PRIME MINISTER PROMISES PROGRESS ON ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000246

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MARR EAID IV
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER PROMISES PROGRESS ON ELECTIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Wanda L.Nesbitt for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: In an April 15 meeting, Prime Minister Soro
told Ambassador that he has sent a draft decree containing a
proposed election date to President Gbagbo for approval. With
the recent USG statement on HIPC and elections clearly in
mind, he sought to reassure Ambassador that the Primature is
doing its best to push the electoral process forward. Soro
also said that a March 15 meeting he attended along with
Presidents Compaore and Gbagbo resolved "ambuiguities"
regarding the Ouaga IV agreement. According to Soro, the
three leaders agreed on next steps: 1) Mixed brigades
(i.e.joint FAFN/FDS units) are established and deployed
throughout the country; 2) The comzones turn over full
administrative authority to the prefects; 3) The comzones and
FAFN troops destined for the new army regroup into barracks
in four cities and surrender their weapons, allowing
elections to take place. The Prime Minister was cautiously
optimistic that he and President Gbagbo would be able to make
the Ouaga IV accord work and saw sharp differences between
the positions the president has taken in negotiations and the
public pronouncements of his political party, the FPI. End
Summary

Elections This Year? Maybe
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador had hoped to see PM Soro soon after the
late March World Bank/IMF Board meeting that approved Cote
d'Ivoire for debt relief under the enhanced Highly Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, but his travel schedule
made it impossible. In the interim, the Department issued a
statement congratulating Cote d'Ivoire on reaching the HIPC
decision point but reiterating that elections can and should
be held this year. When Ambassador called on PM Soro on April
15, it was evident from his demeanor that our statement was
on his mind. Soro volunteered that he had been working with
the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) to address the
conditions they said were necessary for an election in 2009
and that he was confident those conditions would be met. He
told Ambassador that he had sent to President Gbagbo the day
before a draft decree containing a proposed election date.
(He did not say so, but we know the CEI has proposed
October.) Soro was careful to say that President Gbagbo is
not obligated to accept the decree. The President could sign
it or call a cabinet meeting to discuss it. Gbagbo also has
the option of having the Facilitator convene a CPC (Permanent
Consultative Framework) to present the proposal to the main
political party leaders before deciding whether to approve
it. Soro stopped short of promising that elections would take
place this year but was clearly signalling that he, at least,
is trying to move things in the right direction.

Will Ouaga IV Succeed? Maybe
--------------


3. (C) The FPI party has been extremely vocal recently in
accusing the Forces Nouvelles, specifically the comzones, of
being the obstacle to implementation of Ouaga IV (the fourth
supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Political
Agreement) by refusing to disarm immediately and return to
civilian life. First Lady Simone Gbagbo and Interior
Minister Tagro have told the media more than once, for
instance, that the comzones must "disappear" before elections
can be held. In an April 9 meeting, Amb. Alcide Djedje, a
close advisor to the president, told Ambassador that Gbagbo
had offered the comzones postings abroad as Defense Attaches.
(The offer is evidently under consideration.) Djedje said the
comzones could stay in Cote d'Ivoire if they chose, but could
not continue to play an indepdendent leadership role. Amb.
Boureima Badini, the Facilitator's representative,
reconfirmed to Ambassador the same day, however, that Ouaga
IV requires the comzones to cede all administrative authority
to the prefects but does not require them to abandon their
troops. Badini reiterated his (and the Facilitator's)
expectation that the comzones will return to their barracks
along with the 5,000 FAFN elements destined for the new army
and will remain there until after elections. The comzones,
he said, will essentially become "trainers" and will prepare
FAFN troops for service in the new army.

