THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: TRACING CAMEROON'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 YAOUNDE 000237

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA ACTION OFFICERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR CM
SUBJECT: THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: TRACING CAMEROON'S
POLITICAL UNDERCURRENTS

REF: A. YAOUNDE 211 AND PREVIOUS

B. 07 YAOUNDE 1315

C. 07 YAOUNDE 1236

D. 07 YAOUNDE 1069

E. IIR 6 825 0027 08

Classified By: Poloff Tad Brown for Reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S) Summary. President Biya has reason to believe that
powerful political barons worked to manipulate the
population's genuine political-economic frustrations in order
to cultivate instability in more than 30 Cameroonian cities
during the week of February 25 (ref a). Amid the conflicting
accounts of which ministers are conspirators or loyalists and
reports of mysterious white vans distributing motivational
cash to rioters, there is an element of truth: the apparent
monolith that rules Cameroon--the cabinet, the ruling party
and even Biya's Beti ethnic group--is in fact cleaved by
shadowy and shifting political networks, competing subtly but
meaningfully, vying for advantage in the contest to replace
or succeed Biya. These political "tectonic plates" are too
obscure to ever pin down definitively, but this cable seeks
to outline what we perceive to be their contours, to help
policy-makers understand and react to the movements behind
Cameroon's political evolution. End summary.


2. (S) Post conceives of two large groupings of prominent
Cameroonians actively seeking to gain the upper-hand in
determining the course of post-Biya Cameroon, to which we
have given in-house euphemisms: the Elders and the Upstarts.
Additionally, we perceive that many senior figures are
unaffiliated, either because of their unwavering loyalty to
President Biya or because they are uninvolved in the
politicking, more interested in pursuing their personal
enrichment or doing their jobs. We call these latter two
groups the Faithful and the Unaffiliated.

The Elders
==========


3. (S) The "Elders" group is characterized by senior
national leaders, many of whom have participated in governing
Cameroon since the Ahidjo era, who are planning for the
post-Biya era but not seeking to rush events. Perhaps more
than anything, the overarching uniting goal for the Elders is
their abhorrence for the more radical and power-hungry nature
of the Upstarts. The Elders are more legalistic, with a
greater understanding of the responsibilities of governing
and statesmanship. They privilege stability and
predictability, would be content to follow Biya's timeline,
and likely seek to gain his blessing to succeed him. Vice
Prime Minister and Minister for Justice Amadou Ali is the
most prominent member of the group and most likely candidate
for succession, and Ali's pursuit of corrupt officials and
businessmen ("Ali's list," ref c) was the first indication of
the fault lines within Cameroon's ruling circles. We
perceive that Philomen Yang, Assistant Secretary General at
the Presidency, is part of this group (and would be a likely
successor to Inoni if he is dismissed). We believe that two
previous Prime Ministers (and Anglophones),Simon Achidi Achu
and Peter Mafany Musonge, ascribe to the Elders. Other
likely members include: General Benoit Emane Asso'o
(currently hospitalized in South Africa) and Rene Claude
Meka, the Chef d'Etat Major of the Armed Forces, both of whom
are believed to disdain Minister of Defense Ze Meka. We
believe that the Elders' supporters in the armed forces
include the Chief of Staff at the Gendarmerie Oumarou Djam
Yaya, a Northerner.

The Upstarts
============


4. (S) Although they also include a number of government
veterans, the Upstarts is a grouping of powerful figures who
are characterized by their relative youth, their spectacular
corruption, and their impatience with Biya's lengthening
rule. This group is more comfortable with the idea of
forcing Biya's hand (and perhaps him from the scene) in order
to assure their ascendancy. We believe this group is the
reality behind what the Cameroonian press has identified (but
never with credible specificity) as a clique of officials
seeking to prepare for post-Biya that it calls G11
(pronounced "Jay Onze," in reference to 2011, the year when
this generation hopes to take power).


5. (S) Former Minister of Finance Akame Mfoumou, who was
quickly dismissed following too much public speculation that
he was Biya's chosen successor, is a likely eminence grise of
the group since a number of its supposed members, especially

YAOUNDE 00000237 002 OF 004


former Minister of Finance and corruption kingpin Polycarpe
Abah Abah, rose to power under his patronage. The Upstarts
include at least one powerful member of the current cabinet:
Minister of Defense Remy Ze Meka. Biya dismissed a
substantial portion of the Upstarts that were in his previous
cabinet in the September 2007 reshuffle, including: former
Finance Minister Polycarpe Abah Abah, former Minister of
Finance and Secretary General at the Presidency Jean Marie
Atangana Mebara, former Minister of Health Urbain Olanguena
Awono, and former Minister of Communication Gervais Mendo Ze.


