Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08WINDHOEK265
2008-08-28 16:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Windhoek
Cable title:
RUSSIAN RECOGNITION OF S. OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA:
VZCZCXRO0921 PP RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN DE RUEHWD #0265 2411637 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 281637Z AUG 08 FM AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0043 INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L WINDHOEK 000265
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2018
TAGS: PREL GG RU WA
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RECOGNITION OF S. OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA:
NAMIBIA NON-COMMITTAL
REF: STATE 91894
Classified By: Ambassador Dennise Mathieu for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L WINDHOEK 000265
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2018
TAGS: PREL GG RU WA
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RECOGNITION OF S. OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA:
NAMIBIA NON-COMMITTAL
REF: STATE 91894
Classified By: Ambassador Dennise Mathieu for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) DCM delivered reftel talking points on August 27 to
MFA Director for Bilateral Affairs Wilbard Hellao. He
underscored our strong concern over Russia's recognition of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, noting the move was inconsistent
with previous UNSC resolutions (which Russia had voted in
favor of) and the six-point ceasefire agreement brokered by
President Sarkozy. The DCM added that Russia's actions were
likely to exacerbate tensions in the region and complicate
diplomatic efforts. He encouraged the Government of Namibia
(GRN) to issue a public statement critical of Moscow's
recognition of the two Georgian territories.
2. (C) Hellao made no commitments regarding a public
statement, saying only that the GRN was engaged in "internal
consultations" on the matter, and that he would get back to
us once those were completed. He added that, by his count,
there were currently some 200 "global hotspots" involving
secessionist movements, and the GRN was concerned about any
developments that established a precedent. The recognition
of Kosovo, he commented, had done exactly that. The DCM
pushed back firmly, explaining why we believed the Kosovo
situation was unique (genocide, followed by a long period of
UN administration and UN-brokered final status negotiations.)
3. (C) Comment: We think it unlikely the GRN will issue a
public statement in support of Georgia because of historical
ties and solidarity with Russia. At the same time, the GRN
is unlikely to follow Russia's lead in recognizing South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, given Namibia's recent experience with
a secessionist uprising in the Caprivi Strip and a desire to
avoid establishment of precedents viewed as unhelpful in
Namibia's domestic context. That is why the government has
not recognized Kosovo's independence.
MATHIEU
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2018
TAGS: PREL GG RU WA
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RECOGNITION OF S. OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA:
NAMIBIA NON-COMMITTAL
REF: STATE 91894
Classified By: Ambassador Dennise Mathieu for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) DCM delivered reftel talking points on August 27 to
MFA Director for Bilateral Affairs Wilbard Hellao. He
underscored our strong concern over Russia's recognition of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, noting the move was inconsistent
with previous UNSC resolutions (which Russia had voted in
favor of) and the six-point ceasefire agreement brokered by
President Sarkozy. The DCM added that Russia's actions were
likely to exacerbate tensions in the region and complicate
diplomatic efforts. He encouraged the Government of Namibia
(GRN) to issue a public statement critical of Moscow's
recognition of the two Georgian territories.
2. (C) Hellao made no commitments regarding a public
statement, saying only that the GRN was engaged in "internal
consultations" on the matter, and that he would get back to
us once those were completed. He added that, by his count,
there were currently some 200 "global hotspots" involving
secessionist movements, and the GRN was concerned about any
developments that established a precedent. The recognition
of Kosovo, he commented, had done exactly that. The DCM
pushed back firmly, explaining why we believed the Kosovo
situation was unique (genocide, followed by a long period of
UN administration and UN-brokered final status negotiations.)
3. (C) Comment: We think it unlikely the GRN will issue a
public statement in support of Georgia because of historical
ties and solidarity with Russia. At the same time, the GRN
is unlikely to follow Russia's lead in recognizing South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, given Namibia's recent experience with
a secessionist uprising in the Caprivi Strip and a desire to
avoid establishment of precedents viewed as unhelpful in
Namibia's domestic context. That is why the government has
not recognized Kosovo's independence.
MATHIEU