DASHNAK LEADERS TELL AMBASSADOR VIEWS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 001013

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PBTS CVIS KIRF KDEM TU RU GG
AJ, AM
SUBJECT: DASHNAK LEADERS TELL AMBASSADOR VIEWS ON
GEORGIAN-ARMENIANS, TURKEY, RUSSIA

REF: YEREVAN 629

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Classified By: AMB Marie Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Top Dashnaksutyun party leaders called on the
Ambassador to broaden their contacts with USG. The Dashnaks
fretted about the rights and welfare of Georgia's Armenian
minority, which they portrayed as a dangerous crisis with the
potential to deteriorate into irredentist conflict. They
"favored" normalized relations with Turkey, but at the same
time made clear their deep skepticism, unwillingness to
de-emphasize calls for "genocide" recognition, or to disavow
future territorial claims against Turkey. They contended
that U.S. recognition of "Armenian genocide" would galvanize
Turkey to face its history, and that relations among all
three countries -- U.S., Turkey, and Armenia -- would shortly
emerge the stronger for that.


2. (C) The Ambassador rebutted the latter claim with our
assessment that Turkey would most likely respond badly to
such a U.S. proclamation, and she urged that Armenia should
not miss the historic opportunity we now have to achieve
normalization and open borders with Turkey. The senior
Dashnaks argued that Russia and Turkey were moving toward a
common agenda, which is dangerous for Armenia and counter to
U.S. interests. The party's ranking leader, Hrant Markarian,
also complained about his U.S. visa ineligibility, portraying
it unfair and an impediment to the party's relations with the
United States. END SUMMARY

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MEET THE DASHNAKS
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3. (C) Senior Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, often
known simply as Dashnaksutyun, the Armenian word for
Federation) leaders Hrant Markarian, Vahan Hovhanissian,
Hrayr Karapetian, and Giro Manoyan called on the Ambassador
December 11 at their request. The ARF has a complex and
distributed leadership structure. However, ARF "Bureau"
chairman Hrant Markarian -- who has something of a sinister
reputation in Armenia -- is widely understood to be the most
senior leader and was treated as the senior member by his
colleagues. Deputy Parliament Speaker Hrayr Karapetian has a
higher-ranking title in the National Assembly than his
colleague and predecessor in the deputy speakership, but ARF
Parliamentary Faction Leader Vahan Hovhanissian is the
higher-profile public figure. Canadian-Armenian Giro Manoyan
is the "International Secretary" of the ARF's ruling
"Bureau," which means he is responsible for coordinating with
the worldwide ARF movement, which they tell us has affiliate
organizations in 30 countries representing Armenian Diaspora
communities.


4. (C) The Ambassador previously had called on Vahan
Hovhanissian at the National Assembly, but we were given to
understand that Markarian wanted to meet the Ambassador for
himself. Not able to attend the December 11 meeting, due to
foreign travel, was the remaining top-ranking Dashnak Armen
Rustamian, who chairs the Foreign Relations Committee in
parliament and is also the ARF's official delegate on the
governing coalition council.

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DASHNAK VIEWS ON TURKEY -- WORRISOME MISCONCEPTIONS
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5. (C) The largest part of the conversation dwelt on
Turkey, and prospects for Armenian rapprochement with Ankara.
The senior ARF leaders expressed their willingness -- indeed
desire -- to normalize relations with Turkey and achieve an
open border. However, they were quite clear that they were
not prepared to do so at the expense of any soft-pedaling of
Armenia's insistence on Turkish admission of guilt for the
Armenian massacres and acceptance that those events
constituted a "genocide." Markarian pointed out that while
it would benefit Armenia to have an open border with Turkey,
the last 15 years have shown that Armenia can survive without
this -- and if need be could do so "for another 300-400
years."


6. (C) Markarian said that Turkey has three "unacceptable"
pre-conditions to normalization: 1) Armenia's declaration
that it has no territorial claims on Turkish land, 2) that
Armenia stop pursuing worldwide recognition of the "Armenian
Genocide," and 3) holding the Turkish-Armenian relationship
hostage to a pro-Azerbaijani settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Markarian called the first point
"humiliating to Armenia's national dignity." He said that
the Government of Armenia has nothing on its agenda about

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claims on Turkish land. However, he went on to declare that,
"We cannot interfere with the rights of future generations"
to make territorial claims against Turkey.


7. (C) He argued that Turkish proposals for any kind of
historical commission to examine the genocide was an "evil,
sneaky" effort, aimed at luring Armenia into an endless,
fruitless discussion, and thereby to divert the international
community from recognizing the genocide. Markarian and his
colleagues dismissed the suggestion that Turkish leaders
might honestly lack accurate knowledge of the "genocide"
history, and that a commission could help lead to Turkish
understanding and eventual acceptance. Asserting that PM
Erdogan himself is a "Hamshen" (an Armenian forcibly
converted to Islam in the 17th Century, according to their
telling),our interlocutors insisted it was impossible that
GOT leaders did not know the true facts of the Armenian
massacres.


