EUR DAS BRYZA MEDIATES POLITICAL CRISIS IN YEREVAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 YEREVAN 000218

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, NSC FOR MARIA GERMANO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM AM
SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA MEDIATES POLITICAL CRISIS IN YEREVAN


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Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) EUR DAS Matthew Bryza visited Yerevan March 6-8 to
consult with key leaders on Armenia's post-election political
crisis. He met the President, Prime Minister (twice),
Foreign Minister Oskanian, opposition leader Levon
Ter-Petrossian (LTP),and a range of other politicians, civil
society representatives, and the diplomatic corps, as well as
the government ombudsman. President Kocharian held a tough
"law and order" line -- insisting that arresting and
punishing those responsible for post-election violence would
solve the problem. PM/President-elect Sargsian signaled
understanding that the issues are more complex, that
demonstrators were more protesting the GOAM than supporting
LTP, and his readiness to reach out to other political
forces. Ter-Petrossian insisted his campaign's behavior was
legal and peaceful and would remain so; authorities
precipitated crisis with use of force. LTP insisted he would
participate in talks with the GOAM only if the GOAM honors
his right to peaceful protest demonstrations once the State
of Emergency (SOE) is lifted. Other opposition leaders
affirmed the need for multi-partisan political dialogue to
get Armenian democracy back on course. NGO representatives
passionately protested the flawed elections and authorities'
post-election behavior. END SUMMARY.

PRIME MINISTER: POSITIVE COMMITMENTS, SECURITY FEARS
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2. (C) Probably the most important interlocutor was Prime
Minister/President-elect Serzh Sargsian. Bryza met him in a
formal setting March 6, and in an informal one-on-one March 7
for two hours. In the first meeting, Bryza welcomed
Sargsian's cabinet statement earlier in the day that called
for political dialogue, and affirmed that that is the right
strategy. He said it was important to end zero-sum,
all-or-nothing formulations between political forces.
Sargsian agreed, and noted that Armenians are still
struggling to build their democracy. He said everyone was
pressuring Armenia to lift the SOE, but he was dubious of the
wisdom of this. The PM commented that democracy and reform
cannot proceed without public order. Who, he asked, would be
accountable for keeping Armenians safe? The U.S. State
Department? The European Union? He emphasized that the
guilty must be punished -- citing several inflammatory sins
committed by the mob March 1-2 -- and said the GOAM needs
international understanding and support. The PM argued that
the SOE provides a cooling-off period, and prevents media
from writing inflammatory things. Bryza said that while the
USG calls for SOE to be lifted, we are prepared to think
practically, and recounted statements by some NGO leaders
that for a short while emergency measures can be necessary in
some circumstances. The "day after" the SOE would come very
soon, however, and the PM must urgently begin a political
process to de-escalate tension and ensure SOE does not
increase public anger. Bryza expressed concern over reports
of people being detained without access to lawyer or family.
Sargsian said it was LTP who had used such methods while
president, but the current government would not. Bryza
replied that full, transparent information from the
government would help dispel any myths. Authorities must
show even-handedness in prosecuting both pro-government and
opposition law-breakers, including police if they used
illegal force. Sargsian and Bryza each hinted that President
Kocharian was likely to take a much more aggressive line
against LTP and the demonstrators, and, being stubborn,
represented a difficult problem to get around so long as he
remained in office. On LTP, Sargsian asked how he could
negotiate with a man who called government leaders "traitors"
and "mongol-tartars." If LTP continues down this path, the
country will treat him as an outcast. Bryza said he would
make the point to LTP that he was going down the wrong path.


3. (C) Sargsian was more relaxed and frank during his
second, private meeting with Bryza. Sargsian confided that
the SOE -- or at least prohibitions on demonstrations --
might be extended beyond the initial March 20 term, unless
LTP would promise to postpone any protest rallies until after
the April 9 inauguration. With such a commitment from LTP,
Sargsian would be prepared to lift the media blackout,
possibly cancel the SOE early, and enter roundtable talks
with LTP to chart a political way ahead. Bryza undertook to

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convey this message, via emboffs, to LTP. Sargsian also
indicated that arresting LTP would be a public relations
disaster, and one that he would oppose, though President
Kocharian might insist on going forward with this. Bryza
urged Sargsian to step up as the national leader by reaching
out to civil society, ending arrests of opposition leaders,
restoring media freedoms, lifting the SOE, and prosecuting
those who violated election laws and/or unlawfully used
violence. Sargsian assured that there would be no general
round-up of opposition politicians and organizers, and that
only those guilty of real crimes would be prosecuted.
Sargsian conceded that the vast majority of demonstrators
were protesting the Armenian Government, rather than
expressing spontaneous support for LTP. He recognized
Kocharian's hardline approach was damaging his (Sargsian's)
legitimacy with voters, and said he was reaching out to civil
society quietly, in his own way, hoping word-of-mouth would
gradually garner him support.