4.(C) With this perspective in mind, Ambassador asked PM Soro
for his assessment of the Ouaga IV agreement, given what
appear to be ongoing disconnects between the Forces Nouvelles
and the presidential camp over what the agreement requires.
Soro agreed that there were "ambiguities" in the text of
Ouaga IV, but said these had been resolved in a March 15
meeting that he attended along with Presidents Gbagbo and
Compaore. Soro said the Facilitator had been very clear about
what the next steps were to be: First, the government and
the Forces Nouvelles each had to identify 4,000 police and
gendarmes and put them at the disposition of the ICC

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(Integrated Command Center). The ICC is to form an agreed
upon number of mixed brigades to be deployed throughout the
country, not just in the north. According to Soro, Generals
Mangou and Bakayoko (the Chiefs of Staff of the FDS and FAFN,
respectively) were working on a deployment plan that he
expected to be completed and presented to him by the end of
this week (April 17). Once the mixed brigades are deployed,
the PM said the comzones will hand over all administrative
functions and authority to the Prefects, and regroup (along
with those soldiers who are not being demobilized) into four
barracks located in Man, Seguela, Korhogo, and Bouake. Their
weapons will be stored and controlled jointly by the FAFN and
the impartial forces (i.e. UNOCI and Licorne). Soro said that
once the prefects are back in charge and have an enforcement
capability at their disposal, the security conditions for an
election will have been met.


5. (C) The Prime Minister stressed that the mixed brigades
will be comprised of police and gendarmes only; FANCI
soldiers will not be included. His message was clear: the
Forces Nouvelles is not relinquishing military control of the
north just yet. Soro also pointed out that Ouaga IV does not
stipulate that the comzones must "disappear". Ambassador
sought to confirm that President Gbagbo shares this
understanding of Ouaga IV and asked Soro if he thought the
president would follow through on implementing Ouaga IV as
outlined. Soro said he was certain that Gbagbo has the same
understanding because they were together when President
Compaore laid out the next steps. As to implementation, the
Prime Minister didn't say yes, but didn't say no. He talked
instead, about how well he knows the president.

An Old Alliance Still Holds
--------------


6. (C) Soro told Ambassador that observers should distinguish
between Gbagbo and the FPI. Reviving a phrase he
has used on other occasions, Soro emphasized that it was
Gbagbo who signed the Ouagadougou agreements, not the FPI.
Soro said he has told his own entourage never to criticize or
insult the president, and boasted that he knows Gbagbo better
than many in the FPI. Soro reminded Ambassador that he was
the first leader from the north to join Gbagbo in the fight
to allow multiple political parties to exist in Cote
d'Ivoire, and had gone to jail with Gbagbo four times during
the years the PDCI was in power. The Prime Minister thought
that the anti-Forces Nouvelles articles and comments in the
media were the work of FPI hardlines who disagree with the
concessions the president has made. Ambassador noted that the
media statements do, however, have an impact on public
opinion and opined that the FPI had made a good case to the
public about the need for the comzones to "disappear". Soro
smiled at the suggestion and said that while it was true that
some within the FPI would like the comzones to truly
disappear, he doubted that the people who would actually have
to carry out that task had the "guts" to do it.


7. (C) Comment: The Prime Minister expressed more sympathy
for President Gbagbo in this meeting than in prior meetings,
perhaps because they now share the challenge of keeping their
respective camps in line. We will have to see whether this
bodes well for the Ouagadougou peace process, but the change
was quite striking. Soro also appeared much more comfortable
in his role as Prime Minister and was clearly better prepared
on substance than in the past. His insistence that President
Gbagbo has agreed to the Forces Nouvelles retaining military
control of the north until after the election is quite
interesting and would certainly explain the FPI's recent
media attacks on the comzones (venting in public may be their
only option and there is always the possibility that a couple
of the comzones might step aside, putting pressure on others
to do the same.) However, Gbagbo has a history of
signing/saying one thing and doing another, so we remain
skeptical regarding his commtiment to implement what he has
signed. The next few weeks will undoubtedly show whether the
Ouaga IV is proceeding as planned or not.

NESBITT