PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER PESSIMISTIC THAT CRACKDOWN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000202

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ASEC KDEM AM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER PESSIMISTIC THAT CRACKDOWN
STRATEGY MAY PROVOKE FURTHER INSTABILITY

REF: YEREVAN 164

Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Presidential national security adviser Garnik
Isagulian conceded to polchief March 9 that the March 1
morning crackdown was authorized by President Kocharian the
day before, contrary to the government's official line.
Isagulian believes that PM Sargsian -- bolstered by hardline
advisers and the security services -- is likely to imprison
opposition rival Levon Ter-Petrossian (LTP) in coming days,
and in general treat the current situation as a security
problem rather than a political one. Isagulian commented
that such a strategy would lead only to further unrest. A
fierce nationalist, Isagulian's sole comfort in the current
crisis is his belief that Sargsian is now too weakened a
figure ever to be able to sign a peace negotiation along the
lines being negotiated by the Minsk Group. If he did so,
Isagulian said, he would be toppled from power, just as
Sargsian had helped topple LTP in 1998. END SUMMARY


2. (S) AN INSIDER'S VIEW: Garnik Isagulian is President
Kocharian's adviser for national security, though less
influential on policy than the title might suggest. He is
loyal to President Kocharian, and claims friendship with PM
Serzh Sargsian, though it is clear that he is closer to
Kocharian than Sargsian and thinks more highly of the current
president than the president-elect. He is dismayed by the
path that both leaders have chosen in recent weeks, almost to
the point of resigning from his position. Aside from being a
rabid nationalist, on issues of domestic politics Isagulian
has a much more constructive outlook. Polchief has grown to
know Isalgulian quite well over the last 18 months, and
Isagulian does not hesitate to speak candidly about
information unfavorable to his own government. He is
idealistic, pro-American, and with a somewhat romanticized
view of the Armenian nation. Isagulian's liking for
Kocharian sometimes may cause him to interpret facts in a way
that reflects more positively on the president. In recent
months we have begun to detect less positive feelings for
Serzh Sargsian, about whom he had previously spoken warmly.


3. (S) AUTHORITIES TO BLAME FOR VIOLENCE; CRISIS OF
CONFIDENCE: Isagulian was bitter about his own government's
role in the March 1-2 violence, for which he deemed the
authorities completely responsible. He said that Kocharian
had been swayed by the police and security service leaders'
confidence that they could clean out Freedom Square in
minutes, with a minimum of casualties, and had authorized the
operation. Kocharian had been so confident it would go
smoothly, he had planned to go skiing in the Armenian ski
resort of Tsakhadzor that day. Isagulian commented that the
leaders of both services should have resigned afterward, but
of course the regime would never endorse such a step,
believing it would signal error or weakness. Isagulian was
pained by the brutality the police had employed in
gratuitously beating non-violent protesters in Freedom
Square. This and the subsequent clashes later the evening of
March 1, as well as the State of Emergency, were devastating
blows against public trust and confidence in the government.
Isagulian felt that Public Television's relentlessly and
transparently partisan broadcasts were further deepening
public cynicism of the government. He commented that "90
percent of the people in the square were good people," who
not only did not deserve to be so violently handled by their
government, but who represent a critical constituency that
the PM needs to win over in order to govern effectively. But
the PM does not seem to recognize this reality.


4. (S) PM IS NO DEMOCRAT: Isagulian told us that he had
recommended -- in written reports and during a meeting the
week of March 3 with the President, PM, and Deputy Prime
Minister -- a way forward to regain public trust and
legitimacy. He advised lifting the press ban (which he said
only fuels outrageous rumors),putting an end to the
egregious pro-governmental partisanship on public television,
granting the opposition access to television airtime,
releasing from jail the vast majority of pro-LTP political
figures, and starting work setting up a new cabinet whose
composition would signal to the Armenian public a pro-reform
orientation. He said he was very pessimistic, however, that
this advice would be followed, as all indications were that
the President, PM, and DPM, were determined to solve the
current crisis solely by clamping down. He said that the PM

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seemed during their meeting firmly resolved to jail and
prosecute LTP in the coming days. (NOTE: This contradicts
the impression PM Sargsian gave EUR DAS Bryza during their
subsequent meeting March 7, in which he intimated that this
would be a grave political mistake, while hinting he might
not be able to prevent Kocharian from taking this step. END
NOTE) Isagulian said that Sargsian was surrounded by
advisers and security service chiefs who curry favor with the
PM by minimizing the political problems, and insisting that
pro-LTP forces are a minor nuisance that can and should be
easily dealt with by the security services. Isagulian said
the truth of Sargsian's political position can be seen from
the events of February 26, when the PM had bussed into
Yerevan tens of thousands of ostensible supporters for a
rally, only to have most of them, as he put it (our
observation was a sizeable minority),defect to LTP's rally
up the street instead, creating a pro-LTP crowd that
Isagulian put at 60,000 people. Isagulian worried that this
path would lead to continuing instability, commenting that
"Armenia is not Azerbaijan. Armenians won't tolerate being
ruled like that for long."


5. (S) BAGHDASSARIAN A SELLOUT: Isagulian commented that a
contributing factor to the public outrage that erupted March
1 after police cleared Freedom Square was widespread disgust
over what he considered the cynical ploy of buying off
Orinats Yerkir leader Artur Baghdassarian by bringing him
into the government. Isagulian commented "Everybody knows 80
percent of Artur's voters hate the government." Co-opting
Baghdassarian into government only fueled popular disgust.


6. (S) "AT LEAST HE CAN'T NEGOTIATE ON KARABAKH NOW": The
one bright spot in the fiercely nationalistic Isagulian's
mind was his confidence that Sargsian is now so irrepairably
damaged politically that he will never dare to negotiate away
one inch of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) or the surrounding occupied
territories (OT). Isagulian said that if he tried to do so
now, he would be instantly toppled from power, just the way
that LTP had been. (NOTE: LTP is notorious for having
stolen the 1996 election from rival Vazgen Manukian and
having sent in the army to impose order in Yerevan -- though
with no serious injuries or deaths. Just two years later,
LTP was toppled from power in a cabinet coup d'etat by none
other than Robert Kocharian, Serzh Sargsian, and the late
Vazgen Sargsian, after his party deserted him in droves over
the public perception that he was willing to negotiate away
battle-won lands in NK/OT. END NOTE)


7. (C) COMMENT: We take Isagulian's words with due caution
-- recognizing his biases and his desire for
self-aggrandizement. However, this is a man who has known
both the president and president-elect for a long time, and
we would be wrong to dismiss out of hand his portrayal of the
PM as determined to solve his political problems with force
and criminal prosecutions, rather than the more democratic
methods he has advanced with international envoys. The
genuine evidence is slender for the "Sargsian as frustrated
democrat" theory, which holds that if only the muscular
Kocharian were not still president and calling the shots,
things would be very different. We have urged the PM
repeatedly over the past two weeks to take bold steps to
reassure the public of his commitment to democratic reform
and to distance himself from Kocharian's draconian measures.
We remain hopeful that he will move in that direction.
Without such steps, however, betting on Sargsian as a future
reformer will be little more than a leap of faith.
PENNINGTON