LEADER OF SERBS IN CROATIA CALLS FOR DELAYING

C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 000252

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV HR KO
SUBJECT: LEADER OF SERBS IN CROATIA CALLS FOR DELAYING
RECOGNITION OF KOSOVO

REF: ZAGREB 243

Classified By: Ambassador Robert A. Bradtke for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Milorad Pupovac, a respected leader of Croatia's
Serbs, met with the Ambassador March 13 to argue for a
further delay in Croatian recogntion of Kosovo's
independence. Pupovac said that he expected that Croatia,
along with one or more countries in the region, would
recognize Kosovo's independence next week (reftel). Pupovac
explained that he had met with President Mesic's foreign
policy advisor Budimir Loncar to propose a delay until after
the Serb elections in May, and he was seeking to make his
case to Prime Minister Sanader as well.


2. (C) As part of his proposal, Pupovac said that he would be
willing to travel to both Kosovo and Belgrade. In Kosovo,
where Pupovac has worked in the past to support moderate Serb
elements, he would seek a meeting with the Kosovar Albanian
leadership to inform them that Croatia would recognize Kosovo
but needed more time, given the sensitivity of Croat-Serb
relations. In Belgrade, he would try to meet with Serb
leaders to argue for realism in dealing with Kovoso and to
reiterate that Croatian recognition of Kosovo was inevitable.



3. (C) In presenting his ideas to the Ambassador, Pupovac
repeated arguments he has made previously about the damage
that recognition of Kosovo would do to relations between
Croatians and Serbs inside Croatia, as well as to relations
between Croatia and Serbia. Croatia's Serbs had not
demonstrated against Kosovo's declaration of independence,
when Serb communities in Slovenia and even the U.S. had done
so. This, Pupovac claimed, was the result of the leadership
of moderates such as himself. Recognition of Kosovo's
independence would undercut his influence. The reaction of
Belgrade was also unpredictable. All of this would affect
the prospects for further return of Serbian refugees to
Croatia. In view of all the possible negative consequences,
Pupovac maintained it would be better to proceed more slowly
on recognition, and he asked for the Ambassador's support.


4. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged that recognition of Kosovo
was a difficult decision, but stated that further delay would
not make this decision easier. No outcome of the Serb
elections was likely to make a Croatian decision on
recognition more palatable to Belgrade. Further delay could
also make some in Belgrade hope that they could reverse the
steady increase in the number of countries recognizing
Kosovo. The Ambassador made clear that he could not offer
Pupovac any encouragement or support for his initiative.


5. (C) Subsequently, on March 14, the Ambassador discussed
Pupovac's proposal with Mesic advisor Loncar, and asked
whether Mesic supported it. Loncar said that it was his view
and Mesic's that nothing could be achieved by delaying
recognition or by Pupovac's travel to Pristina and Belgrade.
Loncar said that he continued to expect Croatia would
recognize Kosovo's independence next week, in tandem with
Hungary.
Bradtke