratis as we develop
new Iran policy.
--------------
Mil-Mil Relations
--------------
4. (S/NF) The UAE provides critical (not publicized) support for
several military component commands in the CENTCOM AOR.
-- Al-Dhafra air force base is the high altitude ISR hub for the AOR,
and supports 50 percent of aerial refueling in the AOR.
-- Dubai and Fujariah ports in the Northern Emirates are the
logistics backbone for the U.S. Fifth Fleet and commercial trade.
Jebel Ali is the major U.S. military liberty port. Fujariah port
is a major trans-shipment hub to support Afghanistan military
operations.
-- Minhad Air Base is a critical hub for Coalition/ISAF partners in
Afghanistan, including the Australians, Dutch, Canadians, Brits and
Kiwis.
5. (C) Security Assistance is a cornerstone of our relationship.
-- UAE is a cash customer and purchases a significant amount (but
certainly not all) of its equipment and training from the US. FMS
sales are in excess of $11 billion and commercial sales are of a
similar or greater amount. There are an additional $11 billion of
FMS cases in development, and a similar amount for DCS.
-- The UAE recently purchased nine (9) Patriot batteries, and
expects to move forward on the purchase of THAAD soon, with the
aim of supporting the UAE's desire for an integrated air defense
system. UAE will be the first country outside the US to purchase
the THAAD system.
-- The major FMS/DCS systems are: Hawk, F-16, Weapons (JDAM,
Hellfire, Maverick, LGB, cluster, HARM, Harpoon),HIMARS, AH-64,
UH-60 M/L, AOC operating system, Patriot, C-130, CH-47, Shared
Early Warning, CENTRIXS, NVGs, land vehicles, and small arms.
-- You should be aware of the following UAE LOAs in offer status:
training for all major systems, COMSEC including Type I crypto,
3 x E-2C Hawkeye EDA, SL-AMRAAM components, and JAVELIN.
-- The following systems have been requested and are in various
stages of FMS and DCS development: 3 x THAAD, 24 x RQ8 Firescout,
4 x C-17 Globemaster, 12 x C-130J (option for 4 X KC-130J),
satellites/imagery, 16 x CH-47F (4 via DCS),land based Phalanx,
XM-982 Excalibur, XM-1156 PGK, 5000 X GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb,
E-2D Hawkeye, Boeing Wedgetail, AOC system upgrade, Link-16
integration on all appropriate platforms/ground facilities,
stinger/avenger/VMSLP, MRAP, critical national infrastrucure
protection, and Head of State missile ASE.
-- The UAE maintains an active exercise schedule with US and
other multi-lateral partners. They participate in 10-12 US
sponsored exercises annually which help assure interoperability
and build capability.
6. (S/NF) Existing vulnerabilities in the following areas:
-- Capability gap in UAE ability to counter a mine threat from
the sea.
-- Integrated consequence management. Government agencies react
independently in the face of a crisis or mishap.
-- Little perceived collection, processing or dissemination of
actionable counter-proliferation intelligence (often reliant on
US provided targeting information).
--------------
Challenges
--------------
7. (S/NF) One of the main challenges that the USG faces in the UAE is
dealing with rapid growth, both Emirati and our own. It can be
virtually impossible to get a hotel room in Abu Dhabi, housing our
people in a overheated market is a real challenge, and our
new (2004) state of the art Embassy is already too small for
everyone who wants in. As we start the integrated air defense
program (all FMS),and as we move from supplemental to regular
budgetary funding, there will inevitably be pressure from DOD/
CENTCOM (and other agencies) to put more people on the ground here.
The UAE will need to fund the support for their increased military
activity, but so far has been unwilling. They always assert that
the 3.8% admin fee should be enough to cover specific case support.
8. (S) The recent crashes of 2 x UAE F-16 Block 60s are cause for
concern. The first mishap occurred in January and the second occurred
in February. Both aircraft were lost and the UAE pilots were killed.
The initial impression of both mishaps is that they were caused by
pilot error in basic skills. This should not be raised with UAE
officials. We encourage you to thank the UAE for its participation
in OEF and OIF. In particular its efforts in AFG and taking command
of the Maritime Coalition (TF-152, a NAVCENT priority) in late Fall
09.
9. (S/NF) We have been at an impasse with the UAE on the DCA since
1994, and while we have developed a variety of risk-laden work-arounds
for existing deployments, it is difficult to see any great expansion
of combatant forces here absent some movement on this issue. The UAE
asserts its sovereignty at every opportunity and direct negotiation
on the DCA may prove to be more risky than the potential rewards.