PRESIDENT: A TOUGH ACT TO FOLLOW, OR JUST A TOUGH ACT?
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4. (C) President Kocharian treated Bryza to a lengthy and
impassioned apologia for the government's actions on March
1-2, and a detailed indictment of the LTP camp's sins. He
entirely imputed blame for each and every act of mob violence
to LTP personally and the entire March 1 protest generally,
which he insisted was planned and orchestrated in every
detail by LTP's team. He rejected the premise that any of
the demonstrators on March 1 protest were simply disenchanted
with the government and hoping to air their grievances, or
that the numbers were anywhere near as high as have been
reported. He also went out of his way to try to prove that
all the pre- and post-election demonstrations were much
smaller than independent assessments have reported, stating
that 10-11,000 was the maximum. Kocharian signaled his
intention to arrest and prosecute a broad swath of those he
deemed responsible for creating the political crisis, while
insisting that authorities have been above reproach in every
instance. Bryza ventured that the course Kocharian seemed
set on was destroying the reputation of President-elect
Sargsian, who needed to build his credibility and democratic
credentials with the Armenian people and the international
community. Kocharian said he took full responsibility -- all
the while insisting there was nothing wrong to take
responsibility for -- and if people want to blame anyone,
they should blame him. Bryza assessed that a continued
government crackdown would only raise tension. Kocharian
disagreed, expressing confidence that opposition zeal would
fade if the GOAM remained firm.

TER-PETROSSIAN: TALKS REASONABLE, ACTIONS LESS CLEAR
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5. (C) Bryza met March 7 with ex-President Levon
Ter-Petrossian. LTP opened with discussions of Nagorno
Karabakh (NK),asserting that the current regime had
accomplished nothing in the past ten years to settle the
conflict, and were negotiating on very similar policy ground
to what LTP himself had been doing as president. He said the
status quo in NK was dangerously unstable, but congratulated
the Minsk Group Co-Chairs for expanding his (LTP's)
step-by-step concept into a concrete and viable proposal.
Moving to domestic politics, LTP insisted that his campaign
and supporters had never broken any laws. They were
protesting peacefully when authorities violently ejected them
from Freedom Square the morning of March 1. LTP and his
circle could not be held accountable for the violence that
ensued later in the day, because they had had no control over
that, as he himself had been under house arrest, and his
senior lieutenants arrested or in hiding after the brutal
police action. LTP complained about the Sargsian side's
propaganda (alluding to a "documentary" aired on a
pro-governmental station February 14 that called LTP an
Israeli agent and the son of a Turk; septel). LTP called the
SOE illegal, noting that the Constitution allowed for an SOE
to be declared in accordance with legislation, but that the
required implementing legislation to govern SOEs had never
been enacted. LTP emphasized that he is ready for political
dialogue at any time, and he fully supported the approach
outlined in the Slovenian EU Presidency statement March 4,
which called for dialogue and an international inquiry into
the March 1-2 events. LTP insisted he had never and would
never demonstrate illegally, but fully intended to call a
rally with authorities' proper permission once the SOE is

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lifted. Bryza encouraged LTP to enter into dialogue with PM
Sargsian to chart next steps to strengthen Armenian
democracy. LTP agreed to dialogue with Sargsian only on the
condition that the GOAM would permit legal street
demonstrations after the SOE's expiration on March 21. He
commented that under Armenian law, authorities do not have
the legal right to refuse altogether permission to
demonstrate, though they can decline to allow it at a
specific place and time, while providing alternatives. (NOTE:
While the government and most other observers believe LTP's
nine-day Freedom Square rally was illegal, his team have
previously shared with us tortured legal reasoning to the
effect that the law allows spontaneous public gatherings, and
the rally in question had coalesced spontaneously. Since it
never came to an end, this "spontaneous" rally, they claim,
remained legal for the duration. END NOTE.)


6. (C) CDA and polchief met again with LTP March 8, after
Bryza's departure, to convey Sargsian's message (paragraph 3)
that if LTP would defer seeking to rally before the April 9
inauguration, Sargsian would lift the media ban and possibly
the SOE altogether, and enter roundtable talks that include
LTP. LTP replied that this seemed an empty gesture. Once
the SOE expired it was the LTP camp's right to organize
peaceful, legal rallies. He said that this was the only
means that the government had left open to him for
communicating with the people, commenting that the prime
minister has all the national television channels at his
disposal to convey any and all messages to the public. LTP
said that if the government would grant him access to
television, then public rallies might not be necessary.
Polchief met March 10 with PM adviser Levon Martirosian to
convey the idea that LTP would be willing to eschew rallies
if the government granted television access instead.
Martirosian was not empowered to speak for the PM, but seemed
profoundly skeptical about this idea. He promised to convey
to the PM, however. To date, no response has been received.

ARTUR BAGHDASSARIAN: THE FLIP-FLOP MAN
--------------


7. (C) Bryza met Artur Baghdassarian, the
now-I'm-opposition/now-I'm-government former speaker of
parliament, who signed an agreement February 29 to once again
join the governing coalition. Baghdassarian insisted that,
despite widespread opinions to the contrary, his party
rank-and-file remained fully loyal to him and now committed
to the government, now that he had joined PM Sargsian in
exchange for the position of Secretary of the National
Security Council. Baghdassarian -- who just weeks ago had
been a leading voice of criticism of the regime, and whose
top surrogate, Heghine Bisharian had appeared at Freedom
Square's podium alongside LTP -- now claimed that LTP
represented only a tiny percentage of the Armenian
electorate, while together he and PM Sargsian constituted a
large majority. He echoed Sargsian and Kocharian's
indictments of LTP's post-election behavior and ascribed to
LTP full responsibility for the mob violence that erupted
March 1.

