Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABUDHABI133
2009-02-04 14:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

UAE HOSTS ARAB DISCUSSION ON PA SUPPORT

Tags:  PREL PTER PHUM KPAL KWBG EFIN AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041423Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2102
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0226
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0628
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0276
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0879
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1536
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0259
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 1577
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0671
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0423
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0277
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000133 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/FO, AND NEA/IPA/ALENTZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM KPAL KWBG EFIN AE
SUBJECT: UAE HOSTS ARAB DISCUSSION ON PA SUPPORT

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 115, B) STATE 8722, C) ABU DHABI 0021

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000133

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/FO, AND NEA/IPA/ALENTZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM KPAL KWBG EFIN AE
SUBJECT: UAE HOSTS ARAB DISCUSSION ON PA SUPPORT

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 115, B) STATE 8722, C) ABU DHABI 0021

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) As previewed with the Ambassador (ref A),UAE Foreign
Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) hosted a gathering of nine Arab
foreign ministers February 3 in Abu Dhabi to discuss coordination of
Palestinian issues. Eight countries and the PA attended (UAE, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia),
representing what the UAEG characterized privately as the "moderate
camp" and clearly designed to exclude less helpful Arab voices.
(Kuwait and Iraq were reportedly invited but unable to attend.) A
number of the ministers had convened the evening of February 2
together with ministers of information to discuss how to regain a PR
advantage through more effective "messaging."

Goals of the meetings
--------------


2. (C) The February 2 dinner was characterized by UAE Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Anwar Gargash as focused on "strategic
messaging" in hopes of energizing the public voice of moderate Arab
states to reclaim ground from radical voices exploiting public
opinion in their favor. Iran's negative role in stirring public
sentiment against moderate Arab regimes was also noted. Actual aid
to the PA was also discussed in separate UAE and Saudi bilateral
meetings with the PA on the margins of that dinner.


3. (SBU) Reports characterizing the February 3 gathering of
ministers focus on key goals: 1) solidarity with the PA (and
solidarity among Arab ranks, although this meeting was clearly
designed to exclude unwanted Arab voices),2) endorsement of recent
Egyptian and Saudi initiatives related to the peace process
(including Egyptian efforts at a truce in Gaza and Saudi statements
at the Kuwait economic summit),3) rejection of foreign intervention
(an apparent slap at Iran, but also at Doha for inviting Iran to its
recent summit),and 4) looking ahead to a March 2 donors conference
in Cairo (plus reconstruction and reconciliation events in late

February) at which an expanded Arab consensus is desired. Official
UAE news agency reports quote AbZ citing "similar meetings in the
upcoming weeks" to include "additional ministers from the Arab
world," to gather with the aim of boosting Arab solidarity (with an
agenda defined by the moderates) and bolstering "support for the
Palestinian Authority under the leadership of H.E. President Mahmoud
Abbas and for the PLO -- the sole representative of the Palestinian
people." The ministers also called for a stop to Israeli
settlements, particularly around Jerusalem.


4. (SBU) An editorial in semi-official Arabic daily al-Ittihad (by a
Saudi writer) goes somewhat further in stating the objectives of the
"moderates" in sidelining Iran's influence and weaning Syria away
from its support for Hamas (Syria being Iran's "on gateway" through
which it wields influence over Arabs).

Next steps
--------------


5. (SBU) AbZ stated that "we are engaging with additional Arab
countries and consulting with them" in preparation for further
efforts to unify Arab action. The goal is clearly to establish the
"moderate" position as the mainstream Arab approach to Palestine, an
effort that builds upon initial (but smaller) meetings in Riyadh last
week. As the group potentially expands to include more Arab states,
practical questions of budget support for the PA will hopefully be
addressed -- not awaiting the March 2 donors' meeting in Cairo. Also
reportedly on the agenda are a Gaza reconstruction event on February
22 and a Palestinian reconciliation meeting Egypt hopes to host in
the final days of February.

UN SecGen also in Abu Dhabi
--------------


6. (SBU) UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon was also in Abu Dhabi
February 3 for talks described in general terms as focused on
regional stability, "with emphasis on the Palestinian cause and the
Middle East peace process" (official WAM news agency). (Some foreign
ministers departed Cairo before Ki-Moon's arrival, so there was no
group interface between the UN and the Arab ministers.)

Comment: A more active UAEG?

ABU DHABI 00000133 002 OF 002


--------------


7. (C) By hosting a continuation of talks among Arab leaders, the
UAEG is clearly supporting the moderate agenda and particularly
willing to promote events that have an underlying goal of limiting
Iran's regional influence. Incensed by Iran's overtures to the
non-moderates and bellicose language in general, and unhappy with
Qatar's role as a spoiler (in what the Egyptian DCM called a
polarizing Qatari move to create "a counter-alliance against the
mainstream"),the Emiratis can be expected to play a stronger role in
peace efforts going forward to counterbalance the spoilers'
influence. Playing host also helps the UAEG evidence to its public
that the leadership is actively engaged in the interests of regional
stability and peace for the Palestinians -- a critical optic in the
wake of Gaza-inspired public emotions.
OLSON