Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABIDJAN91
2009-02-06 16:10:00
SECRET
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

OUAGA IV MAY RESOLVE THE CRISIS, BUT AT A COST

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM EAID IV 
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P 061610Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4906
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T ABIDJAN 000091 


DEPT FOR AF/W

ALSO FOR INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EAID IV
SUBJECT: OUAGA IV MAY RESOLVE THE CRISIS, BUT AT A COST

REF: A) ABIDJAN 090 B) 08 ABIDJAN 879

Classified By: Ambassador Wanda Nesbitt for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

S E C R E T ABIDJAN 000091


DEPT FOR AF/W

ALSO FOR INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EAID IV
SUBJECT: OUAGA IV MAY RESOLVE THE CRISIS, BUT AT A COST

REF: A) ABIDJAN 090 B) 08 ABIDJAN 879

Classified By: Ambassador Wanda Nesbitt for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: Since the Ouaga IV accord was signed in
late December 2008, Embassy has noted widely varying reports
about what the accord means, both in terms of what it
requires each side to do, and the broader political
implications. This message gives our analysis of Ouaga IV. We
believe the agreement is significant in that it commits the
Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) to disarm before elections -- a
reversal of the position the FAFN has taken in every
agreement up until now -- and to turn over administrative
authority, including control of all financial resources, to
the Gbagbo government almost immediately. In this regard,
Ouaga IV holds out the prospect of a fairly rapid
reunification of the country and dismantling of the
rebellion. Getting there will require the FAFN to give up
perks they've enjoyed until now, which could prove to be
difficult. We believe the political significance of Ouaga IV
is that it reflects the distance that has developed between
Prime Minister Soro and some of his zone commanders, who
represent an obstacle to the PM achieving his political
goals. In the short term, Soro and Pres. Gbagbo may now have
a shared interest in speeding the departure of the comzones:
the PM because he is rapidly losing control over them; the
president, because the comzones represent his government's
failure to prevail against the north. We anticipate that at
least a few of the comzones will refuse to comply with the
provisions of Ouaga IV and that PM Soro will call on loyal
FAFN elements to remove the recalcitrant comzones. We also
anticipate that Soro will have the support of President
Gbagbo and the FDS (national defense forces),as well as
President Compaore, if he ultimately determines that he must
use force to implement Ouaga IV. End Summary.

CONFUSION ABOUT WHAT DISARMAMENT BEFORE THE ELECTION MEANS
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) When SRSG Choi briefed diplomats on January 8 on the
terms of the fourth supplementary agreement to the OPA, he
highlighted the fact that Ouaga IV reverses the sequencing of
disarmament, requiring it to be completed two months before

the election, rather than after the election as anticipated
in Ouaga III and previous agreements. Gen. Amoussou, the
senior UNOCI military officer, asserted that disarmament in
the context of Ouaga IV means the full DDR package, i.e.,
that any payments owed to the FAFN or militias have to be
carried out, in addition to weapons being collected. Several
Ambassadors (including me) noted that this provision could
make holding an election in 2009 extremely difficult, given
that funding for the DDR process has not been identified.


3. (C) In a January 14 meeting, Ambassador raised the
disarmament issue with Prime Minister Soro, who asserted
without hesitation that for the purposes of Ouaga IV,
disarmament means "regroupment", i.e., that the 5,000 FAFN
elements destined for the new army must be identified and
grouped into 4 designated camps. Their weapons must be
surrendered but will be kept under lock and key, and be under
the supervision of the impartial forces. Soro was quite clear
about the payment of demobilized soldiers not being a quid
pro quo for the election. In fact, he said, "the next
administration" may finish paying them. Regarding the civic
service and the PNRRC, Soro confirmed that payments called
for in the Ouaga IV accord are not in addition to, but
instead of government organized vocational training.


4. (S) As noted in Ref A, FAFN leaders in Bouake were
uncertain of what Ouaga IV requires, and Korhogo comzone
Fofie was clearly under the impression that the troops would
be receiving training and money. Despite confirmation from
both PM Soro and Amb. Badini (the Facilitator's
representative in Abidjan) that the comzones concurred with
Ouaga IV before it was signed, there is obviously confusion
about the details and the implementation of this most recent
agreement. In a conversation on February 2, Badini reminded
Ambassador that Soro was in Paris when the final text of
Ouaga IV was agreed to and therefore was not in the room for
a number of important conversations. The is an important
detail as it appears that PM was relying on the judgement of
Pres. Compaore and accepted the text of the agreement based
on Compaore's recommendation. It is worth noting that PM Soro
scheduled a 10 day working visit to Bouake at the end of
January, reportedly to sort out with the comzones how Ouaga
IV is to be implemented. (According to the press, Soro had to
leave Bouake to attend a ceremony in Togo marking the death
of Pres. Eyadema.)

UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHY THE FAFN AGREED TO IT
--------------


5. (S/NF) The question that has puzzled many observers here
is why the Forces Nouvelles reversed their position on
disarming after the election. At first glance, Ouaga IV
certainly appears to be a victory for the presidential camp.
Citing the case of the DRC, the FPI has long argued that
elections could not be held before disarmament because the
climate would be inhospitable. In fact, Simone Gbagbo caused
a major stir last year when she called for disarmament before
the election during a trip to the north. The FAFN has
consistently argued that the presidential camp could not be
trusted to keep its word regarding identification or
elections, and that the presence of an armed force in the
north was necessary to keep the pressure on. Most diplomats
agree in principle with the Gbagbo camp, but virtually all
agree with the FAFN evaluation of Gbagbo's trustworthiness.
Our assessment at this point is that several factors may have
made disarmament before the elections look more attractive to
Soro and the Forces Nouvelles than in the past:

a) PM Soro is losing whatever control he had over the Forces
Nouvelles and undoubtedly has a personal interest in curbing,
if not eliminating, the power of the comzones.

b) The identification process in the north was in danger.
Following postponement of the election last November, the FPI
began a full-fledged campaign to discredit the identification
process, particularly in the north. They argued that massive
fraud was being perpetrated and that a credible process could
not be carried out without civilian authorities present. FPI
members began calling for a complete halt of the
identification process in the north. In addition, CEI
(Independent Electoral Commission) president, Robert Mambe,
floated late last year the idea of allowing documents other
than a birth certificate to be used for the ID process.
Reopening the question of what documents are acceptable could
set the process back several years. The prospect of having
the identification process shut down, after having fought (in
theory) to reach this point, may have alarmed the FAFN enough
to induce them to compromise.

c) In addition to mistrust of Pres. Gbagbo, some observers
say the FAFN was reluctant to disarm before the election due
to fears that Gbagbo would send the FDS to attack them. There
is speculation that the Facilitator may have secured a
commitment from Gbagbo not to do so in return for assurances
that he (Compaore) would not restrain the comzones who choose
to move to Burkina, from launching a new rebellion. We find
this plausible. Compaore's role has consistently been a topic
of great debate although observers in Abidjan have always
assumed that the Burkinabe president retained a high degree
of influence with the Forces Nouvelles.

RETURN TO A SINGLE TAX COLLECTION SYSTEM COULD TRIGGER CLASHES
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The Forces Nouvelles agreed in principle in the Ouaga
III accord to allow the return of government customs agents
and the re-establishment of a single tax and customs
collection operation (unicite de caisse is the local term).
They did not follow through on this commitment, however,
ostensibly because the presidential camp was not meeting its
commitments with regard to resolving the grades/ranks issues.
The reunification of the treasury as called for in Ouaga IV
is therefore not new, but its implementation will still be a
key barometer. As noted in Ref A, elements of the Forces
Nouvelles say they are concerned that government officials
could alienate the local population if they return with an
aggressive tax/customs collection mandate. To reduce the
likelihood of problems, the FAFN have insisted that a
sensitization program be carried out to inform local
populations of changes on the horizon. Some government
officials fear this is a ruse to postpone turning over
control of resources. Embassy's view is this may be a more
difficult issue for the FAFN to resolve internally than the
disarmament one.


7. (S/NF) Moussa Dosso, the Forces Nouvelles' Finance
Minister told Ambassador in December (see ref B) that he and
Finance Minister Diby Koffi had already agreed upon a scheme
whereby the government and the Forces Nouvelles would
implement a single tax/customs collection system and would
share the revenue. We wonder now, what provision, if any, was
made for comzones. Reports that the comzones are not happy
with Ouaga IV, particularly their own financial settlements,
suggest that their needs/interests were not taken into
acount. Rumors have long been in circulation about how much
the comzones have enriched themselves, with the implication
being that all will be able to retire comfortably. Whether
true or not, we are skeptical that all of the comzones will
simply walk away from the substantial resources they control.
Should any resist, we can readily envision clashes of the
kind that took place in Seguela and Vavoua last year when PM
Soro decided to relieve comzone Zakaria Kone of command.
Ouaga IV may represent an implicit acknowledgment on the part
of all the signatories that resolving the crisis may require
the sacrifice of some individuals.


8. (S/NF) Given the limited information available to us about
the current views of the comzones, it is difficult to
determine the extent to which their reported unhappiness with
Ouaga IV represents a desire to hang on to lucrative
positions of power, or sincere discomfort with the terms of
the agreement. Certain comzones have always been skeptical of
PM Soro's rapprochement with Pres. Gbagbo and continue to
suspect that Soro has 'sold out' the FAFN in order to
preserve his own political future. Proponents of this view
see Ouaga IV as proof that Soro has betrayed the FAFN by
agreeing to disarm before elections and will now move to
eliminate the comzones who do not share his philosophy.
Whether or not his viewpoint is accurate, it suggests that
concerns about continued clashes among opposing factions of
the FAFN are valid.


9. (C) In conclusion, Ouaga IV holds out the prospect that
the country will in fact be reunified by the return of
government authorities throughout the country and the
withdrawal of the Forces Nouvelles. Gbagbo, Soro, and
Compaore appear to have agreed that the time has come to end
the stalemate and move forward. As long as the government
permits the identification process to move forward without
major disruption, we believe that PM Soro will do his utmost
to enforce the reestablishment of a single tax/customs
collections system and compel the regroupment of the Forces
Nouvelles. Should he run into opposition, we would expect him
to use force to bring his own troops in line. And we would
expect both Gnagbo and Compaore to defend this decision. the
potential for isolated clashes over the next few months is
real -- but they may be the price of peace.

NESBITT