THE HOVHANISSIANS: VAHAN AND RAFFI
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8. (C) DASHNAKSUTYUN: Vahan Hovhanissian was the
presidential candidate of the century-old Armenian
Revolutionary Federation (or Dashnaksutyun) party.
Hovhanissian said both the government and LTP sides were
equally to blame for the current crisis, and neither had
legitimacy. He had campaigned on the theme of "neither the
bad past nor the bad present leaders", but had been
disappointed that it did not gain traction, as the public was
caught up in the battle of the titans: Sargsian vs. LTP.
Both sides now are equally intransigent, holding to
maximalist positions that would serve to lengthen the
political crisis. Hovhanissian outlined a reasonable and
moderate way forward. He said the PM needs to show
leadership and humility by agreeing to sit down with credible
opposition figures (he thought that LTP himself would not be
possible in the near term) for a frank discussion of what has
gone wrong in Armenia's political culture. Sargsian should
be prepared to hear some tough truth-telling from other
political leaders, including Vahan himself, about the
government's flaws and failures, and agree mutually to
measures to correct these problems. He also felt the
government must take steps to build a more inclusive,

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independent, and truly non-partisan television and radio
regulatory commission, putting an end to the one-sided
propaganda that now emanates from the state-run broadcasting
channels.


9. (C) Heritage Party leader Raffi Hovhanissian, who endorsed
LTP shortly before the election and spoke at a post-election
LTP rally on Freedom Square, said he held the authorities
fully responsible for the events of March 1-2. The
President's decision to clear the square of demonstrators was
the triggering event for the violence. Hovanissian added
that while he had been uncomfortable with some of LTP's
campaign rhetoric, actions by the authorities on election day
and in the post-election period had precipitated the current
crisis. Dismissing Baghdassarian's switch to the Government
side, Hovhanissian suggested that many of Baghdassarian's
supporters were now -- by default -- in the LTP camp. With
Orinats Yerkir supporting the GOAM and the Dashnaks, (ARF)
position unclear, Heritage was now the only remaining
opposition party in the parliament. Hovhanissian said he
would look for ways to play a constructive role in easing
Armenia's political tension, and was generally supportive of
the roundtable proposal being floated by the Dashnaks. He
added that he would continue his contacts with LTP, and urge
the former president to carry out his opposition through
legal channels.

GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER
--------------


10. (C) Bryza also met the Armenian government's Human
Rights Defender (Ombudsman),Armen Harutiunian, who had been
an entirely tame government supporter until witnessing the
events of March 1, after which he released a critical
statement that provoked an angry public broadside from
President Kocharian. Harutiunian told Bryza there was equal
fault between the government and LTP camps for the recent
unrest. However, he said the deeper problem lay in
Armenians' mistrust of their own government, and in a system
where oligarchs exert undue influence, checks and balances
are absent, freedoms limited, and citizens feel they have no
say. Armenia is an angry and divided society, he said.
Harutiunian commented that authorities' current strategy of
demonizing the LTP camp was likely to provoke more clashes,
while the media blackout prompted widespread belief in
outrageous rumors and "black PR." Authorities must also stop
arresting opposition politicians. He proposed several
confidence-building measures to restore political norms,
including giving the opposition more voice in the television
and radio regulatory commission and Central Election
Commission, and extending a negotiation offer to LTP to
reconcile differences. Harutiunian thought both Kocharian
and LTP were each committed to extreme positions, but PM
Sargsian could be persuaded to take a more enlightened
approach, and be made to understand that LTP's base of
supporters represent a legitimate voice of dissent.
Harutiunian praised the PM's statement earlier that day at
the weekly cabinet meeting -- which was later publicized by
the government -- that authorities shared partial
responsibility for the events March 1, and urged ministers to
engage in dialogue with society.

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CIVIL SOCIETY BLASTS CRACKDOWN
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11. (C) Five civil society leaders representing different
sectors warned Bryza that the situation could deteriorate
even further in the absence of swift measures to lift the
state of emergency and engage in dialog with the opposition.
All five agreed that the authorities were abusing the
20-day-long state of emergency to go after perceived enemies
and reinforce their grip on power, at the risk of creating
long-term negative consequences for stability. They appealed
to the United States and the international community at large
to apply pressure that would force a change of attitude.


12. (C) All of the civil society leaders laid the blame for
the current situation on the authorities, and their
heavy-handed tactics in both clearing Freedom Square and
dealing with its aftermath on March 1. Tamara Gevorkian, a
former Deputy Minister from the Labor and Social Affairs
ministry gave an impassioned eyewitness account of what she
saw in person on March 1, and accused the authorities of
provoking the violence. She said she and her family had been

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threatened after she spoke on the square during the
11-day-long protests.
PENNINGTON