GBAGBO INTERVENES TO STOP PORT STRIKE

UNCLAS ABIDJAN 000382


E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ELAB EWWT ECON PGOV IV
SUBJECT: GBAGBO INTERVENES TO STOP PORT STRIKE

REF: ABIDJAN 366


1. (U) Summary. A three-week-long strike at the Port of
Abidjan ended June 17 after President Gbagbo promised to
resolve all of the striking dock workers' grievances and
ordered the release of workers who had been jailed. The
strike resulted in some violence and a major disruption of
port operations. While a wage dispute triggered the strike,
increased competition and jealousies among the groups that
represent dock workers appear to be key underlying factors.
The involvement of personalities close to the president,
particularly Port Director Marcel Gossio, reflects the
importance that revenue from the port plays in Cote d'Ivoire.
End summary.

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BACKGROUND
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2. (U) The employment status of 5,600 dock workers in Abidjan
is rather tenuous. While port operators, such as the Societe
d'Exploitation du Terminal de Vridi (SETV),which manages the
container terminal, hire a small number of full-time,
permanent workers, the majority of dock workers are day
laborers assigned to port jobs by an agency representing
shipping companies known as the "Syndicat des Entrepreneurs
de Manutention et de Transit des Ports d'Abidjan et San
Pedro" (SEMPA). While SEMPA makes decisions regarding which
workers will have jobs on a day-to-day or month-to-month
basis, many of the workers perform the same duties for the
same operators for extended periods. The various port
operators pay SEMPA, which is resposible for setting wages
and distributing salaries SEMPA retains a percentage
(reportedly 10-15 prcent) of the total paid to cover its own
costs.


3. (SBU) Some 11 unions represent Abidjan's doc workers. A
relatively new union, the CollectifNational des Dockers et
Dockers Transit pour la Dfense de Leurs Droits (CNDD),
created in 2007, hs become the primary dock-workers union.
Some loal media have asserted--and post contacts have
cnfirmed--that Gossio instigated the creation of CND with
the intent of siphoning business and moneyaway from SEMPA.
Many of the workers the CNDD hired are reportedly former
members of the Young Patriots, a group that actively opposed
the 2002 coup attempt and is not advese to the use of
violence. Some post interlocutrs believe the union gained
popularity by makingunreasonable promises to its workers.


4. (U) Sice the creation of CNDD, port managers have heard
rumors of strikes, and workers have undertaken varous "spot
actions," such as slow-downs. Beginnig in late 2008, CNDD
began to push for better pa. Accounts vary, but post
contacts generally agee that the union asked for an
extraordinary wageincrease: to an average wage of
approximately UD 8.00 per hour rather than the existing wage
ofapproximately USD 0.60 per hour for unskilled laboers.
(The minimum wage in Cote d'Ivoire is CFA 3,500 per month,
or roughly USD 0.40 per hour.) Te union also asked for
payment of bonuses for peformance of certain specific
duties.


5. (U) I May 2009, following mediation by the Interior
Mnistry (which dock workers reportedly preferred asa
mediator over the Transportation Ministry or Laor Ministry,
given the previous failed attempts f Transportation and
Labor to resolve the issues, SEMPA agreed with the CNDD to
increase certainbonuses, but SEMPA did not agree to an
increase n hourly wages, which are tied to Cote d'Ivoire's
minimum wage and could only be changed through GOC action.
(Note: Interior Minister Desire Tagro s a member of the FPI
and a very close advisor t President Gbagbo, whereas
Transportation Minister Albert Toikeusse Mabri leads one of
the small opposition parties. End note.)

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THE STRIKE
--------------


6. (U) The strike began at midnight on the night of June 1-2.
While CNDD leaders based the strike on SEMPA's alleged
failure to pay the agreed-upon bonuses, most workers were
effectively striking for a significant pay hike on which
there was no agreement between SEMPA and CNDD.


7. (U) On June 4, port authorities threatened to fire all the
dock workers and replace them with new recruits from SEMPA.
On June 5, as the strike continued, port authorities started
recruiting new workers. On June 8, strikers positioned
themselves in front of the port to prevent the new recruits
from working. The confrontation turned violent, and police
used tear gas to disperse the dock workers. Some dock
workers were arrested, and at least three strike-breakers
were hospitalized. Gendarmes and police later implemented
increased security at the port.


8. (U) Port activity initially continued, with actual
employees of the port-operating firms and monthly workers
from SEMPA carrying out port functions, but the strike had
the expected effects on port business: a variety of firms
reported that delays in moving goods through the port created
rising stocks, client complaints, and losses of contracts.
The timing of the strike--at a low point in the cocoa harvest
and export cycle--probably lessened the delays in moving
goods through the port. In recent days, however, activity
slowed to a standstill, increasing the cost to private
industry as well as to the government.


9. (U) President Gbagbo met June 16 in Touba with Yves
Colibu, Secretary General of the National Workers Union, and
Guei Plike, the recently designated spokesman for the CNDD
union. The president reportedly agreed to help resolve all
of the dock workers' grievances and gave orders for (a) the
release of imprisoned workers; (b) the dismissal of
complaints filed against the union; and (c) the re-hiring of
workers who went on strike.

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COMMENT
--------------


10. (U) The port is a critical element of the Ivoirian
economy. In 2008, exports of goods and services represented
approximately 49 percent of GDP, and imports of goods and
services were the equivalent of about 40 percent of GDP.
Some 90 percent of Cote d'Ivoire's total trade passes through
the Port of Abidjan. Additionally, the port is the point of
entry for many goods bound for Cote d'Ivoire's landlocked
neighbors. An estimated 65-70 percent of GOCI revenue comes
from the port, a fact that helps explain President Gbagbo's
interest in averting a lengthy shutdown of operations.


11. (U) It appears that although wage complaints were the
proximate cause of the strike, the CNDD's interest in flexing
its muscle was a key underlying factor. Some have suggested
that port management may have actually encouraged the strike
as part of a plan to break SEMPA's monopoly. Others have
suggested that the strike is the result of a split between
Ivoirian and foreign workers or between workers of different
political parties. Post cannot corroborate this information;
however, it is clear that political calculations played an
important role in this strike.


12. (U) Post interlocutors close to the situation do not feel
that the strike was a symptom of general economic conditions
or a sign of widespread labor discontent. In fact, a top
SETV executive reported that overall port activity for
January through May 2009 (prior to the start of the strike)
was ten percent above port activity for the same period last
year (a surprisingly positive figure, given the global
economic downturn). Although exports decreased during the
first five months of 2009 compared to the same period last
year (primarily because of declines in exports of cocoa beans
and timber),imports were at roughly the same level as last
year, and transshipment operations increased significantly.


13. (U) Although officials have not released any estimates of
the strike's costs to the port, Ivoirian businesses, or the
economy in general, the strike's effects almost certainly
included a decrease in GOCI revenue, diminished corporate
profits, and increases in the cost of critical consumer
goods, such as rice, most of which is imported from Asia.
These are consequences that Ivoirians can ill afford right
now and also help explain President Gbagbo's eagerness to
help resolve the strike.


NESBITT