Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABIDJAN758
2009-12-21 13:00:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

COTE D'IVOIRE: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

Tags:  PTER ASEC IV 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2031
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0758/01 3551300
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211300Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5611
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000758 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT (ATTN: RHONDA SHORE),DS/IP/AF AND AF/W

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

Ref: STATE 109980

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000758

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT (ATTN: RHONDA SHORE),DS/IP/AF AND AF/W

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

Ref: STATE 109980


1. (SBU) Summary: There were few changes or emerging trends
regarding counterterrorism in Cote d'Ivoire in 2009. The ongoing
political crisis continues to weaken police and security forces and
increase the risk that foreign terrorists can use Cote d'Ivoire as
an operational or financial base. Porous borders, widespread public
corruption, and weak police and security services foster activities,
e.g., money laundering and trafficking in drugs, arms and persons,
that can be exploited by terrorists. Both the central government's
security forces in the south and the former rebel New Forces of the
north are primarily focused on internal security concerns. To date,
violence associated with the country's crisis has not been
associated with any international terrorist organizations, and there
is scant evidence to indicate a significant threat of a terrorist
attack. End Summary.

Cote d'Ivoire's Security Environment
--------------


2. (SBU) Cote d'Ivoire does not engage in any major counterterrorism
efforts. Operational elements of terrorist groups are not known to
be present, and terrorism is not generally perceived to be a threat
in Cote d'Ivoire. Intelligence, police and security services (the
central government's in the south and the former rebel New Forces in
the north) are predominately focused on each other and maintaining
domestic stability. We believe that Cote d'Ivoire would cooperate
in extraditing known terrorists should such a case arise. Justice
officials, although inefficient in the areas of the country
administered by the government and hindered from operating normally
in areas still under the control of the former rebels, would likely
cooperate in assisting with U.S. counterterrorist efforts.


3. (SBU)Cote d'Ivoire does not provide political or financial
support to any known international terrorist organization. Although
members of the Lebanese community in Cote d'Ivoire are known to
donate personal income to Hizballah, it is unlikely that the
government of Cote d'Ivoire supports or subsidizes any of these
financial activities.


4. (SBU) On August 6, Ivoirian authorities detained Imam Abd al
Menhem Qubaysi, a Hizballah spiritual leader and US Treasury
designated terrorist financier, at the airport upon his arrival on a
commercial flight from Lebanon. Qubaysi, who lived in Cote d'Ivoire

for a number of years, was denied entry at immigration and returned
to Lebanon on the same flight. The Lebanese community in Cote
d'Ivoire continues to seek permission for his return, unsuccessfully
to date.

Safe Haven Assessment
--------------


5. (SBU) While the Ivorian government does not provide diplomatic
support to any international terrorist organization nor provide a
safe haven, during 2009 there were uncorroborated reports of members
of Al-Qaida in Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) being present in
Cote d'Ivoire. However, there have been no indicators that AQIM is
attempting to extend its presence into Cote d'Ivoire.


6. (SBU) Cote d'Ivoire remains vulnerable to becoming a possible
terrorist safe haven due to porous borders, widespread public
corruption, and weak police and security services. As long as
police and security forces remain underpaid and committed to
internal security, this vulnerability will remain. Measures to
prevent the proliferation and trafficking of weapons of mass
destruction are unknown; however, as a Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism partner nation, it is likely that Cote d'Ivoire
would cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

Foreign Cooperation
--------------


7. (SBU) The Ivoirian Ministry of Interior, in cooperation with the
United States, uses the Personal Identification Secure Comparison
and Evaluation System (PISCES) at the major airport and seaport to
enhance border security. With sanctions in place, there are severe
limits to what the US can contribute to Cote d'Ivoire's
counterterrorism program. In 2009, 11 Ivoirian officials attended
regionally oriented seminars where terrorism was addressed. The
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU),which was formed in 2008,
received additional legal authority when Ordinance 637 on terrorism
financing became law on November 12, 2009. Although not used to
date, the law extends FIU activities to the receipt, analysis, and
dissemination of information on transactions suspected of being
terrorism related.


8. (SBU) In the past five years, there has been no evidence of
activity by known terrorist groups in Cote d'Ivoire nor terrorist
threats against U.S. citizens. Hizballah elements are present

ABIDJAN 00000758 002 OF 002


within parts of the local community but they are not known to be
actively engaged in, or planning for, terrorist activities in Cote
d'Ivoire. The Ivoirian government has not provided military or
paramilitary training or supplied weapons to any known international
terrorist group. There are no known cases of international terrorist
groups seeking refuge in Cote d'Ivoire and the GOCI provides no
provision of safe haven from prosecution to such groups.


9. (U) Embassy Abidjan point of contact for this report is John
Bray, RSO, (225) 22-49-45-01 or brayfj2@state.gov.

NESBITT