Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08WARSAW1173
2008-10-07 06:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Warsaw
Cable title:  

POLES DEEPEN AFGHANISTAN ENGAGEMENT DESPITE PUBLIC

Tags:  PREL AF PL MAPP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWR #1173/01 2810602
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 070602Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7126
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0092
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECU WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 001173 

SIPDIS

EUR FOR GARBER, EUR/CE FOR PIERANGELO, MORRIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018
TAGS: PREL AF PL MAPP
SUBJECT: POLES DEEPEN AFGHANISTAN ENGAGEMENT DESPITE PUBLIC
OPPOSITION

REF: A. IIR 6 878 0037 08

B. IIR 6 878 0015 08

C. IIR 6 878 0216 08

D. WARSAW 1093

E. WARSAW 1140

F. WARSAW 1010

Classified By: DCM Quanrud for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 001173

SIPDIS

EUR FOR GARBER, EUR/CE FOR PIERANGELO, MORRIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018
TAGS: PREL AF PL MAPP
SUBJECT: POLES DEEPEN AFGHANISTAN ENGAGEMENT DESPITE PUBLIC
OPPOSITION

REF: A. IIR 6 878 0037 08

B. IIR 6 878 0015 08

C. IIR 6 878 0216 08

D. WARSAW 1093

E. WARSAW 1140

F. WARSAW 1010

Classified By: DCM Quanrud for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. On November 1, Poland will increase its
military presence and take on new responsibilities in
Afghanistan. Polish forces will consolidate control over
military operations in Ghazni province, and a Polish civilian
contingent will replace its U.S. PRT counterpart over the
course of the coming year. There will likely be immediate
military challenges as Taliban fighters look to "knock out" a
coalition partner who faces a wary public at home. The Poles
are also on a steep learning curve - trying hard to meld
civilian participation into their counterinsurgency
strategies - and they have not yet identified funding for
reconstruction and humanitarian aid. The growing Polish
footprint in Afghanistan reflects a determination to bolster
NATO and Polish military credibility, backed by FM Radoslaw
Sikorski's deep personal convictions. It is also by far the
riskiest action to date of the cautious Tusk government. We
should be prepared to offer the Poles our insights, aid and
encouragement if this activist GoP consensus is to hold. END
SUMMARY


2. (C) Always ambitious participants in the ISAF mission,
the Poles are preparing to take their engagement to new
levels. Throughout their deployment, Polish forces have
served without caveats in the areas of South and East
Afghanistan where the fighting has been heaviest. They are
also lobbying other ISAF partners hard to remove their
caveats as an indispensable prerequisite for victory. As FM
Sikorski once joked to the Secretary, the Poles are in the
awkward position of encouraging the German military to be
more aggressive . . . in Afghanistan. Polish troop levels
are set to rise 1,200 to 1,600 by November 1; Polish forces
will be consolidated in Ghazni, where they will assume
responsibility for military operations. In addition, Poland
intends to gradually take over the Ghazni PRT from the U.S.


3. (C) Poland's political and military leadership views
Afghanistan first and foremost as a test of NATO and - as was
the case in Iraq - Poland's reliability as an Ally (reftels

A, D). Since NATO (and U.S.) military credibility
underwrites the Article V guarantee that is so critical to
Poland's homeland defense strategy, alliance failure in
Afghanistan is unthinkable. The Poles also see the
Afghanistan mission as an opportunity to bolster their
defense capabilities. FM Sikorski has told A/S Fried that
experience in Afghanistan will help Poland enhance its
homeland defense, reflecting the Poles' perennial
preoccupation with Russia.


4. (C) The GoP is increasing its contributions in
Afghanistan in the face of daunting organizational and
political challenges. To date, Polish military commanders
have sought to remain closely tied to U.S. forces. They are
worried that tying themselves regionally and to a Polish
civilian PRT could sever operational connections with U.S.
forces, despite U.S. assurances of support (Reftel C). The
Poles are also still wrestling with how to mobilize civilians
in sufficient numbers and with the financial resources to
make a PRT effective (reftel E).


5. (C) Perhaps of greatest concern, outside the actual
requirements of the deployment, is pervasive negative
domestic public opinion: recent polls show that 74 percent
"dissatisfaction" with Polish participation in the mission, a
number comparable to Iraq levels. The GoP may calculate that
opposition to the war is wide but not deep - but public
opposition will likely intensify if (or more likely, when)
things get ugly. Hence the GoP sensitivity to casualties,
and Prime Minister Tusk's August visit to Afghanistan after
the deaths of three Polish soldiers by IED attack.


6. (C) FM Sikorski's personal engagement spearheads the GoP
commitment. Sikorski first traveled to Afghanistan as a
journalist in 1987, and witnessed Soviet atrocities
first-hand while embedded with the mujahedin. There are
unconfirmed stories, widely believed in Poland, that on at
least one occasion Sikorski carried a gun and killed Soviet
soldiers. An impassioned and authoritative speaker on


Afghanistan, Sikorski is not shy about offering policy
prescriptions or even alternatives to President Karzai's
leadership. If Polish casualties mount in Afghanistan,
Sikorski's ability to maintain GoP support for a high-profile
military role will be tested.


7. (C) Polish defense ministry officials tell us the U.S.
can help the Polish war effort - and bolster Polish public
opinion - through intelligence, logistical and material
support. All eight military deaths in Afghanistan were the
result of IED's, so the GoP greatly appreciates the U.S.
decision to lend Mine-Resistant Ambush Protectant (MRAP)
vehicles. In addition, the Poles have asked for Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAV's) like the Predator. They also argue
that their increasingly prominent leadership position within
ISAF has earned them a seat on the ISAF Joint Coordination
Management Board. As of now, Polish troop levels narrowly
miss the numerical criteria for Board membership, although
qualitative contributions such as serving without caveats may
merit renewed consideration.


8. (C) The growing Polish engagement in Afghanistan is the
riskiest move yet by a cautious Tusk government bent on
preserving political capital for the 2010 presidential
elections here. The U.S. should do everything we can to
mitigate that risk -- with support and encouragement, Poland
can be one of our most energetic and dependable partners
against the Taliban. Despite the domestic opposition to the
conflict, Poland's political leadership is determined to
succeed. In the government's view, the war effort has the
strongest strategic rationale: increasing Poland's and
NATO's war-fighting capabilities will help manage Poland's
greatest threat, an increasingly assertive Russia.
ASHE