Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08WARSAW1140
2008-09-29 14:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Warsaw
Cable title:  

POLAND WRESTLING WITH CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTIONS FOR

Tags:  PREL MAPP AF PL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWR #1140/01 2731406
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291406Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7080
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0090
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 001140 

SIPDIS

EUR/CE FOR MORRIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2018
TAGS: PREL MAPP AF PL
SUBJECT: POLAND WRESTLING WITH CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTIONS FOR
NOVEMBER GHAZNI DEPLOYMENT

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Pam Quanrud for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 001140

SIPDIS

EUR/CE FOR MORRIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2018
TAGS: PREL MAPP AF PL
SUBJECT: POLAND WRESTLING WITH CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTIONS FOR
NOVEMBER GHAZNI DEPLOYMENT

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Pam Quanrud for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Poland begins its fourth Afghanistan
rotation November 1 with the consolidation of 1,450 soldiers
in Ghazni province. The GoP agreed to take sole
responsibility for operations in Ghazni in March 2008, and
began detailed military planning at that time -- particularly
to secure the Kabul-Kandahar road. By their own admittance,
however, the Poles have not made as much progress planning
the civilian component of their counterinsurgency campaign as
they prepare to take on the Ghazni PRT. Personnel and
financial resources have not yet been secured; legal and
other institutional impediments remain; high-level
interagency meetings have not produced policy consensus.
Accordingly, the Poles expect their takeover of the U.S. PRT
in Ghazni to be halting and slow, and are looking for U.S.
support and insight in the coming year. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) DAO and Poloff met September 24 with Ambassador
Tadeusz Chomicki, Director of the MFA Asia and Pacific
Department, to discuss details of civilian deployment to
Afghanistan. Chomicki said the GOP was three weeks into a
high level inter-ministerial "Strategy Review" with regard to
the military contingent and its civilian component, chaired
by MFA Under Secretary Przemyslaw Grudzinski. Other
participants in the Strategy Review include MOD, the
intelligence services, and the Ministry of Finance. The most
recent meeting, attended by FM Radislaw Sikorski, Defense
Minister Bogdan Klc, and Finance Minister Jacek Rostowski
focused on clarifying policy and on enhancing the
"instruments," particularly financial and legal, that will be
needed after the Ghazni take-over.


3. (C) Chomicki said Poland had engaged in peacekeeping
operations of some kind since 1953, but civilian engagement
was foreign to its experience. Accordingly, although Poland
wanted to take more responsibility for the PRT in Ghazni, it
lacked appropriate instruments. Specifically, Poland needs
new regulations to allow civilian recruitment, and greater
understanding and flexibility from the Finance Ministry.
Chomicki said that the MFA will sponsor eight civilian
activities in Ghazni, but would be hampered by its own lack

of expertise, one-year budgets, and a restrictive law on
tenders. Just recruiting would be a major challenge,
Chomicki said, since the few capable people with experience
and language skills were working for multi-national
corporations. As a result, under the Strategic Review, the
GOP had decided to recruit from government agencies beyond
the MFA and MOD.


4. (C) Creating the right instruments to support civilian
activities would be as important, and as difficult, as
securing sufficient outlays, according to Chomicki. He noted
that two years ago, MFA had to return funds to Finance when
it was unable to spend money budgeted for civilian
activities. Chomicki was unconvinced that development
spending would effectively counter insurgency, and
pessimistic about military leaders' use of reconstruction and
development funding on anything other than immediate
problems. He predicted that as quickly as the GOP civilian
bureaucracy removed commanders' regulatory obstacles to
spending money quickly, the military chain of command would
impose controls to insulate themselves from future
accusations of fraud. Chomicki asked for U.S. examples of how
to structure spending authorities to avoid over-regulation.


5. (C) Chomicki said that some ISAF partners had solicited
EU Commission money to fund member state PRTs. But he said
procuring Commission money had been described to him as "the
most painful process possible," and that his Italian
colleagues said that if they could do it over again they
would use their own national funds. Chomicki said that there
was no concrete idea of how to implement FM Sikorski's idea
of forming EU PRTs: it was MFA's view that it would be
impossible to get the necessary formal agreement between the
Commission, ISAF, and U.S. forces. Instead, the Asia and
Pacific Department had briefed Sikorski that if things go
well with the Polish PRT, then EU-member civilians could be
invited to join it.


6. (C) FM Sikorski had considered a plan to augment the
Polish effort with civilian police, Chomicki said. But after
internal negotiations, Sikorski passed this idea to MOD as a
request for military police. At numerous points in the
conversation, Chomicki hinted that the military would be
asked to overcome civilian shortfalls. In all, Chomicki said


the GOP would come to its internal conclusions on the
Strategy Review in about a month.


7. (C) COMMENT. Poland has all along been expected to take
small steps when first assuming responsibility for the PRT in
Ghazni. As the MFA clearly understands, the lack of a
convincing strategy for mobilizing civilian assets is a
persistent problem for the Poles, as for other ISAF partners.
The Polish military has a sufficient challenge in the form
of its patrolling mission, without being forced to take on
PRT activities best managed by civilians. END COMMENT.
ASHE