6. (S) The Upstarts include the preponderance of powerful
Beti figures, evincing their fear that Biya will be forced to
pass the mantle to a non-Beti successor. General Roland
Mambou Deffo, the head of Internal Security at the
Gendarmerie in the Ministry of Defense and an ethnic
Bamileke, is believed to align himself with the Upstarts.
There are tantalizing connections between Yves Michel Fotso,
the son of self-made billionaire Victor Fotso and current
head of the Commercial Bank of Cameroon (CBC) empire, and
leading members of the Upstarts, including Abah Abah (who ran
at least two of his corrupt operations through CBC banks) and
Ze Meka, who has been seen socializing with Fotso. The
Upstarts, and Ze Meka in particular, are said to be behind
the October 2007 rumors of a planned coup (ref b),which
resulted in the jailing of at least a dozen military
officials of northern origin. Additionally, Ze Meka is said
to have been remarkably unresponsive to Biya's orders to
reestablish stability in the face of violent unrest during
the week of February 25, leading many to speculate that he or
his allies played a role in fomenting the troubles (ref e).

The Faithful
============


7. (S) In some ways the distinction between the Faithful
and the Elders may be artificial, but we perceive that some
officials have positioned themselves so loyally to Biya that
they would not entertain the thought of participating in
post-Biya planning. The Secretary General at the Presidency,
Laurent Esso, seems to epitomize this position. We believe
he is thoroughly corrupt, relatively anti-American and
pro-French, and essentially conservative. As a trained
engineer (in petroleum engineering) who was promoted through
the bureaucratic ranks, however, Esso appears to be
remarkably apolitical, perhaps explaining why Biya brought
him to the Presidency in the September 2007 cabinet shuffle.
Ama Tutu Muna, the Minister of Culture and a close Embassy
contact, has proven herself to be a faithful and unapologetic
admirer of President Biya. Although from a prestigious and
historically political family, Ama Muna herself came to
politics from the private sector. In a recent conversation
with the Ambassador, she praised Esso while damning the lead
members of the Upstarts. We could conceive of Ama Muna
joining the Elders, except that her praise for Esso does not
jibe with comments from Ali's counterparts who castigate
Esso, and she seems dispositionally incapable of calculating
post-Biya. Secretary General of the ruling Cameroon People's
Democratic Movement (CPDM) Rene Sadi is regularly mentioned
as one of Biya's most trusted advisors. Biya dismissed
speculation that Sadi was his chosen successor in a past
conversation with the Ambassador, but Sadi is likely to be
closer to Biya than to any of the members of the competing
cliques. Ambassador Martin Belinga Eboutou, recently brought
back from the UN to be a Special Advisor at the Presidency,
is also perceived to have Biya's trust. Absent from the
scene for so long, Belinga is likely to be more loyal to Biya
than to any competing networks and is, perhaps, one of Biya's
most trusted advisors at this moment. Another Presidential
advisor, Foumane Akame, the older brother to Akame Mfoumou
(the Upstarts' eminence grise) is thought to be faithful to
Biya and in open disagreement with his younger brother's
plotting.

The Unaligned
=============


8. (C) We do not believe that all senior officials are
engaged in this struggle: some are too professional, focused
on fulfilling their mandates, or corrupt, focused on stealing
what they can in the short term, to engage in the underlying
political battles. Freshly arrived from working with the IMF
in Washington, D.C., Finance Minister Essimi Menye was
recruited for his qualifications and competency more than his
partisanship or loyalty. Essimi Menye told the Ambassador
that he supported Biya's efforts to change the constitution
in hopes that it would tamp down the jockeying for succession
that Essimi Menye regarded as a distraction from more
important business. Similarly, Fuh Calistus Gentry,

YAOUNDE 00000237 003 OF 004


Secretary of State at Ministry of Mines, was brought in the

SIPDIS
class of September 2007 ministers for his technical
expertise. (Fuh has a distinguished career in the private
mining sector.) Fuh is from the North West Province and
likely has higher political ambitions, but has not yet risen
to the level where he would be recruited by one of the
competing camps.

What About These Guys?
======================


9. (S) Jean Baptiste Bokam, Secretary of State at the
Ministry of Defense for the Gendarmerie: The fact that he
serves with Ze Meka in the Ministry of Defense (a sensitive
ministry, where Biya is known to place individuals who will
balance, not collude with, each other) argues that Bokam is
not a member of the Upstarts, but his presence on Ali's
"list" suggests that he is not in Ali's camp either. He is
believed to be corrupt and ruthless (according to comments by
Cameroon's financial crimes watchdog). His status as a rare
East Province native with national power may lead him to be
among the faithful, remaining loyal to Biya until the
President has indicated his anointed next steps.