8. (C) Markarian said that the best way forward would be for
PM Erdogan and the Turkish government simply to admit the
"genocide" and let the healing begin. He argued that a U.S.
declaration that the 1915 massacres constituted genocide
would "help Turkey to speak openly about this" and face their
past. He expressed great confidence that this would be a
quick and simple solution to detoxifying almost 100 years of
bad blood between Turkey and Armenia. Manoyan chimed in that
Armenians will never back away from demands that Turkey
acknowledge its "genocide" guilt. Hovhanissian said he was
completely convinced that nothing bad could come of U.S.
"genocide" recognition. He compared it to asking Jews to
concede that the Holocaust might not have actually happened.
It was simply unacceptable.


9. (C) Markarian asserted that the issue unites all
Armenians, pointing out that -- with no real organization or
promotion by anyone -- each April 24 Remembrance Day hundreds
of thousands of Armenians flock to the Armenian Genocide
Memorial to lay flowers. The Ambassador relayed the
assessment of U.S. experts on Turkey, who were convinced that
if the U.S. were publicly to label the events "genocide" it
would lead to a major, long-lasting rupture in U.S.-Turkish
relations, as well as take any hope of Turkish-Armenian
rapprochement off the table for the foreseeable future. The
Dashnaks clung tenaciously to their view that "genocide"
recognition would solve everything in a quick, easy stroke.

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JAVAKHETIA AND GEORGIA'S ARMENIAN MINORITY
--------------


10. (C) Markarian asserted that tensions are growing in
Georgia's ethnic-Armenian province of Javakhetia and with
Georgia's Armenian minority generally. He said that if steps
were not taken, the region "risks an explosion" and suggested
it could "become like South Ossetia or Abkhazia. He also
suggested that Russia could exploit grievances of the
Armenian minority to drive a wedge between Georgian-Armenians
and the Georgian government, and thereby expand its
destabilizing influence in Georgia.


11. (C) Markarian complained about a reputed Georgian law
requiring all state officials -- including local government
officials -- to be fluent Georgian speakers. Noting that
Javakheti-Armenians tend to speak Armenian as a first
language and Russian as a second, and most are not able to
speak Georgian, he commented that the effect is to impose
what amounts to a colonial government on the Armenian
minority population. Georgian officials are sent from
Tbilisi to administer local government structures in the
Armenian-majority districts. He also mentioned that the
Armenian population is twice as poor as other rural
Georgians, and requested that some Georgian supplemental
funds be spent in Javakhetia to help the local population.
Markarian said that the ARF wants badly to avoid any blow-up
in Javakhetia, because this would be harmful to the critical
relationship between the two countries. (NOTE: Reftel
suggests a different possible ARF agenda for Javakhetia,
which is unconfirmed, but bears watching. END NOTE.)

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RUSSIA'S GEOPOLITICAL GAME
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12. (C) Markarian found it worrisome that Russia is now
"pressuring" Armenia toward rapprochement with Turkey.
Markarian saw this as part of a Russian strategy to establish
with Turkey a joint dominance over the Black Sea region. He
said "it is always painful for Armenia when Turkey and Russia
make deals together, and this is what we see happening

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today." Markarian said it was "obvious" that Moscow is in a
"pro-Turkish mood." As evidence, he cited that Russian
newspapers had refused to publish a recent open letter on
Turkey by Armenian intellectuals. Manoyan added that Russian
authorities had opposed plans by Russian-Armenians to
organize a conference in Moscow in honor of the 60th
anniversary of the international convention on genocide.


13. (C) In a difficult-to-follow argumentation, Markarian
asserted that U.S. failure to recognize the "Armenian
Genocide" pushed Turkey into Russia's arms, whereas U.S.
recognition would strengthen U.S.-Turkish relations. The
U.S. must protect its own interests and presence in the
region by acknowledging "genocide" and by "promoting but not
forcing" reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey.
(COMMENT: The ARF tends to be more Russophobic than is the
norm in Armenia. Many of its senior leadership are former
Diasporan Armenians who have re-settled in Armenia in the
last 20 years, who did not grow up as part of the Soviet
Union and lack the Soviet cultural ties common to many
Armenians. END COMMENT.)

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OF A VISA AND DASHNAK-U.S. RELATIONS
--------------


14. (C) Markarian had opened the meeting with a plea for
"better relations" between the USG and the worldwide
Dashnaksutyun organization. The Ambassador was puzzled by
this, having twice met senior ARF leaders during her short
tenure in Yerevan to date. Markarian continued to argue
somewhat opaquely for "stronger, more direct relations"
between the ARF Bureau and Washington. This segued into his
complaint that he was unable to get a U.S. visa. He urged
that this be corrected. (NOTE: Markarian has a "00" hit in
the visa lookout system. END NOTE.) Markarian moved on to
the Turkey topic, obviating the need to respond directly to
his visa complaint.

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COMMENT
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15. (C) This meeting showed that ARF party doctrines remain
in play. The party shows an almost willful refusal to
understand the Turkish point of view, or the view of many of
their fellow Armenians who are longing for an open border,
normal relations with Turkey and the benefits both would
bring. The ARF is dogmatically convinced that the key to
unlock everything good is simply to keep demanding "genocide"
recognition until they achieve this goal. More worrisome was
the ARF leaders' comparison of Javakhetia to South Ossetia
and Abkhazia.

YOVANOVITCH