Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ZAGREB286
2008-03-28 09:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

NEW ISAF CONTRIBUTIONS: CROATIA'S GROWING

Tags:  NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF HR DEFENSE REFORM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7155
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVB #0286/01 0880902
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 280902Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8791
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 3476
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ZAGREB 000286 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/FO, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE
USNATO FOR UNDERWOOD, COCKRELL, BAEZ
NSC FOR BRADLEY AND BRAUN
OSD FOR NATO POLICY - DAS FATA
JCS FOR SHIELDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF HR DEFENSE REFORM
SUBJECT: NEW ISAF CONTRIBUTIONS: CROATIA'S GROWING
CONTINGENT

REF: STATE 19516

Classified By: Political Officer Tom Selinger for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ZAGREB 000286

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/FO, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE
USNATO FOR UNDERWOOD, COCKRELL, BAEZ
NSC FOR BRADLEY AND BRAUN
OSD FOR NATO POLICY - DAS FATA
JCS FOR SHIELDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF HR DEFENSE REFORM
SUBJECT: NEW ISAF CONTRIBUTIONS: CROATIA'S GROWING
CONTINGENT

REF: STATE 19516

Classified By: Political Officer Tom Selinger for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Croatia has steadily expanded its
contribution to ISAF and has assumed increasingly complex
missions. Croatian forces are currently in their 11th
rotation with 203 soldiers. The MoD plans to increase this
to 280 troops this summer and has Parliamentary approval to
raise this to 300 by the end of the year. The additional
Croatian troops scheduled to deploy in the August 2008
rotation have already been committed to support the German
contingent in RC North, while the MoD is holding the
remaining 20 slots to staff emerging needs such as a D-30
artillery refurbishment initiative or a possible joint
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) with the
Minnesota National Guard. The GoC continues to actively
explore the possibility of taking over a Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 2009, but lack of experience on
the civilian side of PRT operations may make Croatia better
positioned to provide additional OMLTs in the near term.
Based upon our conversations with senior Croatian civilian
and military officials, Post believes that pursuing these
deployment plans (D-30 project or joint OMLT, plus possible
PRT lead) will produce better results than Reftel-proposed
contributions of two OMLTs with ANA infantry battalions, and
support for a Greek-led PRT in Dai Kundi. END SUMMARY.

DISPERSED DEPLOYMENT, CRITICAL MISSIONS
--------------


2. (SBU) Croatia's current ISAF contingent is spread among
three regional commands and includes troops under the command
of four different allies.

- Kabul (RC Kabul): This 62-member contingent includes a
military police platoon, command/staff/support elements, a
3-man national intelligence cell, embedded staff officers in
the Kabul Multinational Brigade and HQ ISAF, and a 4-member

medical team assigned to the Adriatic Charter medical unit
under Czech command at the Kabul airport.

- Mazar-e-Sharif (OMLTs): A 27-member Croatian OMLT is
responsible for training and supporting the 3rd Kandak of the
Afghan National Army (ANA). Croatia was the first non-NATO
member to accept the OMLT mission and allies have praised
their performance. Croatia,s OMLT is completely self-funded
except for the U.S.-provided strategic lift. During late
2006, this team temporarily deployed with the 3rd Kandak to
Kandahar to support operations in Regional Command South.
Croatia also maintains a two-man OMLT element in the 209 ANA
Corps Headquarters in Mazar-e-Sharif.

- Mazar-e-Sharif (RC North): This 79-member contingent
includes an infantry platoon task force, staff, and military
police under German command as well as a support element and
intelligence team that remain under national command and
control.

- Chaghcharan (PRT): This 28-member contingent embedded in
the Lithuanian-led PRT in RC West includes two 7-man Military
Liaison and Observation Teams (MLOT),guard personnel, a
CIMIC staff officer, a PSYOPS officer and a support element.

- Pol-e-Khomri (PRT): A five-member team of staff officers
and military police team support the Hungarian-led PRT in RC
North.

- Feyzabad (PRT - civilians) Three civilian diplomats and
police are assigned to this German-led PRT.

