Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ZAGREB171
2008-02-29 11:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

CROATIA TO RECOGNIZE KOSOVO BY MID-MARCH

Tags:  PREL HR KO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVB #0171 0601120
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291120Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8637
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 000171 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2018
TAGS: PREL HR KO
SUBJECT: CROATIA TO RECOGNIZE KOSOVO BY MID-MARCH

Classified By: A/DCM Rick Holtzapple, Reasons 1.4 B/D

C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 000171

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2018
TAGS: PREL HR KO
SUBJECT: CROATIA TO RECOGNIZE KOSOVO BY MID-MARCH

Classified By: A/DCM Rick Holtzapple, Reasons 1.4 B/D


1. (C) In a February 29 meeting with the Ambassador, Croatian
Prime Minister Ivo Sanader said that he intended to have
Croatia recognize Kosovo by mid-March. He told the
Ambassador he had already spoken with Serbian President Tadic
and PM Kostunica on February 15 to inform them that Croatia
would be measured in its approach, but that it would
recognize Kosovo's independence once a majority of the EU had
done so. Sanader said both had asked him to reconsider and
not recognize Kosovo, but that he had told them it would be
"impossible" for Croatia not to recognize. Sanader asked the
Ambassador to explain directly to Washington that Croatia was
taking a measured approach in hopes of maintaining an open
channel of communication with Belgrade, and to minimize
possible negative reactions against Croatia's sizable
business interests in Serbia. Sanader said he had suggested
to Kostunica that they meet in the coming weeks, but no such
meeting had yet been scheduled.


2. (C) Sanader also expressed concern that Croatia's
recognition of Kosovo could be met with threatening
statements from Belgrade, either from the government or from
other prominent figures, menacing Croatia's territorial
integrity or looking to establish a "government in exile" for
the "Serb Krajina" (i.e., the parts of Croatia the Serbs held
during the conflict in the 1990's). While Sanader said he
had no fears about Croatia's security or stability, he asked
that the United States be prepared to denounce any such
statements from Serbia.


3. (C) The Ambassador replied that Washington understood
Croatia's position, and that recognition by mid-March sounded
like a reasonable timeline. Waiting any longer, however,
would be difficult, and was not likely help the situation.
The Ambassador also noted that the US had been absolutely
clear in opposing threats or statements that questioned the
borders of any of the states in the region. While we would
need to be careful not to respond to every minor provocation,
he said that if there were statements made that the Croatians
felt were serious enough to merit it, then he would work with
Washington to prepare an appropriate response.


4. (C) Bianca Matkovic, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
who also attended the meeting, said she had recently met with
the Russian Ambassador to Croatia and informed him of
Croatia's intention to recognize Kosovo. She said the
Russian had replied that Russia understood Croatia's position.
Bradtke