Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABUDHABI106
2009-01-27 09:53:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

(S) UAE FOREIGN MINISTER ON BADR AIR OVERFLIGHT DENIALS

Tags:  PARM PREL ETTC MASS IR SU AE 
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O 270953Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2076
INFO AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 
AMEMBASSY RIYADH 
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 
AMEMBASSY SANAA 
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 
AMCONSUL DUBAI
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000106 


NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP
ALSO FOR ISN/CATR AGANZER, MMITCHELL, AND MROLLERI

E.O. 12958: DECL:01/26/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MASS IR SU AE
SUBJECT: (S) UAE FOREIGN MINISTER ON BADR AIR OVERFLIGHT DENIALS

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 0089, B) STATE 5567, C) ABU DHABI 0031

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b),(c),and (d).

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000106


NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP
ALSO FOR ISN/CATR AGANZER, MMITCHELL, AND MROLLERI

E.O. 12958: DECL:01/26/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MASS IR SU AE
SUBJECT: (S) UAE FOREIGN MINISTER ON BADR AIR OVERFLIGHT DENIALS

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 0089, B) STATE 5567, C) ABU DHABI 0031

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b),(c),and (d).


1. (S) Ambassador raised USG concerns about Badr Air operations in
and through the UAE with Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ)
January 25, summarizing the sequence of demarches delivered in recent
weeks (reftels),including the fact that Badr appeared to be
operating out of Sharjah. AbZ had clearly been briefed on the issue
and stressed the need to know the credibility of the information and
legal mechanisms for acting on it.


2. (S) AbZ said the UAEG's request for clarity on the reliability of
the information had not been answered. Ambassador emphasized that
the intelligence was deemed reliable, but as is the nature of
intelligence (including our inability to specify exact sourcing) we
must act on what is available to increase our collective
understanding. AbZ also said the UAEG needs clear legal cover to
take action, lest it be accused of hijacking an aircraft. Ambassador
pointed out that while our request did include potentially having the
aircraft land for inspection, overflight denial, at a minimum, would
also be a helpful measure. AbZ took the point without responding.


3. (S/NF) This meeting was an opportunity to address the Badr Air
issue in unambiguous terms at the political level, citing the risks
to the UAEG of letting Badr Air's potentially destabilizing activity
continue. UAE Security and military officials have consistently
reminded us in earlier discussions of these demarches that they look
to political decision-makers to define their options.

OLSON