COTE D'IVOIRE: GBAGBO SAYS HE AND SORO ON THE SAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000281

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MARR IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: GBAGBO SAYS HE AND SORO ON THE SAME
PAGE

REF: A) ABIDJAN 246 B) ABIDJAN 244 C) ABIDJAN 091

Classified By: Ambassador Wanda L. Nesbitt for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: President Gbagbo was upbeat about the
likelihood of elections in 2009 when I met with him on April

27. He said his key concern is no longer the identification
process but achieving reunification of the country and the
disarmament of the Forces Nouvelles (FAFN). Gbagbo asserted
that he and Prime Minister Soro see eye to eye on what needs
to be done to achieve that goal and described the process
exactly as Prime Minister related it to me (see ref A) in an
April 15 meeting. President Gbagbo was confident that
pro-Soro elements of the FAFN would join forces with the
government if necessary to subdue FAFN elements that refuse
to relinquish control, a strong indication that a renewed
clash may be more likely than not before this crisis comes to
an end. End Summary


2. (C) For the first time, President Gbagbo met with me with
no aides present. Mrs. Sarata Ottro, who died in late April,
or Ambassador Alcide Djedje (who was in New York for the UNSC
discussion of Cote d'Ivoire) had always joined us in the
past. It is perhaps a sign that Gbagbo has no other aides
whom he trusts to handle OPA (Ouagadougou Political
Agreement) issues with us, as Ambassador Koffi (Cote
d'Ivoire's Ambassador to Washington) was also in town.

IDENTIFICATION PROCESS CANNOT MARGINALIZE THE WEST
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Acknowledging the statement issued by the USG on March
30, President Gbagbo said he agreed that elections should
take place this year and was optimistic about the prospects
of that happening. He saw the biggest hurdle to completing
the identification process as opening 205 registration
centers that are not yet operational; he claimed 180 of them
are in the west. Noting that he himself hails from the west,
Gbagbo said he would be accused, justifiably, of
marginalizing an entire region were he to agree to end the
identification process now. I asked if there was a particular
reason why so many centers in the west had not been opened.
Gbagbo said he wasn't sure but thought it was due to the poor
infrastructure. (Note: the west has always been the most
volatile region of the country; security concerns were
probably an equally important factor.) He observed that many
people in the region had not been able to obtain their birth
certificates and implied that the CEI (Independent Electoral
Commission) understood the need to give people enough time.
The president estimated that registration would be completed
by the end of June and said he did not anticipate vetting of
the preliminary electoral list to take more than a month (a
much more optimistic timeframe than we have heard from
others). Based on these calculations, he said it was possible
to hold elections in October of this year.

DISARMAMENT AND REUNIFICATION = THE LAST HURDLE
-------------- ---


4. (C) Gbagbo said that he was much more concerned about
reunifying the country and achieving "disarmament" before the
election. He told me pointedly that he and Prime Minister
Soro are in agreement on what needs to be done and went on to
describe the remaining steps: 1) mixed brigades comprised of
4,000 FAFN and 4,000 FDS (Defense and Security Forces) units
are established and deployed throughout the country; 2) the
comzones turn over full administrative authority to the
prefects; and 3) the comzones and any remaining FAFN troops
regroup in barracks in four cities (Bouake, Korhogo, Seguela
and Man) and surrender control of their weapons to the
impartial forces. Employing a bit of theatre, President
Gbagbo insisted on calling Prime Minister Soro during the
meeting to ask him for a status report on the mixed brigades.
Soro reported that Generals Mangou and Bakayoko (the Chiefs
of Staff of the FDS and FAFN, respectively) were still
drawing up their plans and were to submit a report to the
PM's office by April 28. In discussing the role of the mixed
brigades, Gbagbo gave the impression that all 8,000 had been
identified, however, we know from other sources that the FAFN
has had difficulty producing 4,000 qualified police and
gendarmes. Echoing the Prime Minister's words from our
earlier meeting, President Gbagbo said that once the FAFN
relinquished control and the prefects were back in charge,
the security conditions necessary for an election would have
been met.

5.(C) Given ongoing media reports and our own information
about divisions within the Forces Nouvelles, I raised with
President Gbagbo the possibility that some comzones would not
willingly hand over authority to the prefects. Gbagbo agreed
that it could be a problem, citing the riches that the

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comzones have amassed and readily acknowledged that force
might be needed to compel compliance by all of the comzones.
He hoped, however, that the presence of a substantial force
committed to "implementing Ouaga IV" would be persuasive. We
think that the police, the gendarmes and "the FAFN who are
with us", he said, will be enough to deter or defeat
resistance. Gbagbo cited Wattao (Deputy Chief of Staff of the
FAFN and acting comzone of Seguela) as one of the FAFN
leaders Soro could count on and referred to Cherif Ousmane
(the comzone of Bouake) as leading the anti-Soro faction.
Gbagbo asserted confidently that the civilian leadership of
the FAFN,i.e. Guillaume Soro, is ready to end the war, and so
is the FAFN's original backer, President Blaise Compaore.
Gbagbo even went so far as to say that any weapons the FAFN
may still be getting from Burkina Faso were not coming with
Compaore's blessing.

6.(C) Comment: President Ggabgo was unshaven and looked tired
in the meeting. His face appeared puffier than usual although
he was perfectly alert. The Embassy has had indications for
several months that the FAFN was splintering and that the
pro-Soro faction had moved closer to President Gbagbo. So the
biggest surprise was not what Gbagbo said but the fact that
he said it openly and in a very matter of fact way. Far more
striking was the absence of any of the standard FPI rhetoric.
Gbagbo made no reference to the comzones disappearing, or to
the FAFN totally disarming before the election -- a logical
position if he is counting on elements of the FAFN to join
forces with him. Whether this was a conscious effort on his
part to demonstrate his commitment to Ouaga IV or the sign of
a genuine gulf between him and hardliners in the FPI is
impossible to say. However, I did not sense the same degree
of animosity towards the FAFN that Gbagbo clearly exhibited a
year ago. Nonetheless, the potential for violent clashes is
very real and should not be underestimated. Gbagbo and Soro
appear to be ready to join forces to defeat those in the FAFN
who do not share their agenda and willing to do so by force
if necessary.


7. (C) Comment Cont'd: With regard to the identification
process, the president's comments seemed disingenuous. While
it is true that the west is the most unsettled region of the
country, it seems too much of a coincidence that virtually
all of the remaining areas in which voters need to be
registered are areas the FPI views as leaning in their favor.
This could reflect plans to pad voter rolls in west, if need
be, based on the results from other regions. Gbagbo's
calculation that vetting of the electoral list can be
accomplished in one month is also quite optimistic. Despite
indications that the government will soon announce an
election date in October, we remain skeptical that an
election will take place unless and until the presidential
camp is confident of winning it. End Comment





Note: the west has always been the most volatile region of
the country and security conditions are just as likely to
have been the impediment. It is also natural that the
president would want to have as many people as possible
enrolled from his native region.)

NESBITT