CAMEROON: STRIKES AND DEMONSTRATIONS...WHAT NOW?

C O N F I D E N T I A L YAOUNDE 000211

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR AFRICA ACTION OFFICER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM PREL MARR ECON ELAB CM
SUBJECT: CAMEROON: STRIKES AND DEMONSTRATIONS...WHAT NOW?

REF: YAOUNDE 193

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Scott Ticknor for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. On February 25-27, Cameroon experienced its
worst period of violence since the early 1990s. Violent
protests and looting left major property damage and 16-17
dead (according to government estimates; nonofficial
estimates are much higher). The causes were a mix of
political and economic factors, including rising fuel and
other commodity prices, the killing of two youths in a
political demonstration, the government closure of a popular
TV station, the President's plans to change the constitution,
and internal power struggles. The GRC quelled the violence
with a strong military presence and a crackdown on opposition
voices and those the government considered to be potential
troublemakers. A tense calm has been restored but unless the
government (GRC) takes steps to address some of the people's
grievances, demonstrations could reignite. The events of
last week are a reminder of many of the underlying sources of
potential instability in Cameroon. End Summary.


Three Days That Shook A Nation
--------------


2. (U) The situation in Cameroon began deteriorating on
February 23 after Social Democratic Front (SDF, the main
opposition party) parliamentarian Jean Michel Nintheu
attempted to demonstrate in Douala against a proposed
constitutional amendment to remove presidential term limits.
According to witnesses, gendarmes were waiting for Nintheu at
the site of the demonstration and he canceled the protest
because he did not have enough demonstrators. In an effort
to intimidate the population, police and gendarmes used water
cannons and tear gas in the surrounding neighborhood. The
population, already incensed by the GRC closure of a popular
independent TV station, left their homes and surrounded the
gendarmes. The security forces responded forcefully, in the
process killing two youths.


3. (U) On February 3, the taxi and transport unions had
announced that they would strike on February 25 to oppose a
20 FCFA (4 US cent) increase in gasoline prices. Fueled by
the taxi strike and outrage over the deaths of the two youths
at the protest in Douala, the port city erupted into violence
on February 25. The same day all major cities in Cameroon,
with the exception of those in the Grand North and East,
observed the taxi strike. The capitals of the West, North
West, South West and Center Provinces (including Yaounde)
subsequently experienced violence and looting. Late on
February 26, the taxi and transport unions signed an
agreement with the GRC to reduce gas by 6 FCFA (1 US Cent)
and end the strike.


4. (SBU) Despite the union agreement, most taxi drivers and
transporters continued their strike. On February 27
President Biya addressed the nation with an uncompromising
speech (reftel). Many Cameroonians were incensed by the
President's harsh tone and the lack of any concessions.
However, the speech, backed up with a heavy security force
presence on the streets, had the immediate effect of quelling
the demonstrations and violence. The country has since
returned to a tense calm. The local media puts the death
toll from last week's violence at around 20; a senior
government official told us it was 16 or 17, with some killed
by security forces and some otherwise killed in the course of
the riots. Radio France International reported over 100
deaths. We have not been able confirm any of these figures.

Why the Riots Happened Now
--------------


5. (C) The GRC was surprised by the violence that accompanied
the taxi/transporter strike. Unlike previous strikes, there
appeared to be no government infiltration in the ranks and
the strike was effective. This type of violence had not been
seen since the turbulent 1990's and had never before been
seen in Yaounde. Some senior government contacts are
convinced that at the heart of the unrest was an ongoing
high-stakes power struggle, with elements of the government
and some ousted senior officials (such as former Finance and
Economy Minister Polycarpe Abah Abah) trying to sow
instability and undermine the President. As evidence, they
argue that rioters received pay-offs, that the riots were
limited to certain regions of the country (five of ten
provinces and only certain districts within each affected
province),and that the violence of the past week appeared
unusually well coordinated. There is certain paranoia at top
levels of government and one senior presidential aide told
Pol/Econ Chief he did not know who was behind the events but
was sure the instigators did not come from within the
government. There are definite signs of internal power
jockeying and we do not discount this perspective, conveyed
to us by a wide range of top GRC contacts over the past few
days.