10. (S/NF) Without directly addressing the DCA, the relationship
could be improved if the UAE were to partner with the US more closely
in a few areas. Moving the US Naval forces in Fujairah onto the UAE
Naval Base would improve our force protection and lead to increased
cooperation and security on the sea and the shore. Streamlined US
military entry and exit with a MIL ID card at Al Dhafra would be
welcomed. Increased access and pier space in Jebel Ali port are
becoming critical issues as the Dubai Ports World (DPW) has
decreased the amount of pier space for NAVCENT use. Increased use
of the Abu Dhabi port may serve to ease the pressure at Jebel Ali
and Fujairah. As the US reorganizes its MIL basing footprint in
the region, there may be some willingness for the UAE to allow
more passive US presence in their country.
11. (C) We look forward to seeing you at IDEX. I welcome any
initiative to synchronize USG efforts. The Embassy team works
closely with all commands with a stake in the UAE.
OLSON
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS MASS IR IZ AF PK AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT AND ATTENDANCE AT IDEX 2009
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON, REASON 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) We look forward to your visit to the UAE and
participation in the 9th International Defense Exhibition and
Conference (IDEX).
--------------
Punching Above Its Weight
--------------
2. (C) Over the past five years the UAE has emerged
as a regional powerhouse, using its financial clout and diplomatic
activism to expand its influence from North Africa through the
Levant to the Indian Sub-Continent, and indeed globally in
financial circles. The bilateral relationship has been carefully
nurtured from a strong mil-mil base emerging out of the first Gulf
war into a much broader relationship in which the full range
of USG Agencies work closely with Emirati counterparts. We consult
extensively with the Emiratis and seek their advice, especially on
tricky regional issues. Our trade relations have grown (they are
our largest export market in the Middle East region) and although
the UAE, and particularly Dubai, is feeling the pinch of the global
financial crisis, we have not seen an immediate impact in the
security field. Abu Dhabi's oil reserves generally suffice to keep
defense programs on track, although some discretionary construction
projects may be slowed down. In the broader economy, the frenzied
pace of construction which we saw only six months ago has slowed
considerably.
--------------
UAE and the Region
--------------
3. (S) The UAE has generally played a helpful role in a number of
areas:
Iraq:
-- First GCC Country to cancel Saddam era debt and to re-establish
an embassy: other GCC nations followed;
-- Supportive of Iraqi participation in the GCC+3;
-- Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ)
came away from a meeting with PM Maliki more convinced he has Iraqi
national interests at heart, and also convinced about the
importance of the US security agreement with Iraq.
Afghanistan:
-- UAE SOF has been quietly deployed as part of OEF since 2002, and
has recently come out of the closet as part of ISAF (UAE is
permitting press coverage emphasizing a humanitarian mission);
-- UAE SOF plans to deploy aviation components to Afghanistan (4 x
AH-64 Apache Longbows, 3 x UH-64L Blackhawks, 1 x Twin Otter, and
2 x CH-47F Chinooks);
-- MbZ sees the Afghan deployment as a way of transforming and
hardening his forces, but also recognizes the political imperative
for moderate Arabs to publicly support the fight against Al-Qaida
and the Taliban.
Pakistan:
-- UAE has taken a leading role in the Friends of Pakistan
initiative, and is signaling that it will contribute financial
support, provided multilateral arrangements are put in place;
-- The Al Nahyan family had a long-standing relationship with
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and this has transitioned
to support for her husband, Asif Ali Zardari.
Iran:
-- For the Emiratis, Iran is a primordial obsession, and all
security conversations soon turn to the Iranian threat (Iran is
46 seconds from the UAE, as measured by the flight of a ballistic
missile);
-- Abu Dhabi leadership believes the international community is
seized with the nuclear issue, but insufficiently focused on
Iran's efforts to destabilize the region or rebuild past
"Persian" influence;
-- Important to consult closely with the Emiratis as we develop
new Iran policy.
--------------
Mil-Mil Relations
--------------
4. (S/NF) The UAE provides critical (not publicized) support for
several military component commands in the CENTCOM AOR.
-- Al-Dhafra air force base is the high altitude ISR hub for the AOR,
and supports 50 percent of aerial refueling in the AOR.
-- Dubai and Fujariah ports in the Northern Emirates are the
logistics backbone for the U.S. Fifth Fleet and commercial trade.
Jebel Ali is the major U.S. military liberty port. Fujariah port
is a major trans-shipment hub to support Afghanistan military
operations.
-- Minhad Air Base is a critical hub for Coalition/ISAF partners in
Afghanistan, including the Australians, Dutch, Canadians, Brits and
Kiwis.
5. (C) Security Assistance is a cornerstone of our relationship.
