Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ABIDJAN640
2009-10-30 14:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

RENEWED SKIRMISH OVER NATIONALITY DELAYING

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM SOCI IV 
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VZCZCXRO4971
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0640/01 3031413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301413Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5489
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0271
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000640 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SOCI IV
SUBJECT: RENEWED SKIRMISH OVER NATIONALITY DELAYING
ELECTORAL LIST PUBLICATION

REF: A) ABIDJAN 626 B) ABIDJAN 629

Classified By: Ambassador Wanda L. Nesbitt for reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000640

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SOCI IV
SUBJECT: RENEWED SKIRMISH OVER NATIONALITY DELAYING
ELECTORAL LIST PUBLICATION

REF: A) ABIDJAN 626 B) ABIDJAN 629

Classified By: Ambassador Wanda L. Nesbitt for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Publication of the provisional electoral list
remains stalled; key Ivorian leaders cannot agree on how to
deal with 1.9 million cases in which names on the list have
not been matched with a historical record. President Gbagbo
reportedly favors immediate publication of a list that
distinguishes confirmed from unconfirmed voters, but would
require the latter to present proof of nationality. The
opposition adamantly opposes this approach which it believes
undermines the foundation of the Ouagadougou Political Accord
(OPA). PM Soro is trying to broker a solution with the
support of Facilitator Blaise Compaore and, according to SRSG
Choi, has asked the electoral commission to do additional
record checks. Choi believes it will be at least another
month before the preliminary list is published. If that is
the case elections cannot be held before March 2010. End
Summary


2. (SBU) As noted in ref A, 2.7 million of the 6.3 million
individuals who registered during the identification/
enrollment process were not found when the names were checked
against a set of historical records. Secondary checks reduced
that number to 1.9 million. The political parties agree that
some percentage of the 1.9 million are Ivorian and should be
able to vote; they also agree that some are people who
registered using fraudulent documents and are not Ivorian.
They have fundamentally different views, however, about how
to resolve the problem.

FPI CONCERN: FOREIGNERS WILL BECOME IVORIAN
--------------


3. (SBU) President Gbagbo's FPI has long feared that
foreigners (26% of Cote d'Ivoire's population is from
neighboring countries) who have no right to vote would
infiltrate the electoral process. First Lady Simone Gbagbo
and other leading FPI officials have publicly expressed
skepticism about the 1.9 million and the FPI appears to
genuinely believe that most are probably not legitimate
voters. The FPI is therefore insistent that names not found
in a historical record be separated out and these individuals

required to present proof of nationality during the four week
period set aside for resolving disputed cases. The FPI also
maintains that historical record checks were always
envisioned and that the opposition agreed to these checks
even before the OPA was signed. FPI leaders, such as Sokouri
Bohui, one of the party's founding members, are insisting in
press interviews that historical record checks were always
intended to confirm the nationality of everyone on the list.
The FPI believes the opposition is being duplicitous.

RDR/PDCI CONCERN: IVORIANS WILL BE LABELED FOREIGNERS
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) The opposition, particularly Alassane Ouattara's
RDR party, has been equally adamant that the FPI approach is
unacceptable. Amadou Gon Coulibaly, campaign manager and
spokesperson for RDR president Alassane Ouattara, explained
the RDR perspective to Ambassador on October 26. Coulibaly
stressed that the FPI tried the same approach in 2006 and
failed because there are too many incomplete and/or
inaccurate records in Cote d'Ivoire. Coulibaly said the OPA
was a major breakthrough because it allowed Ivorians to
register to vote using only a birth certificate or jugement
suppletif (the document issued through the audience foraines
or mobile courts process.) For the RDR, this was an implicit
recognition of the fact that many Ivorians have no other
documentation and it wants that understanding to be honored.
The RDR believes that most of the 1.9 million are legitimate
voters and that all should be considered Ivorian unless proof
to the contrary is located. They see the FPI position as a
maneuver to exclude new voters and are insisting on a clean
electoral list that does not categorize Ivorians.


5. (C) Coulibaly explained the difference between the FPI and
the RDR over the purpose of "historical record checks". The
RDR's view, Coulibaly said, has always been that historical
record checks could be conducted to identify foreigners,
thereby addressing the FPI's stated concern. Relevant records
would include refugee lists, the list of foreigners who were
issued resident cards, etc. Coulibaly shared with Ambassador
a letter the RDR sent to the CEI (Independent Electoral
Commission) in July 2009, proposing that three specific sets
of records be consulted. Coulibaly said the RDR never
received a response, and never agreed to the twelve
historical records that were ultimately selected. The RDR
maintains that were it possible to confirm everyone's

ABIDJAN 00000640 002 OF 002


nationality through a historical record, the audiences
foraines process would not have been needed.

LIST NEEDS TO NUMBER AT LEAST 5 MILLION
--------------


6. (SBU) SRSG Choi briefed the diplomatic community October
29 on efforts to resolve this dispute. According to Choi, PM
Soro has asked CEI president Mambe to conduct another round
of record checks to reduce the 1.9 million by as many names
as possible. Choi pointed out that the 2000 voter list
contained a little over 5 million names; it would be
politically untenable for the CEI to produce a list in 2009
with fewer names (only 4.4 million were confirmed after the
first check.) Soro believes the CEI must try to positively
confirm at least 5 million. However, this will delay even
further the publication of a preliminary list. Choi thought
it would be at least another month before a new list was
compiled and ready for posting. He acknowledged that he would
not be able to certify the electoral list if any of the major
parties/candidates deemed it unacceptable. Choi stressed,
however, that he sees no sign that any of the parties have a
hidden political agenda and that the available data indicate
that no party has a particular advantage with regard to the
1.9 million, who are spread throughout the country. Choi
would not speculate about a new election date. He thought it
important for the electoral list dispute to be resolved and a
final list agreed upon by the end of the year. EU
representatives reaffirmed their calculation that a minimum
of three months are needed between publication of the final
list and election day. They estimate March 2010 to be the
earliest realistic timeframe.


7. (C) Comment: Contacts at the French Embassy tell us that
the CEI is still under pressure from President Gbagbo to
publish the list as soon as possible (Gbagbo told the press
October 29 that the list would be available on November 3)
but the CEI is evidently following instructions from PM Soro
to continue whittling down the 1.9 million. Soro appears to
have the support of Blaise Compaore in this approach,
underscoring the critical role the Facilitator still plays.
This episode demonstrates that CEI is not, and perhaps cannot
be, truly independent given the political sensitivities that
surround its work.


8. (C) Comment Cont'd: The controversy over the preliminary
electoral list also highlights the deep divisions that remain
over the national identity issue. SRSG Choi has been
criticized for advocating a political solution, but we
believe his approach is the right one. Nationality in Cote
d'Ivoire is not a technical calculation but a very sensitive
political issue that could once again spark violent clashes.
Exchanges between the political parties are becoming
increasingly heated and we anticipate they will become even
more rancorous as the process drags on. Embassy will
encourage the GOCI to continue moving forward and will
support Choi's efforts to impress upon Ivorians the fact that
too much progress has been made to allow the process to now
unravel.

NESBITT