Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08YEREVAN117
2008-02-13 15:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

LIKELIHOOD OF STREET PROTESTS, POSSIBLE VIOLENCE,

Tags:  PGOV ASEC CASC AM 
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VZCZCXRO7195
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHYE #0117/01 0441517
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131517Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7003
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1455
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4/ECJ5-A/ECJ1/ECJ37// PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0538
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000117 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, S/ES-O-CMS, DS/ITA, CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV ASEC CASC AM
SUBJECT: LIKELIHOOD OF STREET PROTESTS, POSSIBLE VIOLENCE,
AFTER FEBRUARY 19 ELECTION


Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000117

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, S/ES-O-CMS, DS/ITA, CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV ASEC CASC AM
SUBJECT: LIKELIHOOD OF STREET PROTESTS, POSSIBLE VIOLENCE,
AFTER FEBRUARY 19 ELECTION


Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The Armenian political scene is growing
more, rather than less, unpredictable as Election
Day draws near. It is clear to us that both ex-
President Levon Ter-Petrossian's (LTP) and PM Serzh
Sargsian's camps are each "all in" on this election
outcome. Neither will be prepared to accept a loss
at the ballot box, whether fairly or otherwise.
Both sides seem to be girding themselves for
a post-election fight. This is LTP's last, best
chance to return to power and avenge his 1998
ouster, while Sargsian's only electoral advantage
is incumbency -- if he should fall now, he has
little chance to make it back. Sargsian could
conceivably lose the presidency, and still manage
to hold onto a dominant political position from his
prime ministerial perch, but this strategy depends
on the risky proposition that he can hold his
parliamentary faction together when all the
momentum is running the other way. Both the timing
and outcome of the showdown remains hard to call.
Critical unknowns are how many people LTP can
mobilize to the streets, how determined will be
protesters' resolve, and whether authorities can
really count on the security services to crack down
hard on the opposition should events come to that
extreme pass.


2. (C) BOTTOM LINE: Our best estimate is that LTP
will probably fail to bring out the critical mass
of determined protesters necessary to threaten
regime control. Most likely is that the protest
rallies will be quickly dispersed by authorities
with minimal violence and without ever gaining
traction. We cannot rule out the possibility,
however, of a serious clash. A final possibility
is that LTP's camp may fail to galvanize sufficient
numbers even to make a credible attempt, and the
whole thing will evaporate without a murmur. END
SUMMARY

--------------
PROTEST IS THE PLAN
--------------


3. (C) Post has concluded that key opposition
political forces (led by LTP) have as their core

strategy the intention to take to the streets after
the upcoming presidential election, claiming that
the election was stolen by authorities. Their hope
will be to gather a critical mass of protesters
somewhere in downtown Yerevan with an eye toward
creating a "Rose8 or &Orange Revolution"-style
public uprising, which they hope would create
enough pressure on authorities to force the
government to step down. Our judgment --
reinforced by private sentiments we have heard from
government insiders over past months -- is that the
authorities are equally resolved to win at any
cost, and would sooner resort to violence than risk
losing their grip on power. Moreover, our sense is
that the authorities are fully sensitized to the
possibility of an attempted uprising, and will be
prepared to be as firm as they deem necessary to
control events. LTP's faction probably hopes there
will be enough divided loyalties within the
security services that authorities will not be able
to bring decisive force to bear on the protests,
and that that failure will add momentum to the
movement.

--------------
WHEN WILL IT HAPPEN?
--------------


4. (C): There are many unknowns that complicate our
ability to predict the timeline, extent, or outcome
of street protests. The first question is whether
Prime Minister Serzh Sargsian will genuinely win or

YEREVAN 00000117 002 OF 003


perhaps fraudulently claim to win in the first
round of balloting February 19, and how soon those
results will be announced. In this scenario,
street protests might be called for February 20, or
might be delayed one or two days beyond that, until
results have been announced by authorities and the
opposition has had time to gather itself. The
recent buzz has been that the ruling party is
determined to win in the first round, by fair means
or foul. In that event, sources close to LTP have
hinted that protests would be organized swiftly,
perhaps as early as election night.