-- UAE is a cash customer and purchases a significant amount (but
certainly not all) of its equipment and training from the US. FMS
sales are in excess of $11 billion and commercial sales are of a
similar or greater amount. There are an additional $11 billion of
FMS cases in development, and a similar amount for DCS.
-- The UAE recently purchased nine (9) Patriot batteries, and
expects to move forward on the purchase of THAAD soon, with the
aim of supporting the UAE's desire for an integrated air defense
system. UAE will be the first country outside the US to purchase
the THAAD system.
-- The major FMS/DCS systems are: Hawk, F-16, Weapons (JDAM,
Hellfire, Maverick, LGB, cluster, HARM, Harpoon),HIMARS, AH-64,
UH-60 M/L, AOC operating system, Patriot, C-130, CH-47, Shared
Early Warning, CENTRIXS, NVGs, land vehicles, and small arms.
-- You should be aware of the following UAE LOAs in offer status:
training for all major systems, COMSEC including Type I crypto,
3 x E-2C Hawkeye EDA, SL-AMRAAM components, and JAVELIN.
-- The following systems have been requested and are in various
stages of FMS and DCS development: 3 x THAAD, 24 x RQ8 Firescout,
4 x C-17 Globemaster, 12 x C-130J (option for 4 X KC-130J),
satellites/imagery, 16 x CH-47F (4 via DCS),land based Phalanx,
XM-982 Excalibur, XM-1156 PGK, 5000 X GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb,
E-2D Hawkeye, Boeing Wedgetail, AOC system upgrade, Link-16
integration on all appropriate platforms/ground facilities,
stinger/avenger/VMSLP, MRAP, critical national infrastrucure
protection, and Head of State missile ASE.
-- The UAE maintains an active exercise schedule with US and
other multi-lateral partners. They participate in 10-12 US
sponsored exercises annually which help assure interoperability
and build capability.
6. (S/NF) Existing vulnerabilities in the following areas:
-- Capability gap in UAE ability to counter a mine threat from
the sea.
-- Integrated consequence management. Government agencies react
independently in the face of a crisis or mishap.
-- Little perceived collection, processing or dissemination of
actionable counter-proliferation intelligence (often reliant on
US provided targeting information).
--------------
Challenges
--------------
7. (S/NF) One of the main challenges that the USG faces in the UAE is
dealing with rapid growth, both Emirati and our own. It can be
virtually impossible to get a hotel room in Abu Dhabi, housing our
people in a overheated market is a real challenge, and our
new (2004) state of the art Embassy is already too small for
everyone who wants in. As we start the integrated air defense
program (all FMS),and as we move from supplemental to regular
budgetary funding, there will inevitably be pressure from DOD/
CENTCOM (and other agencies) to put more people on the ground here.
The UAE will need to fund the support for their increased military
activity, but so far has been unwilling. They always assert that
the 3.8% admin fee should be enough to cover specific case support.
8. (S) The recent crashes of 2 x UAE F-16 Block 60s are cause for
concern. The first mishap occurred in January and the second occurred
in February. Both aircraft were lost and the UAE pilots were killed.
The initial impression of both mishaps is that they were caused by
pilot error in basic skills. This should not be raised with UAE
officials. We encourage you to thank the UAE for its participation
in OEF and OIF. In particular its efforts in AFG and taking command
of the Maritime Coalition (TF-152, a NAVCENT priority) in late Fall
09.
9. (S/NF) We have been at an impasse with the UAE on the DCA since
1994, and while we have developed a variety of risk-laden work-arounds
for existing deployments, it is difficult to see any great expansion
of combatant forces here absent some movement on this issue. The UAE
asserts its sovereignty at every opportunity and direct negotiation
on the DCA may prove to be more risky than the potential rewards.
10. (S/NF) Without directly addressing the DCA, the relationship
could be improved if the UAE were to partner with the US more closely
in a few areas. Moving the US Naval forces in Fujairah onto the UAE
Naval Base would improve our force protection and lead to increased
cooperation and security on the sea and the shore. Streamlined US
military entry and exit with a MIL ID card at Al Dhafra would be
welcomed. Increased access and pier space in Jebel Ali port are
becoming critical issues as the Dubai Ports World (DPW) has
decreased the amount of pier space for NAVCENT use. Increased use
of the Abu Dhabi port may serve to ease the pressure at Jebel Ali
and Fujairah. As the US reorganizes its MIL basing footprint in
the region, there may be some willingness for the UAE to allow
more passive US presence in their country.
11. (C) We look forward to seeing you at IDEX. I welcome any
initiative to synchronize USG efforts. The Embassy team works
closely with all commands with a stake in the UAE.
OLSON