NEW TROOPS IN '08: GERMAN COMMITMENT, OTHER POSSIBILITIES
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) The Croatian contingents' August rotation will
include 77 additional troops pledged to support the Germans
around Mazar-e-Sharif. Exact missions and structure of the
expanded contingent will be coordinated with German forces in
April, according to the Croatian MoD, but a likely mission
appears to be airfield security.


ZAGREB 00000286 002 OF 003



4. (C) Croatian troops operate in Afghanistan without
explicit caveats, but politicians including PM Sanader have
made press statements that the contingent will remain in the
north. However, MOD and General Staff are convinced that
Croatian forces must move into the south for Croatia to
demonstrate its commitment to being an active and engaged
ally. Croatia's senior military representative to NATO has
spoken with President Mesic about immediately sending staff
officers to the Canadians to demonstrate solidarity with an
ally under pressure and as a prelude to a more robust
deployment south.


5. (SBU) In order to be able to respond to such contingencies
and address other emerging needs, the MoD is intentionally
holding back on staffing the 20 slots remaining from the 300
approved by Parliament for 2008. One possibility is a US-led
project to refurbish Afghanistan's Soviet-era D-30 artillery
pieces and refit them to NATO standards. Having converted
its own inventory of D-30s, the Croatian military has experts
capable of assisting in this effort and may well be called
upon to deploy them to convert the sights of the D-30s. A
second possibility is a USEUCOM initiative to leverage the
National Guard State Partnership Program and form a
multinational OMLT involving Croatia and the Minnesota
National Guard.

PRT IN CROATIA'S FUTURE?
--------------


6. (C) We are not aware that the GoC has had any discussions
about possibly supporting a Greek-led PRT in Dai Kundi, and
it is unlikely the Croatians see such a move as practicable.
The GoC continues, however, to actively explore the
possibility of taking over a PRT of its own, most likely in

2009. In preliminary discussions about the location of a
PRT, the Croatians have focused on areas where they would be
able to provide logistical support themselves. Post is
supporting these efforts by sponsoring MoD and MFA
participation in Marshall Center training on Stability,
Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTAR) and will
bring this course to Zagreb in June to ensure meaningful
discussions of what is required for PRT success.

COORDINATION NEEDED TO FOCUS THE CROATIAN CONTRIBUTION
--------------


7. (C) COMMENT: As the GoC continues to consider ways in
which it can increase the effectiveness and size of its ISAF
contributions, one challenge it faces is the lack of a
consistent message from NATO allies on what would be most
helpful. Reftel indicates that USG priorities are for OMLTs
and PRTs, and that has been Post's consistent message to the
GoC. Yet we see no sign that the Germans have echoed that
focus on OMLTs in their discussions on what specific elements
should be included in Croatia's 100-man increase in 2008.
And GoC State Secretary Raboteg has told the Ambassador that
Canada's Defense Minister, at the recent Defense Ministerial
in Riga, also made a plea for Croatia to provide unspecified
contributions to the Canadian contingent.


8. (C) Given these competing demands, Post believes the most
appropriate course of action is to work with the Croatians to
realize the efforts already under consideration and to help
clarify priorities for those increases. The Croatian
military is already strained to provide the necessary
language-qualified personnel for ISAF missions, whether for
OMLTs or PRTs. Regarding OMLTs, assigning the qualified
senior NCOs and officers required for OMLTs may not add up to
many bodies in theater in Afghanistan, but effectively
degrades the capability of the entire unit or units from
which they are drawn. Therefore, we doubt the Croatians can
identify personnel for more than one additional joint OMLT
with the Minnesota NG. Regarding a PRT, Croatia seems
well-equipped to operate the military/security side of a PRT,
but the GoC has no experience in managing international
development projects. The MFA is well aware of this
shortcoming and has been hesitant to commit to more than it
can deliver. After the June training referred to in para 6
above, the GoC should be better able to determine its
capacity to lead a PRT. In the near-term, however, Croatia
may be a better candidate for increased OMLT support rather
than PRT leadership. Over the course of 2008 and into 2009,

ZAGREB 00000286 003 OF 003


delivering on a joint OMLT, a team to convert D-30 artillery,
and possibly leading a PRT already represents an ambitious
challenge for the Croatians. ISAF needs to indicate
priorities even among these tasks, and then make sure that
all Allies, particularly Germany, also reflect them with the
Croatians. END COMMENT.
Bradtke