6. (C) The power struggle within the government took
advantage of a mix of real grievances shared by many
Cameroonians, including:

- Economic Problems: The fuel price rise, while small, came
on the back of a series of price increases. Prices of basic
foodstuffs and other items also increased, and there is
widespread discontent about the high cost of living. Overall
economic growth is tepid, with significant unemployment and
the perception of growing poverty. We examine the economic
underpinnings of the violence in more detail septel.

- Perceived Government Insensitivity: There is a great
disconnect between the government and society in Cameroon and
many average Cameroonians are tired of Biya's 25 year reign.
Symptomatic was the fact that the GRC made no public attempt
to explain fuel price increases. The Minister of
Communication blamed the SDF for the violence. Rene Sadi,
Secretary General of the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic

SIPDIS
Movement (CPDM),blamed political and social actors for the
violence. No politicians, with the exception of the Minister
of Transport, reached out to the general public during this
period. The February 27 speech by President Biya, in which
he blamed opposition politicians for manipulating the
country's youth, further fanned the flames of popular
discontent. Many saw in Biya's address the echoes of former
President Amadou Ahidjho's statement during the 1981
university riots, in which he addressed the nation with one
statement: "the forces of order will use all necessary means
to restore order."

- Constitutional Change: Another, particularly important
example of this disconnect was President Biya's New Year's
announcement that he would "reconsider" provisions of the
constitution, including eliminate term limits, thereby
allowing the possibility he will stay in power beyond 2011.
Despite civil society and opposition party calls for
dialogue, the GRC has not been responsive. The SDF and some
of the protesters were motivated by opposition to
constitutional change. Some contacts also point to this as a
significant source of anger for the youth, who reportedly had
been resigned to weathering Biya's last years until his New
Year's speech.

- Limits on Freedom of Expression: There is growing
frustration with a climate of reduced freedom of expression.
Examples include:

-- On January 10, the government interrogated human rights
activist Hilaire Kamga for speaking out against
constitutional change.

-- On January 17, the Governor of the Littoral Province
(which includes Douala) banned public demonstrations.

-- On February 21 and 22 the GRC shut down Equinoxe TV and
Radio Station for covering the rallies in Douala opposing the
constitutional amendment on term limits. According to the
GRC, Equinoxe TV/Radio had not paid their licensing fee.
(Note: 95% of radio and television stations have not paid
their license fees.) On February 27, Equinoxe Radio paid the
licensing fee and placed a down payment for the TV licensing
fee but was not allowed to reopen.


The Crack Down
--------------


7. (SBU) Biya's speech, backed by a very heavy military
deployment, chilled the protesters and opposition, bringing
an end to the violence, at least for the moment. There is a
tense calm and great uncertainty in the air. The GRC has
tightened its grip on opposition voices. On February 28, the
GRC seized the radio equipment of privately owned Magic FM
because it claimed their call-in program was "irresponsible
in allowing the public to voice their reactions to President
Biya's speech." The GRC also threatened the editor of the
station, as well as other journalists.


8. (C) The GRC reportedly blocked the road of SDF leader John
Fru Ndi and took the cell phone SIM cards of many in the
Bamenda area. There are reports of roundups of opposition
elements and arbitrary arrests. Vice Prime Minister and
Minister of Justice Amadou Ali told Pol/Econ Chief that in
response to last week's violence there have been 250 arrests
in Yaounde, 600 in Douala and 180 in the Northwest, for a
total of 1,030, all of whom he claimed were accused of crimes
or misdemeanors. On March 1, gendarmes beat and dragged away
two peaceful protesters in front of our Embassy (which we are
formally protesting).


