CAMEROON: GOV'T OFFICIALS ON IMPENDING BAKASSI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YAOUNDE 000762

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR AF/C, AF/W AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: CM EAID MOPS NI PBTS PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SOCI MASS
SUBJECT: CAMEROON: GOV'T OFFICIALS ON IMPENDING BAKASSI
HANDOVER

Classified By: Pol/Econ Officer Linnisa Wahid for reasons 1.4 b&d


1. (C) Summary. The Government of Cameroon (GRC) is not
well-positioned to understand or deal with on-going violence
in Bakassi and likely will not be so until well after the
planned August 14 handover, according to meetings the
Ambassador had with GRC officials and others during the week
of July 23. On July 23 and 25, the Ambassador held a series
of discussions about Bakassi with Nigerian High Commissioner
Philip Ali Douada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Henri
Eyebe Ayissi and the Secretary General at the Presidency,
Laurent Esso. Esso argued that it was the Government of
Nigeria's (GON) responsibility to secure Bakassi until the
August 14 handover to Cameroon. After the handover, Esso
said, President Paul Biya will install five new sub-governors
in Bakassi and the GRC would be in a better position to
develop a solution to the insecurity. Ayissi appealed to the
Ambassador for development and intelligence assistance, a
message that was delivered to other COMs in a series of
highly publicized meetings. Douada stressed the need for a
delicate approach to Bakassi, while expressing fear that the
GRC would use a heavy hand. Despite the approaching August 14
handover, none of the officials knew how the handover would
take place. Given the escalation in attacks against the GRC
military and the subsequent GRC counter-offensive, we
anticipate a stronger response from the GRC leading up to and
after August 14, making continued USG engagement--on mil-mil
training and in fostering GRC-GON communication--all the more
important. End Summary.


2. (C) On July 25, Ambassador called on the Secretary
General at the Presidency Laurent Esso, who told the
Ambassador that the Bakassi problem was "simple:" the
Greentree Agreement gave the GON full latitude to organize
their departure and provide security in Bakassi. The
Cameroonian army had no access to the zone, and so could not
effectively address the insecurity. After the formal
transfer, President Biya planned to appoint five new prefets
(sub regional authorities) in Bakassi after which the GRC
would determine the best course of action against the
pirates.


3. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the GRC was planning to
send the highly trained and equipped Battalion
d,Intervention Rapide (BIR) to stabilize Bakassi. Esso
evaded the question, repeating that the security response
would depend on the nature of the problem, which could not be
determined until after the installation of the prefets. The
situation in Bakassi is new, he added, as there had never
been a military intervention in the region. However, Esso
said there are "professionals to battle with the pirates".

August 14 Handover
--------------


4. (C) Esso stated that the GON had two years since the
signing of the Greentree Agreement to secure Bakassi, but
they did not. He said that the GON was pushing for the
August 14 handover to occur in either in Ikang or Abuja,
Nigeria because the GON said they could not secure Bakassi.
Esso added that the GON Minister of Justice would soon visit
Cameroon to discuss the modalities of the August 14 handover
ceremony.

International Community
--------------


5. (C) Esso told the Ambassador that as witnesses to the
Greentree Agreement, the USG, Germany, France and the UK had
an obligation to ensure that the agreement was implemented.
He suggested that the USG pressure the GON to pay attention
to the Bakassi problem. The GON needs to "manifest its
political will", Esso argued. The USG should stress to the
GON, particularly the National Assembly, that the
International Court of Justice decision was clear: Bakassi
must return to Cameroon. He stressed that neighboring
countries must cooperate to secure the area and cited the
"Gulf of Guinea Commission" which was established to examine
the problem of security. Esso said that the GRC was ready to
join the Commission, but that the GON would not agree to the
treaty because it does not want to defer to the ICJ in cases
of disputes. In terms of joint patrols between the GON and
the GRC, Esso said that if the GON wanted to cooperate,
Cameroon would be willing to go along. He added that the

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situation in Bakassi had implications for the operations of
the Douala port, which has major economic implications for
Cameroon and others in the region.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Calls in Ambassador
-------------- --


6. (C) On July 25, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Henri
Eyebi Ayissi convoked the Ambassador with the purpose of
"giving the latest information to the international
community" on Bakassi, one of a series of highly publicized
meetings with members of the diplomatic corps. Ayissi said
the GRC appreciated the support of the countries who
witnessed the Greentree Agreement. He said there was a
strong public commitment by the GON and the GRC to the
peaceful transfer of Bakassi, but suggested that the
situation on the ground did not mirror public commitments.
He requested that the USG publicly condemn the attacks and
provide intelligence and development assistance. Ayissi
added that the GRC had taken the needs of Bakassi into
account in the FY09 budgeting process.

Ambassador meets with Nigerian High Commissioner
-------------- ---


7. (C) On July 23, the Ambassador called on Nigerian High
Commissioner Philip Ali Douada, who said he still did not
have details of the handover ceremony. He opined that the
handover ceremony could occur in Calabar or Atabong in
Nigeria and promised to share more information within the
next two weeks.


8. (C) Douada said that the internal debate in Nigeria was
about whether the National Assembly had ratified the
Greentree Agreement. He added that there was evidence that
the Agreement had been tabled in the Assembly and that due to
the Assembly's inaction the agreement had not been ratified.
Douada stated that the new National Assembly was discussing
the Greentree Agreement in order to appear relevant to their
constituents.


9. (C) Douda said he had assured Nigerian leaders in Cameroon
that Nigerians in the region would not see any immediate
changes, such as an influx of Cameroonians, after the
handover. Douada cautioned that that the GRC military needed
to be careful not to harass the people in Bakassi, but
predicted that the GRC would intentionally send non-English
speaking gendarmes to English-speaking Bakassi and use the
language barrier as an excuse for the increased harassment of
the population. In response to whether there was connection
with the Niger Delta rebels and the Niger Delta Defense and
Security Council (NDDSC),which has claimed responsibility
for the Bakassi attacks, Douada said the forces were separate
and in competition with one another. He added that the Niger
Delta rebels had no reason to be in Bakassi because the Niger
Delta was more financially rewarding. In response to
Ambassador's question about joint GON-GRC security patrols,
Douada said a Joint Commission (set up before the 2002 ICJ
ruling) that was supposed to work on joint security patrols
in the Gulf of Guinea had not continued. He added that the
GON and the GRC were attempting to re-implement the
Commission.

Comment: USG Engagement All the More Important
-------------- --


10. (C) The planning for the August 14 handover ceremony
appears to be stalled until the arrival of the Nigerian
representative. At this point, however, it looks unlikely
that the ceremony will be held in Bakassi due to security
concerns. With the planned appointment of five new prefets,
it appears the GRC will make a significant effort to
administer the region. If the GRC does move ahead with
reported plans to train a new Battalion d,Intervention
Rapide (BIR) for Bakassi within the next year, it will be a
strong signal of the GRC's determination to secure the
region. But the GRC will be unable to secure the region
without cooperation and support from the GON and the
international community. As a witness to the Greentree
Agreement, the USG should encourage and facilitate increased
cooperation between the GON and GRC. Military training is
especially important because gendarmes, not the BIR, are the
first armed forces on the ground in Bakassi. The people of
Bakassi and the international community will closely monitor

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their actions. If the military in Bakassi uses a too heavy
hand it could spell a long, protracted conflict with the
people and the armed elements, bringing more instability to
Cameroon. End comment.
GARVEY