NEW FRIENDS OF GEORGIA CALL FOR MAP, LESS RUSSIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000812

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2018
TAGS: PREL GA PL
SUBJECT: NEW FRIENDS OF GEORGIA CALL FOR MAP, LESS RUSSIA,
MORE EU

Classified By: Polcouns F. Daniel Sainz for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On June 25, DAS Bryza participated in the
"New Friends of Georgia" (NFG) conference along with Foreign
Ministers, State Secretaries or Special Representatives from
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia,
Lithuania, NATO, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and the EU
Council. The NFG discussed possible strategies for reducing
tensions in Abkhazia while reaffirming Georgian sovereignty.
Participating NATO members all expressed strong support for
offering a membership action plan (MAP) to Georgia this
December at NATO's foreign ministerial. However, given
opposition from other NATO states they tabled alternatives
including: greater EU involvement, deferring action until
NATO's 60th anniversary events, or authoring a joint
NATO-Georgia statement. Others suggested that the UNGA might
serve as a platform to express support for Georgia. Georgia
itself preferred MAP over the alternatives, but given EU
engagement, there was a willingness to employ multinational
police in Abkhazia and be flexible on a conflict resolution
process. However, Georgia drew a hard line against
then-President Putin's April 16 decree authorizing direct
official relations with secessionist entities in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. END SUMMARY

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NATO's Role: NFG Agree MAP Desirable But Unlikely
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2. (C) Deliberations began with a strong push for offering
MAP to Georgia. FM Sikorski noted that the current "promise
of eventual membership with no institutional structure"
invited Russian mischief. Georgian FM Ekaterine
Tkeshelashvili acknowledged "shortcomings" in recent
elections but noted "the test has been passed." She
expressed "high hopes" for September's North Atlantic Council
(NAC) visit to Georgia where she expected the alliance to
reaffirm the results of the Bucharest NATO summit in
preparation for December's ministerial. FM Schwarzenberg of
the Czech Republic asked the NFG to make a firm statement in
support of MAP for Georgia anyway. Bulgaria's Maya Dobreva,
Director for Europe at MFA, backed the Czech call while
Romania's Raduta Matache, State Secretary at MFA, went so far
as to call on Georgia to prepare by crafting a mock MAP of
its own. FM Sikorski, as moderator of the discussion,
reminded participants that those opposed to MAP were not
likely to change by December and asked what else the NFG
might do. This led to a discussion of other-than-MAP options
for December: pushing for greater EU involvement, waiting
until NATO's 60th anniversary to offer MAP, producing a joint
NATO-Georgia statement reaffirming Georgia's sovereignty, or
pursuing something similar at the UNGA.


3. (C) While acknowledging the value of these alternatives,
DAS Bryza offered strong U.S. support for MAP itself. He
underscored that within the context of MAP deliberations, we
could moderate destabilizing behavior in the Caucasus by
asking MAP skeptics to declare that continued friction could
lead them to change their vote and actually support MAP for
Georgia. He noted that in any case the way forward had to
include: a clear political cost to Russia for violations,
direct Abkhaz-Georgian dialogue, and readiness of the
international community to offer diplomatic and financial
support for Georgia,s peace plan, as well as a forum for
direct Georgian-Abhkaz talks. Bryza also pressed for EU
member states to consider offering personnel/trainers/mentors
to a possible international police force for Abkhazia, as
well as potential sanctions against Russian persons/entities
that conduct business illegally in Abkhazia. Most
delegations responded positively; Polish FM Sikorski said
Poland might be able to contribute police.

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The EU's Role
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4. (C) The EU's Special Representative for the South
Caucasus, Peter Semneby, offered perspective from
Brussels. Georgia is an increasingly divisive issue in the
EU. But there seemed to be a place for "sensible" Russian
involvement. Indeed, the Abkhaz have claimed a need for
Russian security while also welcoming greater EU involvement.
There is an "opening" to the EU for Abkhazia "if they follow
the rules." The EU should consider bringing something of
direct interest at the "grass roots," perhaps police. The EU
could also rehabilitate Abkhaz railways.


5. (C) The subject of passports and visas also surfaced. FM
Tkeshelashvili described how Georgia had completed an audit

WARSAW 00000812 002 OF 002


of its civil registry to strengthen passport controls. Czech
FM Schwarzenberg stated that Russian passports for Abkhaz
should not be the norm.

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Georgia's Concerns
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6. (C) With some friendly sarcasm, Georgian FM Tkeshelashvili
asked that the NFG "temper" their realism with some optimism
-- "The fight is not yet over." According to her, the
Bucharest Summit offered a dangerous mix of commitment and
hesitation that tempted the Russians to interfere, with
possibilities for escalation. She cautioned that the window
of opportunity was closing. "The Germans have told us that
their position (on MAP) might be changeable if Russia
continues its current course. We should convince the
Russians that their actions will expedite, not deter, MAP for
Georgia." She called for a
clear cost to Russia for impeding the peace process,
expressing concern that Gazprom is about to
negotiate with the Republic of Abkhazia." She called for
"positive actions that can change the context of the
situation. We have good ideas but Russia does what it wants
regardless." Tkeshelashvili led the call for EU actions,
including economic involvement and "civil actions," to
discourage Russia's annexation policy. She suggested
rehabilitation of hospitals or schools in a joint
Georgian-Abkhaz project.

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Georgia's Bottom Line
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7. (C) FM Tkeshelashvili closed by underscoring that Putin's
dangerous decree of April 16 established a quasi-legal
infrastructure for further Russian annexation and therefore
had to be rolled back. With EU involvement, Georgia would be
more flexible on the timing and format of a conflict
resolution process, including accepting the presence of
multi-national police. The EU must engage Abkhazia to
provide an alternative to the Russian Federation and
demonstrate that this is a European issue. Georgia and the EU
should work together to provide the Abkhaz some breathing
space, and thereby entice them into substantive settlement
talks.


8. (C) COMMENT: FM Tkeshelashvili seemed to signal an urgent
need for "European" help sooner rather than later in order to
avoid a dangerous escalation of the situation in the South
Caucasus. Thankfully, she was forward-leaning in agreeing to
an international police force and flexibility in the peace
process. However, she clearly cautioned that "restraint is
no longer an option." END COMMENT.


9. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable.
ASHE