10. (S) Ephraim Inoni, Prime Minister: Inoni is generally
perceived to be more of a technocrat than a politician, but
the up-tick in reports of his supposed corruption suggests
that he is becoming an increasingly polarizing figure.
Inoni's feud with Abah Abah was personal and passionate, and
sources report that Ali kept Inoni off the "list of
billionaires" because Ali "is friends" with Inoni (who had
worked for Ali at the Presidency). Growing rumors that Inoni
will be dismissed in the next cabinet shuffle, however, may
force Inoni to ally (if he has not already) with whomever he
feels will best protect his future prospects.


11. (S) Hamidou Yaya Marafa, Minister of Territorial
Administration and Decentralization: Marafa previously
confided to the Embassy his ambitions to become President,
but it is difficult to know where his affiliations lie in
this fight. Marafa was reportedly furious that Ali included
him on the list of officials to be investigated, and Ali
specifically mentioned Marafa as a target of interest in a
private conversation with Emboffs. (Ali lumped Marafa in in
the same group as Abah Abah, Mebara, Mendo Ze, and Olanguena
(ref d).) Nevertheless, we are reluctant to include Marafa
among the Upstarts because he seems unlikely to align himself
with those more radical and self-serving agitators, and his
status as a northerner with national ambitions (something
anathema to the Beti, who feel that a President from the
North will seek revenge against the Beti for the aftermath of
the 1984 coup),makes him all the less likely to associate
with the Beti-dominated Upstarts.


12. (C) A. E. Mebe Ngo'o, General Delegate for National
Security (DGSN): There is some debate as to whether Mebe
Ngo'o and Abah Abah (who share a hometown, Zoetele, in the
Beti homeland) are thick as thieves or at knives drawn.
Press reports shedding light on their efforts to discredit
each other and sources in Zoetele tell us that Mebe Ngo'o
argued for Abah Abah's dismissal from the cabinet, meaning
that Mebe Ngo'o is unlikely to associate himself with the
Upstarts. As a Beti, however, Mebe Ngo'o is unlikely to team
up with the Elders, who have a Northerner, Ali, as a leading
contender for national leadership.


13. (C) Gregoire Owona: Some sources place Owona with the
Upstarts, and Ali included Owona on his list, suggesting
Owona does not enjoy Ali's support. Owona's reputation as
being relatively reform-minded and his position as they point
person for Biya's agenda to reform the constitution, however,
make it difficult for us to place him with the rebellious
Upstarts.

Location, Location, Location (=Ethnicity)
=========================================


14. (C) Despite Cameroonians' proud boast that their
country is too ethnically diverse to suffer from tribal
politicking on a national scale, the fact is that ethnicity
plays a central role in these power struggles. One analysis
holds that Cameroon's 200 ethnic groups can actually be
boiled down to three that matter: the Beti-Bulu (in the
Center and South Provinces; they are not numerous, but are
powerful and rich beyond proportion through Biya's rule); the
Northerners (who are numerous, relatively but not totally
united, and who have experience ruling the country) and the
Bamileke (who wield little apparent political power but are
believed to control the nation's economy). Around these

YAOUNDE 00000237 004 OF 004


three groups, this theory holds, the smaller ethnic groups
(e.g., the Bassa outside of Douala, the Easterners, the
Anglophones) will align themselves to one of the emerging
blocks, likely following the most persuasive national member
of their own group. Above all else, leading members of the
Beti elite are said to agree that a Northerner can not be
allowed to succeed Biya, for fear that it would unleash
vengeance-seeking for the post-1984 violence and prosecution
and persecution of the Betis' corrupt excesses.

Where is the USG Interest?
==========================


15. (S) Any such effort to divine the intentions of
Cameroon's most astute political operators is bound to raise
as many questions as it answers; our fundamental purpose is
to sketch a construct to help policy-makers navigate the
turbulent waters of Cameroon's power politics. Biya's next
cabinet shuffle will likely be decisive, and there are some
indications to suggest that he is already moving to weaken
the Upstarts: the September 7 shuffle dismissed many of them,
and RUMINT indicates Biya is aware of and angered by Ze
Meka's machinations. This is likely good news for Cameroon
and American interests, as Ze Meka, Abah Abah and their ilk
had already proven their reckless willingness to ransack the
treasury and jeopardize the nation's security apparatus in
pursuit of their personal agendas. Nevertheless, we must not
confuse the Elders' conservatism for enlightenment or
uprightness. In the long term, our interest is to move this
political wrangling into the public sphere, where the
Cameroonian polity can choose the leadership of their
country. In the short term, our interest is to strengthen
those who are most likely to shepherd Cameroon towards a more
stable but also more democratic and prosperous future.
GARVEY