Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08YEREVAN108
2008-02-11 12:27:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

ARMENIA ON POST-2008 PLANS IN IRAQ (C-DI7-02264)

Tags:  PINR PREL MARR MOPS IZ AM 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYE #0108/01 0421227
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 111227Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6984
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0029
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:RUE// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4/ECJ5-A/ECJ1/ECJ37// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3-E/CCJ5-E// PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0528
S E C R E T YEREVAN 000108 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPT FOR INR/I (SMCCORMICK),EUR/CARC, NEA/I-PM (SEPTSTEIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS: PINR PREL MARR MOPS IZ AM
SUBJECT: ARMENIA ON POST-2008 PLANS IN IRAQ (C-DI7-02264)

REF: A. STATE 9941

B. STATE 4865

C. 2006 YEREVAN 1251 DTG 170618Z OCT 07

Classified By: CDA JOSEPH PENNINGTON, REASONS 1.4 B/D.

S E C R E T YEREVAN 000108

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPT FOR INR/I (SMCCORMICK),EUR/CARC, NEA/I-PM (SEPTSTEIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS: PINR PREL MARR MOPS IZ AM
SUBJECT: ARMENIA ON POST-2008 PLANS IN IRAQ (C-DI7-02264)

REF: A. STATE 9941

B. STATE 4865

C. 2006 YEREVAN 1251 DTG 170618Z OCT 07

Classified By: CDA JOSEPH PENNINGTON, REASONS 1.4 B/D.


1. (S) In response to reftels, the Defense Attache (DATT) and
two PolOffs met February 5 with Armen Yedigarian, Head of the
Department of Arms Control and International Security at the
Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inquire about GOAM
intentions in Iraq after the eventual expiration of the
Chapter VII UNSC resolution in December, 2008.


2. (S) Yedigarian, who served in Washington as Deputy Chief
of Mission for five years in the first half of the decade,
and who was intimately involved in 2003-04 negotiations to
contribute Armenian forces to the MNF-I, said the GOAM was
taking a wait-and-see approach before deciding on any future
steps.


3. (S) Yedigarian said that the process for extending
Armenian troop contributions in Iraq after the expiration of
the UNSC resolution at the end of the year, or changing their
composition, ultimately depended on decisions that will be
made at the government's highest levels, in this case
Armenia's next President and Prime Minister. (NOTE: Armenia
chooses a new president on February 19, 2008. The President
then appoints the Prime Minister based on the composition of
political parties in the country's unicameral parliament.
END NOTE.) Referring to the December, 2007 extension of
Armenian forces in the MNF-I through the end of 2008,
Yedigarian characterized the legislative process as fairly
pro-forma, but lengthy (May-December time frame),once the
President and Prime Minister provide their go-ahead. He said
the MOD and the parliament take their cues from the two
leaders on such politically-sensitive issues, and this would
continue to be the case in the future. He also pointedly
stressed that even if there were a change in the composition
of Armenian troops in Iraq in the future, it definitely would

not involve a decrease in troop numbers.


4. (S) Yedigarian said he did not see any drastic changes on
the horizon in the GOAM's thinking on supporting the MNF-I,
or other international peacekeeping operations around the
world for that matter (ie, Kosovo). He noted that Armenia is
even considering contributing troops to Afghanistan in the
future. He stated that Armenia needed to be involved in such
international efforts, that participation in them supported
its international image, provided experience to Armenian
forces, and enhanced the Armenian military's interoperability
with foreign militaries. He noted that Armenia had already
started the process to upgrade its peacekeeping forces from a
battalion-sized element to a brigade-sized element. The
second peacekeeping battalion began its manning and equipping
at the end of 2007. In further support of his claim that
Armenia increasingly favored participation in peacekeeping
operations, he quoted PM Sargsian's oft-stated line that
"Armenia must not only be a consumer of international
security, but a producer as well."


5. (S) Yedigarian said the GOAM would watch how the USG
conducts its negotiations for its post-2008 defense
relationship with Iraq before it declared its position on a
potential third-party defense cooperation agreement (DCA)
that would tie Armenia into a bilateral US-Iraq DCA. In a
veiled reference to the approaching US presidential election,
Yedigarian hypothetically stressed that Armenia would want to
avoid a potential scenario where it might be "marooned" in
Iraq if the US were ever to abruptly change gears on Iraq
policy and its military presence there.


6. (S) DATT and PolOffs asked whether Armenia's February 19
presidential election could have a possible impact on GOAM
thinking vis-a-vis its troop contributions to the MFN-I.
Yedigarian said that it is conceivable that policy could be
changed in the event that an opposition candidate wins the
presidency. He noted that there is still a part of the
Armenian public that wonders why it is in Armenia's interest
to send troops to Iraq. He said so far two factors have
contributed to tamping down any public opposition to the
MNF-I, those being a) no Armenian casualties to date, with
the exception of a serviceman who lost his leg; and b) no
religion-hued backlash in Iraq (and by extension, the rest of
the Arab world) against ethnic Armenians living in the Middle
East.


7. (S) On possible USG incentives to support Armenian troops
in post-2008 Iraq, Yedigarian said the GOAM appreciated all
of the technical and logistical support that Armenian forces
had received from the United States in Iraq, and hoped it
would continue as long as Armenian forces played a role in
the MNF-I.


8. (S) COMMENT: Current prime minister (and long-time
defense minister) Serzh Sargsian is the front-runner for the
presidency. Should he win, as expected, we would expect him
to deliver on his promise (Ref C) to double Armenia's Iraq
contingent after the elections. However, should the
elections prove messy -- for example, if Sargsian wins in a
way that provokes sharp criticisms from the USG and
international community -- it is possible he would retaliate
by ending Armenia's Iraq deployment. Should, against all
odds, a rival candidate win the presidency, it is an open
question whether the new president would support continued
deployment there. The detailed mechanics and legal
technicalities of the deployment are considerably less
important than the views of the political leadership. If
there is a high-level political will to continue Armenia's
Iraq deployment, they will not let technical details stand in
the way.
PENNINGTON