5. (C) It is also quite possible, however, that no
candidate will be found to have a majority of
votes, which would lead to a second round run-off
election on March 4. In that scenario, opposition
street protests would likely be deferred until
after the second round. However, it is also
possible that the opposition would choose to ramp
up its protest campaign after the first round.
This scenario might unfold if Levon Ter-Petrossian
is not/not among the two finalists slated to
participate in the second round. This possibility
becomes more likely if the second round comes down
to PM Sargsian and a run-off opponent who is not
considered a "real" opposition candidate. Vahan
Hovannissian (Dashnaks) would be the best fit for
such a stalking horse candidacy, but it is not
unthinkable for Artur Baghdassarian to be cast in
that role.

--------------
COULD LTP ACTUALLY WIN?
--------------


6. (C) We also cannot rule out the possibility
that Levon Ter-Petrossian or another opposition
candidate might actually attract enough votes to
legitimately win, though that seems unlikely at
this point. We have no polling data that we can
truly rely on to assess how many voters are fed
up with the current government, versus how many are
relatively content, and where the protest votes
might ultimately go. Many voters seems to be in a
quandary, not much liking Serzh Sargsian, not much
liking Levon Ter-Petrossian, not sure about whether
Vahan Hovannissian is really prepared to stand
against Sargsian, and not sure if Artur
Baghdassarian has what it takes to stand up against
regime pressures. There is plenty of mistrust of
all four of the leading candidates' motivations,
records, and consistency. Vazgen Manukian rides
the fine line between serious and frivolous
candidates -- less disliked than any of the main
three Sargsian rivals, but also having the smallest
and least effective campaign organization and
political base. Still, even Manukian could be the
beneficiary of a sizeable "pox on all their houses"
vote. Also unclear is whether a real anyone-but-
Sargsian movement might yet galvanize a grand
coalition of strange bedfellows behind a second-
round Sargsian rival.

--------------
YERKRAPAH WILD CARD
--------------


7. (C) We continue to hear unconfirmed reports from
various sources that the Yerkrapah association of
Nagorno Karabakh war veterans will back LTP, and
Yerkrapah members will serve as a key source of
pro-LTP muscle on Election Day and in any subsequent
confrontations. Deputy Defense Minister General
Manvel Grigorian (most commonly known simply as
General Manvel) is the head of the Yerkrapah
organization. Our senior DAO FSN specialist reported
a conversation he had with a friend he considers
reliable, who is an inner member of LTP's campaign
organization. The source tells us that General Manvel
backs LTP's campaign, and has made clear to fellow
senior MOD staff that his Yerkrapah members would keep
a close watch on the polling procedures in polling
places across Armenia. Our DAO FSN also tells us

YEREVAN 00000117 003 OF 003


that the MOD corps commander in Lori region is General
Manvel's close friend, war buddy, and former deputy,
while Manvel's son is a regimental commander in the same
corps. Other Yerkrapah members and sympathizers
may be sprinkled elsewhere in the army hierarchy,
potentially raising the question of some disunity
in the army ranks if called upon to quell
demonstrators.


8. (c) COMMENT ON YERKRAPAH: Yerkrapah's true extent,
political unity, and fervor, remain difficult for
us to measure. In 1999, the war veterans group
threatened President Kocharian's hold on power. It
is widely understood that General Manvel's senior
MOD post (with its lucrative portfolio overseeing
military construction) was and remains purely a
matter of buying Manvel's support. The true
relationship between Manvel and his superiors in
government is not well known to us, but it is
plausible that these relations are chilly. If
Yerkrapah is indeed mobilized to support LTP, the
next unknown is whether Yerkrapah's members remain
as fervently committed and as tough as they were
nine years ago, when all were younger and more
recently returned from the fields of battle. END
COMMENT)

--------------
EAC TO MEET
--------------


9. (C) Post will convene an Emergency
Action Committee meeting February 14 to review the
scenarios outlined in this cable and assess whether
Embassy or Department action, such as a possible
security notice, public statement or warden
message, may be appropriate.
PENNINGTON