Questions for the Future
--------------


9. (C) How long will the "enforced calm" last? Government
sources believe there is a low risk of the situation flaring
up again at the moment, given the strong security presence
and the GRC's desire to address some of the commodity price
issues. Some contacts, including in the military, believe
there is a very real potential for another flare-up,
especially when the security presence is lowered. All our
European diplomatic colleagues, except the French, believe
the potential for renewed unrest in the short term remains.
None of the grievances of the public have been addressed,
whether in the President's speech or the government's
actions. The power struggle at the top helping to drive the
violence is not over. Douala remains a hotbed of political
opposition and all eyes will be on that city for clues about
what will occur in other parts of the country. Some sources
believe the President will take advantage of the current
military posture on the streets to submit the controversial
constitutional amendment to parliament, perhaps as early as
next week, posing new risks for unrest. Any spark --
including manipulative politicians, a catastrophic event,
deeper economic problems, or a triggering event external to
Cameroon -- could suffice to set off another spasm of
violence.


10. (C) What will the military do? The army, Presidential
Guard, and elite Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) are very
heavily deployed on the streets, including about 500 regular
military and 400 BIR forces in Yaounde and another 400 BIR in
Douala. They are unlikely to be capable of maintaining this
kind of posture indefinitely. However, they appear loyal to
the President, who has carefully nurtured and maintained the
ethnic balance of the armed forces. Elements of the military
are unhappy about the lack of upward mobility (with so many
elderly generals) and there is strong dislike for Minister of
Defense Ze Meka, who some see as helping support the current
unrest. However, while things may change, there is no sign
of an imminent coup.


11. (C) What will the opposition do? The country's four main
opposition parties are weak, lacking a strong leader. SDF
President John Fru Ndi disclaimed any involvement in the
riots and blamed elements within the CPDM, specifically
"white collar thugs, manipulating the state apparatus and its
information system, who helped Cameroon top the corruption
league." Opposition parties are unlikely to take on the
military but may support some future protest action.


12. (C) What are the Implications for the U.S.?

-- At the least, the image of Cameroon as a bastion of
stability in Central Africa needs to be examined more
carefully. Even if the current situation remains calm, last
week was a reminder that there are many unresolved issues,
both political and economic, that are likely to resurface at
some point down the road, possibly soon. The 75-year-old
Biya is increasingly isolated and unpopular and Cameroonians,
while generally peaceful, have shown themselves capable of
violently taking to the streets.

-- We should continue to work actively to encourage a
democratic transition. Biya's determination to end term
limits and stifle or intimidate opposition will make this
work more difficult and may require us to speak out more
forcefully, in private and in public. We issued a statement
published on March 3 expressing regret for the violence and
deaths and calling for greater political dialogue and a
peaceful resolution of problems. Top French and the European
Union (EU) officials have recently made similar statements.

-- Our economic engagement is all the more important to
stability, and the unrest is likely to make the GRC even more
eager for U.S. investment (in part to help legitimize the
government). Our robust mil-mil engagement should continue.
We have many shared interests in Cameroon's security and this
part of our relationship gives us more leverage than any
other, but we should be prepared to reassess it over time as
the situation evolves.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) The worst violence here in over 15 years has left
many Cameroonians feeling angry and more anxious about the
future. Even if calm returns over the short term, Cameroon
has the ingredients of serious instability: a long-serving
president out of touch with his people and in the last period
of his life/tenure; no viable constitutional succession
mechanism; slow economic growth amid rising expectations;
ethnic divisions below the surface (reflecting the country's
280 ethnic groups); increasing crime; and a troubled
neighborhood. Average Cameroonians would say they were
economically better off in the 1990s than today. To date the
GRC has moved slowly on economic and political reform, often
citing the need for stability as a justification.
Ironically, the go-slow approach could very well undermine
stability, if not soon then over the longer term.
GARVEY